SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 15, 2010

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 15, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-049.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 15, 2010

Time: 11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin co-chaired a meeting to discuss
proposed agreed statements on February 15. The agreed statements
on converted B-1B bombers, converted SSGNs, joint basing of heavy
bombers and rapid reload were discussed in detail. The sides
agreed to defer discussion on the agreed statements on Leninsk,
transfer of Trident II to the United Kingdom, and the ban on the
use of telemetry to enhance missile defenses until the
Notifications and Telemetry Working Groups had an opportunity to
work on these issues. Both sides agreed to resume discussion on
the agreed statement on basing deployed heavy bombers at the
conversion or elimination (CorE) facility at Davis-Monthan Air
Force Base (AFB),Arizona, and to defer discussion on the missile
defense agreed statement pending the outcome of the Heads of
Delegation meeting on the matter.




4. (U) Subject Summary: Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs;
Joint Basing; Converted Former Silos at Vandenberg AFB; Trident I
SLBMs; Rapid Reload; Deferral of Discussion; and Davis-Monthan AFB
and Missile Defense.



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Converted B-1B heavy bomberS

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5. (S) With regard to the agreed statement on converted B-1B heavy
bombers, Ilin stated the U.S. and Russian delegation lawyers had
agreed on appropriate language for paragraph 1 and 1(A) and agreed
not to cite individual treaty provisions within the agreed
statement but rather use the phrase "the following provisions shall
apply." Elliott added that the lawyers had also agreed to use the
phrase "as applicable" in paragraph 1(A) and Ilin concurred.
Elliott explained that the term "airbase" would not be applicable
for either Dyess AFB, Texas, or Elssworth AFB, South Dakota,
following the last B-1B conversion to which Ilin responded that the
Russian side accepted the term "eliminated facilities" as a
proposed change in nomenclature to be used throughout the remainder
of the agreed statement.


6. (S) Elliott stated that the proposed Russian text in paragraph
1(d) was very complicated and recommended the lawyers attempt to
develop a solution to this issue. He also explained that the U.S.
side had found a chronological incongruity in the text of the
agreed statement and recommended swapping paragraphs 1 and 1(A)
with paragraph 2 which would place the paragraphs into logical
order. Elliott offered to provide a new joint draft text and Ilin
agreed to review the proposed changes. Ilin recommended
eliminating paragraph 1(D(i)) since it was a repeat of text in Part
Five of the protocol to the treaty. Elliott concurred and agreed
to incorporate this change in the new proposed joint draft text,
with the caveat that it must be incorporated in Part Five of the
protocol. Ilin provided a copy of Russian-proposed changes.



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U.S. SSGNS

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7. (S) Ilin declared that the brackets in the first paragraph and
paragraph 1(A) of the agreed statement on SSGNs converted from
SSBNs were resolved in the same manner as the converted B-1B agreed
statement by incorporating the phrase "the following provisions
shall apply." He provided a copy of the proposed changes. Ilin
stated there remained a bracket in paragraph 1(B). Elliott
recommended changing the bracketed text to read "on the submarine
base during the period of inspection, as depicted on the coastlines
and waters diagram. This diagram will depict the locations of all
SSBNs and SSGNs currently located on the submarine base in
accordance with subparagraph 2(b)I of Part Four of the annex on
Inspection Activities of this Protocol." Ilin responded positively
to the proposed change and agreed to review it. Elliott agreed to
provide a new joint draft text with the discussed changes.



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Joint basing

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8. (S) Elliott proposed inspection of two heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments and two heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments during a Type-1 inspection at a joint base
and inspection of two SSGN launchers when present at a submarine
base during a Type-1 inspection. He expressed concern over the
impact a greater number of bombers being inspected would have on
the joint bases. Ilin rejected considering the quotas associated
with the number of items to be inspected in two different agreed
statements together. Elliott proposed allowing inspection of three
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, as already agreed in
Part Five of the protocol and two heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments during a Type-1 inspection at a joint base,
in addition to the United States accepting inspection of two SSGN

launchers when present at a submarine base during a Type-1
inspection. Ilin questioned the difference in effort required to
inspect two versus three heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments. Elliott replied there was additional effort required to
inspect heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments (e.g.,
removal of external panels from the aircraft to allow visibility of
the distinguishing features). Ilin reminded the U.S. side that
under START, all the heavy bombers on the base were subject to
inspection vice the proposed three under START Follow-on. He
stated it was clear that only the U.S. side benefited from this
reduction. Elliott firmly reminded the Russian delegation that it
was still possible that Russia would not gain the right to
re-inspect any heavy bombers that had been converted to employ
non-nuclear armaments. Elliott pointed out that the very fact the
U.S. side was discussing a potential right to the re-inspection of
items removed from the treaty, including B-1Bs, SSGN launchers, and
potentially converted ICBM launchers, was a significant step toward
the Russian side. He reminded Ilin that the U.S. side had offered
significant concessions in an attempt to demonstrate good faith and
transparency, but that the Russian delegation had not been equally
forthcoming. Ilin maintained the Russian position.




9. (S) Gen Orlov explained the Russian position that this treaty
was not only about strategic nuclear systems but non-nuclear
strategic systems as well and, since the United States was
converting significantly more items to non-nuclear use, Russia
needed to ensure these newly converted non-nuclear systems had not
been reconverted to nuclear usable status. Elliott stated the
United States had taken a significant step to allow for inspection
of non-nuclear-capable systems to provide such transparency but
inspecting three heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and
three heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments would have
an unacceptable impact on U.S. operations. Elliott reminded the
Russian side of the U.S. desire to have the opportunity to inspect
100 percent of all eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, which
the Russian side had rejected. Elliott continued that the
discussion was becoming very one-sided and not accommodating to
U.S. concerns.




10. (S) Both sides agreed to review whether a reference to the
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) was needed on every agreed
statement or if treaty Article XIV was sufficient to cover
resolving questions on agreed statements in the BCC. Ilin
recommended creating a chapeau in Part IX of the Protocol for all
agreed statements as an alternate method for referring questions on
them to the BCC. Both sides agreed to review this option.



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CONVERTED FORMER ICBM SILOS AT Vandenberg AFB

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11. (S) Ilin asked whether the U.S. side had prepared a response
to the Russian-proposed agreed statement on the former ICBM
launchers converted into ground based interceptor launchers at
Vandenberg AFB. Elliott responded that the U.S. side had only

received a rough draft of the Russian proposal through Amb Antonov
and questioned whether a formal proposal would be provided.




12. (S) Ilin stated the Russian side understood that some ICBM
launchers at Vandenberg AFB had been converted to launchers holding
missile defense interceptors and, similar to the U.S. conversions
of submarine launchers and heavy bombers, the Russian side felt an
agreed statement was necessary. Ilin continued that the agreed
statement must have two components; first, an initial exhibition to
demonstrate distinguishing features of the converted launchers and
to confirm that an ICBM cannot be launched from the converted
launchers and, second, an opportunity to re-inspect the converted
launchers to confirm that the launchers have not been reconverted.
Ilin recognized that the number of verification events would be
limited throughout the life of the treaty, similar to what was
proposed in the SSGN agreed statement. Elliott agreed to consider
the option but reminded the Russian side that the ground-based
missile defense interceptor launchers at Vandenberg AFB were part
of an operational system and cautioned that only a limited number
of exhibitions or inspections commensurate with this operational
status would be possible.



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Trident I

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13. (S) Elliott asked whether the Russian side had comments on the
U.S.-proposed unilateral statement on Trident I SLBMs. Ilin
provided no comments.



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RAPID RELOAD

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14. (S) Elliott declared that removal of the first sentence from
the rapid reload agreed statement was acceptable to the United
States and agreed to keep the second sentence. Elliott rejected
the Russian proposal to prohibit storage of ICBMs or SLBMs with
front ends attached in loading tubes since it would adversely
impact operations at U.S. submarine bases. He clarified that
loading tubes were designed to move slowly and were limited to
operations within the confines of the submarine base and therefore
were not suitable for use in a rapid reload capacity following a
major nuclear exchange. Gen Poznikhir questioned whether the
loading tubes could be used to reload a submarine that had just
launched missiles from a position next to the pier. Elliott
responded that U.S. submarines are not equipped to launch from
pier-side as Russian submarines are. He added that the very low
likelihood that a U.S. submarine base would exist following a major
nuclear exchange would logically preclude SSBNs from rapidly
reloading SLBMs stored in loading tubes at these submarine bases.


15. (S) Orlov questioned the need for the agreed statement.
Elliott explained that the purpose was to make a positive statement
that neither Party would develop the capability to rapidly reload.
Orlov stated that he still could not understand the need for the
statement and tried to relate the concept to the U.S. use of rotary
launchers for air launched cruise missiles (ALCM). He compared the
loading time for U.S. rotary launchers to that of Russian rotary
launchers and specified that the time for reloading Russian bombers
was far longer than that for U.S. bombers. Elliott assured Orlov
that while the time to install a rotary launcher on a U.S. bomber
might be less than that to install a rotary launcher on a Russian
bomber, the transporter for the U.S. rotary launchers were limited
to a few miles per hour and therefore provided no ability to
quickly relocate warheads off the bomber base and no measure of
survivability for use in a rapid reload capacity. Elliott
reiterated that none of these systems could quickly draw assets
from non-deployed status and move them to a position to be used for
use during a nuclear exchange. Orlov questioned whether it was
possible to relocate ALCM rotary launchers using transport
aircraft. Elliott stated that it was probably possible, but due to
the high center of gravity of the launchers they were only designed
to be transported slowly on special fixtures over smooth surfaces.




16. (S) Dr. Warner explained the concept of rapid reload was
directly related to concepts set forth in Soviet military writings
in the 1960s and 1970s, which depicted extended nuclear war with
multiple exchanges. He stated that while it was logical that rapid
reload could be conducted at alternate, non-disclosed air bases for
heavy bombers and using mobile ICBMs; it was not logical for
submarine bases or fixed ICBM silos. He continued that the
prohibition on development of rapid reload capability had been
placed in the START Treaty to prevent development of this
capability, and since the capability to rapidly reload various
types of strategic delivery systems could still be developed, the
U.S. side proposed this agreed statement to discourage either side
from developing such a capability in the future. Gen Venevtsev
said the statement seemed to reflect feelings present in the 1960s
and since we have dropped all references to the "Cold War," there
was no need for this agreed statement. Mr. Koshelev stated that if
either side created alternate airfields or developed mobile ICBM
bases outside of those declared in the treaty they would be in
violation of the treaty, and by expressing the need for this agreed
statement the U.S. side must believe that the Russians plan to
violate the new treaty. Elliott reiterated that in START there was
a prohibition on development of a rapid reload capability and upon
comparison of this treaty with START it would be considered a step
back if this provision were not included. He acknowledged that
operational use of rapid reload was unlikely but that the proposed
agreed statement was an attempt by the U.S. side to inoculate both
Parties against criticism if this prohibition were not included.
Poznikhir countered that there were a number of prohibitions in
START Article V; would it now be necessary to include all those
prohibitions in this treaty, such as the prohibition of deploying
strategic offensive arms in internal waters? Elliott responded
that the U.S. side had already been criticized by some for not
including all the prohibitions from Article V in the new treaty.

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Deferral of discussion

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16. (S) Ilin questioned whether the U.S. side had any questions on
the Russian-proposed agreed statement on the use of telemetric
data. Elliott recommended discussion of this agreed statement be
deferred to the Telemetry Working Group and that it would be best
if discussion on the agreed statements on Leninsk and transfer of
Trident II SLBM to the United Kingdom be deferred until the
Notifications Working Group had an opportunity to discuss these
issues. Mr. Trout clarified that there is a difference between
Russian movement of missiles to the test range at Leninsk and the
U.S. transfer of Trident II SLBMs to the United Kingdom.
Transferring Trident II SLBMs to the United Kingdom is allowed in
the treaty as the continuation of an existing pattern of
cooperation. Trout went on to point out that the Russian side
clearly had plans to utilize the Leninsk facility for ICBM flight
tests but would be unable to transfer these ICBMs on paper to a
facility not declared in paragraph 4 of Article IV. Trout
requested the Russian side explain how they intended to utilize
Leninsk without the agreed statement. Elliott added that it was
not the U.S. side's intention to prohibit the use of Leninsk, but
the agreed statement was an attempt by the U.S. side to ensure it
was clearly allowed.



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Davis-Monthan afb and Missile defense

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17. (S) Elliott recommended resuming discussion on the
Davis-Monthan AFB agreed statement now that the sides had generally
agreed to a definition of non-deployed heavy bombers. Ilin
concurred and said the Russian side would study the U.S. proposal.
Ilin inquired on the status of the agreed statement on missile
defense. Elliott replied that the subject of statements regarding
missile defense was being discussed by the Heads of Delegation.




18. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Russian-Proposed Text, Paragraph 1(a) of the Agreed
Statement on U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from
SSBNs, dated February 15, 2010; and



-- Russian-Proposed Text, Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers, dated

February 15, 2010.




19. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Elliott

Mr. Albertson

Mr. Ahlm (RO)

Mr. Brown

Mr. Evans

Lt Col Goodman

LTC Litterini

Amb Ries

Mr. Trout

Dr. Warner

Mrs. Zdravecky

Ms. Gesse (Int)



RUSSIA



Col Ilin

Mr. Koshelev

Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Gen Orlov

Gen Poznihir

Gen Venevtsev

Mr. Zaitsev

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING