SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 15, 2010

S E C R E T GENEVA 000139 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 15, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-049. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 15, 2010 Time: 11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin co-chaired a meeting to discuss proposed agreed statements on February 15. The agreed statements on converted B-1B bombers, converted SSGNs, joint basing of heavy bombers and rapid reload were discussed in detail. The sides agreed to defer discussion on the agreed statements on Leninsk, transfer of Trident II to the United Kingdom, and the ban on the use of telemetry to enhance missile defenses until the Notifications and Telemetry Working Groups had an opportunity to work on these issues. Both sides agreed to resume discussion on the agreed statement on basing deployed heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination (CorE) facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB),Arizona, and to defer discussion on the missile defense agreed statement pending the outcome of the Heads of Delegation meeting on the matter. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs; Joint Basing; Converted Former Silos at Vandenberg AFB; Trident I SLBMs; Rapid Reload; Deferral of Discussion; and Davis-Monthan AFB and Missile Defense. -------------- Converted B-1B heavy bomberS -------------- ¶5. (S) With regard to the agreed statement on converted B-1B heavy bombers, Ilin stated the U.S. and Russian delegation lawyers had agreed on appropriate language for paragraph 1 and 1(A) and agreed not to cite individual treaty provisions within the agreed statement but rather use the phrase "the following provisions shall apply." Elliott added that the lawyers had also agreed to use the phrase "as applicable" in paragraph 1(A) and Ilin concurred. Elliott explained that the term "airbase" would not be applicable for either Dyess AFB, Texas, or Elssworth AFB, South Dakota, following the last B-1B conversion to which Ilin responded that the Russian side accepted the term "eliminated facilities" as a proposed change in nomenclature to be used throughout the remainder of the agreed statement. ¶6. (S) Elliott stated that the proposed Russian text in paragraph 1(d) was very complicated and recommended the lawyers attempt to develop a solution to this issue. He also explained that the U.S. side had found a chronological incongruity in the text of the agreed statement and recommended swapping paragraphs 1 and 1(A) with paragraph 2 which would place the paragraphs into logical order. Elliott offered to provide a new joint draft text and Ilin agreed to review the proposed changes. Ilin recommended eliminating paragraph 1(D(i)) since it was a repeat of text in Part Five of the protocol to the treaty. Elliott concurred and agreed to incorporate this change in the new proposed joint draft text, with the caveat that it must be incorporated in Part Five of the protocol. Ilin provided a copy of Russian-proposed changes. -------------- U.S. SSGNS -------------- ¶7. (S) Ilin declared that the brackets in the first paragraph and paragraph 1(A) of the agreed statement on SSGNs converted from SSBNs were resolved in the same manner as the converted B-1B agreed statement by incorporating the phrase "the following provisions shall apply." He provided a copy of the proposed changes. Ilin stated there remained a bracket in paragraph 1(B). Elliott recommended changing the bracketed text to read "on the submarine base during the period of inspection, as depicted on the coastlines and waters diagram. This diagram will depict the locations of all SSBNs and SSGNs currently located on the submarine base in accordance with subparagraph 2(b)I of Part Four of the annex on Inspection Activities of this Protocol." Ilin responded positively to the proposed change and agreed to review it. Elliott agreed to provide a new joint draft text with the discussed changes. -------------- Joint basing -------------- ¶8. (S) Elliott proposed inspection of two heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and two heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments during a Type-1 inspection at a joint base and inspection of two SSGN launchers when present at a submarine base during a Type-1 inspection. He expressed concern over the impact a greater number of bombers being inspected would have on the joint bases. Ilin rejected considering the quotas associated with the number of items to be inspected in two different agreed statements together. Elliott proposed allowing inspection of three heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, as already agreed in Part Five of the protocol and two heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments during a Type-1 inspection at a joint base, in addition to the United States accepting inspection of two SSGN launchers when present at a submarine base during a Type-1 inspection. Ilin questioned the difference in effort required to inspect two versus three heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Elliott replied there was additional effort required to inspect heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments (e.g., removal of external panels from the aircraft to allow visibility of the distinguishing features). Ilin reminded the U.S. side that under START, all the heavy bombers on the base were subject to inspection vice the proposed three under START Follow-on. He stated it was clear that only the