SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-045.





2. (U) Meeting Date: February 13, 2010

Time: 10:00 A.M. - 11:00 A.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva





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SUMMARY



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3. (S) At a small group meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working
Group (IPWG) chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin on February 13,
the sides discussed their respective views on the use of hard,
soft, and "hybrid" covers that include a combination of hard and
soft components during the warhead inspection portion of a Type-1
inspection. The Russian side stated its intent to develop
conforming soft covers for all reentry vehicles, and assured the
U.S. side that it considered the unitary Trident D-5 reentry
vehicle cover with individual towers to cover the RVs/warheads to
be a device that has "individual" covers for the RVs/warheads
carried by the D-5 missiles. This assurance prompted both sides to
agree to the removal of the bracketed word "individual" in
paragraph 15 of Section VI to Part Five of the Protocol. End
Summary.







4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Soft Covers, Hard Covers, and Hybrid
Covers.





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SOFT COVERS, HARD COVERS, AND HYBRID COVERS



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5. (S) Warner explained the U.S. view on what constituted soft
covers, hard covers, and hybrid covers, the latter of which
included a combination of hard and soft components, using examples
drawn from U.S. and Russian practices under START. The front
section cover used on U.S. Trident missiles (stiff composite
material with no flexibility), he said, was a hard cover. The
Minuteman front section "witch's hat" covers for the individual RVs
carried by the MMIII were soft covers. The SS-25 cover(canvas with
hard components and metal stays) was a hybrid cover. He sought
Russian agreement on these concepts as a departure point for
discussion. With assurance from Col Petrov, Ilin said these
descriptions were valid.





6. (S) Warner asked if the Russian side planned to employ hybrid
covers containing both hard and soft elements during warhead
inspections under START Follow-on (SFO). Petrov explained that the
foremost Russian principle was that a cover should never interfere
with an inspector's ability to confirm the number of warheads. As
such, Russia was looking at developing new types of covers which
were more conformal than those they had employed under START.
Since there were no fixed dimensions for a reentry vehicle, Petrov


did not see any point in measuring covers. Although he indicated
that the Russian side did not want to use the type of barrel-shaped
hybrid cover which was used on the SS-25 during START, he later
asked if the United States would agree with the continued use of
such a hybrid cover. (Begin comment: This appeared to imply that
the Russian side may continue to use the same JCIC-approved SS-25
hybrid cover until development of a more conforming cover is
complete. End comment.) Warner indicated that the SS-25 hybrid
cover was still acceptable.





7. (S) Warner concurred with the Russian proposal that RV covers
would not be measured if they were soft. If a hybrid cover were
developed, he argued, the United States believed that such hybrid
covers should be demonstrated and measured in their full-up
configuration and that the hard elements within these covers would
remain subject to measurement during each warhead inspection. He
noted that the United States had conducted a demonstration of the
Trident II D-5 hard cover under START and anticipated that the
Russian inspectors would continue to measure the Trident II hard
cover during SFO Type-1 warhead inspections.





8. (S) Petrov added that the Russian side still intended to show
the inspecting Party any soft covers before they were placed over
the warheads during an inspection. However, no measuring of these
soft covers would be permitted. He claimed the viewing of the
cover prior to the warhead inspection should help to erase any
doubt an inspector might have about the ability of the cover to
conceal more than the stated number of RVs on a front section.





9. (S) Warner restated the U.S. position that soft covers should
not be measured, but that hybrid and hard covers should be
measured. This procedure, he stated, should be included in the
Annex on Inspection Activities. Ilin asked what components of the
hybrid covers would be measured, fully admitting that he was not an
expert in this area. Warner explained that only the hard
components of the hybrid cover would be measured.





10. (S) Warner asked if the Russians could agree that the Trident
D-5 unitary hard cover included a series of individual towers that
are "individual" covers under the description and context of
paragraph 15 of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. Petrov
said that he did not think there was any problem with the United
States employing the same cover used in START and considering it to
contain a number of "individual" covers. Col Zaitsev added that
the Russian Federation would appreciate the U.S. demonstration of
the D-5 hard cover to be used in SFO, which Warner had offered
earlier. Warner suggested that with this agreement on the
character of the U.S. hard covers used with the Trident D-5, the
bracket could be removed on the word "individual" in paragraph 15
of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol. He also noted that
brackets would remain around the language on taking measurements on
covers in that section until both sides had consulted with their
capitals on dropping the requirement for measuring soft covers.





11. (S) Ilin asked what would be discussed at the next IPWG
meeting. Warner said the United States had not yet received
additional guidance from Washington on the conduct of Type-2
elimination inspections, so he suggested the Working Group begin
work on the Annex to the Protocol on Inspection Activities. Ilin
said he was willing to do so, but only in the event that the sides
had not received guidance from capitals on issues related to CorE
inspections. Warner agreed with this approach and underscored that
there were still several serious issues to be addressed, to include
Type-2 inspections at CorE facilities and the conversion of
individual launchers for SLBMs. Ilin agreed that these were some


of the issues, but said that both sides should move to discussion
of the Annex if no guidance was received on the unresolved issues.






12. (U) Documents provided: None





13. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Dr. Warner

Mr. Buttrick

LTC Litterini

Mr. Rust

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

LTC Lyasovskiy

Col Petrov

Ms. Vodopolova

Col Zaitsev

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)





14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING