Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10GENEVA141
2010-02-26 13:04:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 17, 2010

Tags:  PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US 
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TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0187
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000141 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 17, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 139 (SFO-GVA-VIII-049)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T GENEVA 000141 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 17, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 139 (SFO-GVA-VIII-049) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-058. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 17, 2010 Time: 11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin co-chaired a meeting to discuss proposed agreed statements on February 17. The agreed statements on converted B-1B bombers, SSGNs, joint basing and rapid reload were discussed. The Russian side questioned the need to reorder the agreed statement on converted B-1B bombers and again questioned the need for the agreed statement on rapid reload. End summary. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Vandenberg; Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs; Joint Basing; Rapid Reload; and Status of Other Agreed Statements. -------------- Vandenberg -------------- ¶5. (S) Ilin asked whether the U.S. side would like to respond to the Russian delegation's proposed agreed statement on Vandenberg Air Force Base. Elliott responded that an official translation had been completed and a draft response had been drafted and sent to Washington for approval. He said he hoped to be able to discuss the matter further later in the week. -------------- Converted B-1B heavy bomberS -------------- ¶6. (S) Ilin recalled that during the last meeting agreement had been reached on paragraphs 1 and 2 of the agreed statement on B-1B heavy bombers. He noted the new U.S. draft did not reflect this. Elliott reminded the Russian side of the need to reorder the text of the agreed statement due to a chronological inconsistency which had been discussed at the last meeting (Reftel) and said it was the intention of the U.S. side to fully capture all the agreements mad
e during the previous meeting. Elliott requested the Russian side bracket the new draft as it saw fit. In a paragraph-by-paragraph review, Elliott pointed out where all of the agreed portions from the previous version were in the new document, identified which paragraphs had been eliminated, and pointed out where Russian bracketed text remained. Ilin said he would review the new proposal and provide comments. ¶7. (S) Elliott reminded the Russian side that the United States had continued conversions of B-1B bombers following the expiration of START and noted that all conversions might be completed prior to START Follow-on ratification, depending on how long that process took. Elliott said there might be a need to provisionally apply this agreed statement in order to conduct the exhibition offered if the last B-1B were scheduled for conversion prior to treaty ratification. Ilin questioned the legality of this idea. Elliott and Mr. Koshelev both said this was legal. -------------- U.S. SSGNS -------------- ¶8. (S) Ilin inquired whether the United States had a response to the questions the Russian side had posed on individual SLBM launcher conversion. Elliott responded the answers were still being prepared. Ilin noted the United States had slightly modified the language of the agreed statement on SSGNs to which Elliott replied that some of the language in the chapeau and paragraph 1 was redundant so the two paragraphs were combined. Ilin said the new paragraph implied that both sides already agreed that the SSGN was incapable of launching an SLBM. He noted this agreement had yet to be reached, which was why exhibitions were needed. Elliott agreed to review the language. ¶9. (S) Ilin agreed to the U.S.-proposed changes in paragraph 1(b) regarding the annotation of SSGN locations on the coastlines and waters diagram. Ilin recommended the deletion of paragraph 1(c)(iii) because it was redundant and Elliott concurred. -------------- Joint basing -------------- ¶10. (S) Elliott explained that paragraph 2 of the agreed statement on joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments was not needed because, unlike paragraph 2 in the agreed statement on SSGNs, no additional inspection rights would need to be developed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). He continued that Article XII of the Russian treaty text (Article XIV of the U.S. treaty text) provided both Parties the right to raise any questions in the BCC. Ilin requested paragraph 2 be written in a more consistent manner and Adm (ret) Kuznetsov requested it capture the applicability to B-1B bombers and B-52H bombers. Elliott stated that the agreed statement on joint basing was not specific to B-1Bs or B-52Hs as Kuznetsov had implied but was applicable anytime either side jointly based heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. That being said, Elliott agreed to review the revised paragraph and determine whether the United States could accept it. -------------- rapid reload -------------- ¶11. (S) Ilin inquired whether the U.S. side was ready to remove the brackets on the last sentence of the agreed statement on rapid reload related to maintaining ICBMs and SLBMs with warheads on them. Elliott responded that this was a political issue and the inclusion of the last sentence would impact routine operations; therefore, the United States could not accept the sentence. Elliott proposed referring this agreed statement to the Heads of Delegation. Kuznetsov questioned the need for the agreed statement and asked what it implied about the relationship between the United States and Russia. He claimed the issue was "a complete throwback that resurrected the Cold War." Mr. Zaitsev commented that rapid reload was not a problem under START, so, he inquired, why was it necessary to broach the topic under this treaty. Zaitsev questioned whether the facilities the United States utilized for SSGNs in Diego Garcia might be developed as infrastructure for rapid reload of U.S. Ohio Class SSBNs. Elliott explained that a failure to address the matter of rapid reload in Start Follow-on might be considered a step back from the prohibition in START. He mentioned that it might be necessary for the United States to make this a unilateral statement, potentially raising the question among observers as to why Russia had not agreed to the same statement. Koshelev explained that rapid reload had been an important political question between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States and that it appeared the United States was attempting to extend this matter into the current relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States. He continued that any attempt to make this an agreed statement could be misconstrued as a disagreement between the sides. He added that the purpose of the agreed statements for this treaty should be to solve current problems not the problems of the past. -------------- Status of other agreed statements -------------- ¶12. (S) Elliott stated both sides were waiting for the Notifications Working Group to resolve issues related to the Leninsk Test Range and the transfer of Trident II missiles to the United Kingdom. Ilin concurred, asking whether the U.S. side retained its brackets on the agreed statements on the use of telemetry. Elliott replied that discussions on that matter were being conducted at the Heads of Delegation level. Ilin recommended the U.S. side review the use of the word "retired" in the proposed unilateral statement on Trident I since there was no defined term "retired" in the proposed treaty. Elliott agreed to review the matter. Elliott and Ilin said the agreed statement on basing of deployed heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base was agreed. ¶13. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶14. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Elliott Mr. Albertson Mr. Ahlm (RO) Mr. Brown Mr. Evans Lt Col Goodman LTC Litterini Amb Ries Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gesse (Interpreter) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Trifonov Mr. Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Interpreter) ¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING

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