U.S. side benefited from this reduction. Elliott firmly reminded the Russian delegation that it was still possible that Russia would not gain the right to re-inspect any heavy bombers that had been converted to employ non-nuclear armaments. Elliott pointed out that the very fact the U.S. side was discussing a potential right to the re-inspection of items removed from the treaty, including B-1Bs, SSGN launchers, and potentially converted ICBM launchers, was a significant step toward the Russian side. He reminded Ilin that the U.S. side had offered significant concessions in an attempt to demonstrate good faith and transparency, but that the Russian delegation had not been equally forthcoming. Ilin maintained the Russian position. ¶9. (S) Gen Orlov explained the Russian position that this treaty was not only about strategic nuclear systems but non-nuclear strategic systems as well and, since the United States was converting significantly more items to non-nuclear use, Russia needed to ensure these newly converted non-nuclear systems had not been reconverted to nuclear usable status. Elliott stated the United States had taken a significant step to allow for inspection of non-nuclear-capable systems to provide such transparency but inspecting three heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and three heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would have an unacceptable impact on U.S. operations. Elliott reminded the Russian side of the U.S. desire to have the opportunity to inspect 100 percent of all eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, which the Russian side had rejected. Elliott continued that the discussion was becoming very one-sided and not accommodating to U.S. concerns. ¶10. (S) Both sides agreed to review whether a reference to the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) was needed on every agreed statement or if treaty Article XIV was sufficient to cover resolving questions on agreed statements in the BCC. Ilin recommended creating a chapeau in Part IX of the Protocol for all agreed statements as an alternate method for referring questions on them to the BCC. Both sides agreed to review this option. -------------- CONVERTED FORMER ICBM SILOS AT Vandenberg AFB -------------- ¶11. (S) Ilin asked whether the U.S. side had prepared a response to the Russian-proposed agreed statement on the former ICBM launchers converted into ground based interceptor launchers at Vandenberg AFB. Elliott responded that the U.S. side had only received a rough draft of the Russian proposal through Amb Antonov and questioned whether a formal proposal would be provided. ¶12. (S) Ilin stated the Russian side understood that some ICBM launchers at Vandenberg AFB had been converted to launchers holding missile defense interceptors and, similar to the U.S. conversions of submarine launchers and heavy bombers, the Russian side felt an agreed statement was necessary. Ilin continued that the agreed statement must have two components; first, an initial exhibition to demonstrate distinguishing features of the converted launchers and to confirm that an ICBM cannot be launched from the converted launchers and, second, an opportunity to re-inspect the converted launchers to confirm that the launchers have not been reconverted. Ilin recognized that the number of verification events would be limited throughout the life of the treaty, similar to what was proposed in the SSGN agreed statement. Elliott agreed to consider the option but reminded the Russian side that the ground-based missile defense interceptor launchers at Vandenberg AFB were part of an operational system and cautioned that only a limited number of exhibitions or inspections commensurate with this operational status would be possible. -------------- Trident I -------------- ¶13. (S) Elliott asked whether the Russian side had comments on the U.S.-proposed unilateral statement on Trident I SLBMs. Ilin provided no comments. -------------- RAPID RELOAD -------------- ¶14. (S) Elliott declared that removal of the first sentence from the rapid reload agreed statement was acceptable to the United States and agreed to keep the second sentence. Elliott rejected the Russian proposal to prohibit storage of ICBMs or SLBMs with front ends attached in loading tubes since it would adversely impact operations at U.S. submarine bases. He clarified that loading tubes were designed to move slowly and were limited to operations within the confines of the submarine base and therefore were not suitable for use in a rapid reload capacity following a major nuclear exchange. Gen Poznikhir questioned whether the loading tubes could be used to reload a submarine that had just launched missiles from a position next to the pier. Elliott responded that U.S. submarines are not equipped to launch from pier-side as Russian submarines are. He added that the very low likelihood that a U.S. submarine base would exist following a major nuclear exchange would logically preclude SSBNs from rapidly reloading SLBMs stored in loading tubes at these submarine bases. ¶15. (S) Orlov questioned the need for the agreed statement. Elliott explained that the purpose was to make a positive statement that neither Party would develop the capability to rapidly reload. Orlov stated that he still could not understand the need for the statement and tried to relate the concept to the U.S. use of rotary launchers for air launched cruise missiles (ALCM). He compared the loading time for U.S. rotary launchers to that of Russian rotary launchers and specified that the time for reloading Russian bombers was far longer than that for U.S. bombers. Elliott assured Orlov that while the time to install a rotary launcher on a U.S. bomber might be less than that to install a rotary launcher on a Russian bomber, the transporter for the U.S. rotary launchers were limited to a few miles per hour and therefore provided no ability to quickly relocate warheads off the bomber base and no measure of survivability for use in a rapid reload capacity. Elliott reiterated that none of these systems could quickly draw assets from non-deployed status and move them to a position to be used for use during a nuclear exchange. Orlov questioned whether it was possible to relocate ALCM rotary launchers using transport aircraft. Elliott stated that it was probably possible, but due to the high center of gravity of the launchers they were only designed to be transported slowly on special fixtures over smooth surfaces. ¶16. (S) Dr. Warner explained the concept of rapid reload was directly related to concepts set forth in Soviet military writings in the 1960s and 1970s, which depicted extended nuclear war with multiple exchanges. He stated that while it was logical that rapid reload could be conducted at alternate, non-disclosed air bases for heavy bombers and using mobile ICBMs; it was not logical for submarine bases or fixed ICBM silos. He continued that the prohibition on development of rapid reload capability had been placed in the START Treaty to prevent development of this capability, and since the capability to rapidly reload various types of strategic delivery systems could still be developed, the U.S. side proposed this agreed statement to discourage either side from developing such a capability in the future. Gen Venevtsev said the statement seemed to reflect feelings present in the 1960s and since we have dropped all references to the "Cold War," there was no need for this agreed statement. Mr. Koshelev stated that if either side created alternate airfields or developed mobile ICBM bases outside of those declared in the treaty they would be in violation of the treaty, and by expressing the need for this agreed statement the U.S. side must believe that the Russians plan to violate the new treaty. Elliott reiterated that in START there was a prohibition on development of a rapid reload capability and upon comparison of this treaty with START it would be considered a step back if this provision were not included. He acknowledged that operational use of rapid reload was unlikely but that the proposed agreed statement was an attempt by the U.S. side to inoculate both Parties against criticism if this prohibition were not included. Poznikhir countered that there were a number of prohibitions in START Article V; would it now be necessary to include all those prohibitions in this treaty, such as the prohibition of deploying strategic offensive arms in internal waters? Elliott responded that the U.S. side had already been criticized by some for not including all the prohibitions from Article V in the new treaty. -------------- Deferral of discussion -------------- ¶16. (S) Ilin questioned whether the U.S. side had any questions on the Russian-proposed agreed statement on the use of telemetric data. Elliott recommended discussion of this agreed statement be deferred to the Telemetry Working Group and that it would be best if discussion on the agreed statements on Leninsk and transfer of Trident II SLBM to the United Kingdom be deferred until the Notifications Working Group had an opportunity to discuss these issues. Mr. Trout clarified that there is a difference between Russian movement of missiles to the test range at Leninsk and the U.S. transfer of Trident II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. Transferring Trident II SLBMs to the United Kingdom is allowed in the treaty as the continuation of an existing pattern of cooperation. Trout went on to point out that the Russian side clearly had plans to utilize the Leninsk facility for ICBM flight tests but would be unable to transfer these ICBMs on paper to a facility not declared in paragraph 4 of Article IV. Trout requested the Russian side explain how they intended to utilize Leninsk without the agreed statement. Elliott added that it was not the U.S. side's intention to prohibit the use of Leninsk, but the agreed statement was an attempt by the U.S. side to ensure it was clearly allowed. -------------- Davis-Monthan afb and Missile defense -------------- ¶17. (S) Elliott recommended resuming discussion on the Davis-Monthan AFB agreed statement now that the sides had generally agreed to a definition of non-deployed heavy bombers. Ilin concurred and said the Russian side would study the U.S. proposal. Ilin inquired on the status of the agreed statement on missile defense. Elliott replied that the subject of statements regarding missile defense was being discussed by the Heads of Delegation. ¶18. (U) Documents provided: - Russia: -- Russian-Proposed Text, Paragraph 1(a) of the Agreed Statement on U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, dated February 15, 2010; and -- Russian-Proposed Text, Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers, dated February 15, 2010. ¶19. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Elliott Mr. Albertson Mr. Ahlm (RO) Mr. Brown Mr. Evans Lt Col Goodman LTC Litterini Amb Ries Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Gen Orlov Gen Poznihir Gen Venevtsev Mr. Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING