SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,

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SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,
FEBRUARY 16, 2010

REF: 10 GENEVA 113 (SFO-GVA-VIII-039)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-054.




2. (U) Meeting Date: February 16, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:20 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



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SUMMARY

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3. (S) At the Definitions Working Group meeting chaired by Mr.
Siemon and Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov, agreement was reached on the
following four terms: "soft-site launcher;" "new type;" "variant;"
and "warhead." The following definitions were discussed, but
disagreement remained: "solid-fueled ICBM or solid-fueled SLBM"
"solid rocket motor," "rocket motor case," and "non-deployed heavy
bomber." The Russian side provided proposed definitions for
"submarine base" and "launch." End summary.




4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Terms and Definitions Discussed.



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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS DISCUSSED

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5. (S) Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov stated the Russian side had reviewed
the U.S.-proposed definitions for "soft-site launcher" and "new
type," had no objections and recommended sending the two terms to
the Conforming Group. The agreed terms were as follows.



Begin text:



The term "soft-site launcher" means any land-based fixed launcher
of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.

The term "new type" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or
SLBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from those of
an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each type declared previously in
at least one of the following respects:


(a) number of stages;

(b) type of propellant of any stage;

(c) length of either the assembled missile without front
section or length of the first stage, by more than three percent;

(d) diameter of the first stage, by more than three percent.



End text.




6. (S) Siemon asked if this meant the Russian side also agreed to
delete the term "variant." At the previous meeting the U.S. side
had stated that with agreement on the new text for "new type," the
term "variant" was no longer needed (Ref A). Kuznetsov responded
that the Russian side could not agree to delete "variant" since
Part Five of the Protocol on Inspection Activities included the
term and it should be retained due to the unpredictable future of
heavy bombers and missiles.




7. (S) Siemon believed that if the sides agreed to drop the U.S.
bracketed text in subparagraph (b) the definition could be sent to
conforming. Kuznetsov agreed since the proposed definition
retained text in subparagraph (b) that contained the concept of an
item that was distinguishable from other items of the same type.
The sides agreed to the following.



Begin text:

The term "variant" means:

(a) for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected
Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are
distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same
category;

(b) for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the
inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs for the same type that are
distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type.



End text.




8. (S) Kuznetsov provided an unofficial translation for the term
"warhead" and indicated there were only two differences between the
two side's definitions. The first was the Russian text substituted
the actual limit for the reference to Article II (b) and broadened
the definition by including a reference to deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. Siemon agreed with the proposed
definition after which the sides agreed to send the definition to
the Conforming Group. The sides agreed to the following.


Begin Text:



The term "warhead" means a unit of account for counting toward the
1550 aggregate limit as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs
and deployed heavy bombers.



End Text.




9. (S) Kuznetsov provided the U.S. side with an unofficial
translation of the term "submarine base."



Begin text:



The term "submarine base" means a facility at which ballistic
missile submarines, as well as submarines that had been previously
equipped with launchers of SLBMs but after conversion are no longer
capable of launching an SLBM, are based and that provides
shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the
assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs.



End text.




10. (S) The Russian side believed the term, which had been
previously agreed, required redefinition because of the content of
the U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement on U.S. Guided Missile
Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, currently dated February
15, 2010 and would assist Russian inspectors during inspections at
submarine bases.




11. (S) Kuznetsov noted that the U.S. based SSBNs together with
those that had been converted to SSGNs. The converted SSBNs
remained susceptible to inspection for the purpose of confirming
reconversion had not taken place. Therefore, the converted SSBNs
needed to be on the coastlines and waters diagram.




12. (S) Mrs. Zdravecky asked if the Russian concept captured both
SSBNs and those converted to SSGNs during inspection activities at
bases where both were located, in addition to those bases where
only the converted SSBNs were based. Kuznetsov indicated this was
correct.




13. (S) Kuznetsov provided the U.S. side with an unofficial
translation of the term "launch."


Begin text:



The term "launch" means the start and subsequent flight of a
ballistic missile.



End text.




14. (S) Kuznetsov explained that the proposed definition was
consistent with text that was included in the Agreement Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles, dated
May 31, 1988. He believed "launch" should replace "flight test"
throughout the Treaty, Protocol and Annexes.




15. (S) Siemon remarked that he had considered replacing "flight
test" with "launch" in Part Seven of the Protocol on Telemetry but
had not considered this in other places of the Treaty or in the
Annexes. He remarked that in English the word "launch" accurately
described the beginning or start of a missile's flight. Kuznetsov
suggested that the group continue the discussion at the next
meeting.




16. (S) In reference to the Russian-proposed definition of
"solid-fuel missile," Siemon stated he had spoken to U.S. members
of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group who did not
object to the proposed text; however, the formulation needed to be
refined by broadening the definition to include the language
"solid-fueled ICBM or solid-fueled SLBM" instead of "solid-fueled
missile." Col Kamenskiy asked if the change was related to
elimination procedures for solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled
SLBMs. Siemon replied in the affirmative. Siemon stated the CorE
Working Group indicated the need for definitions for the terms
"solid rocket motor" and "rocket motor case" which were also
related to the elimination process for solid-fueled ICBMs and
solid-fueled SLBMs. The sides agreed to continue this discussion
at the next meeting.




17. (S) Kuznetsov asked if there was any further movement on the
U.S. side on the term "non-deployed heavy bomber." Siemon stated
that although the U.S. side did not have a formal proposal, he
believed the proposed definition could be similar to the following:
"The term non-deployed heavy bomber means a heavy bomber equipped
for nuclear armaments that is a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber
at a repair facility."




18. (S) Kuznetsov noted that the sides had agreed that a deployed


heavy bomber was a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments.
The sides had a common understanding of a "type" of heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments and of the conversion of a heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments into a heavy bomber not
equipped for nuclear armaments. He believed that until the moment
when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of a type
had been converted to a heavy bomber not equipped for nuclear
armaments, that type was considered a deployed heavy bomber. His
concept was based on the entire type and not the individual
airplane.




19. Mr. Dean clarified that in the U.S. concept a deployed heavy
bomber was a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments that was
not a test heavy bomber or at a repair facility. A non-deployed
heavy bomber was the opposite; a heavy bomber that was a test heavy
bomber or at a repair facility. The U.S. concept was to be applied
on an airplane by airplane basis. It focused on the individual
airplane and not the entire type. Kuznetsov could not accept this
definition. The entire type was deployed until the last one of the
type had been converted. The definition could not be based on an
airplane by airplane basis. He used the conversion of the B-1B and
possible conversion of the B-52H as examples. All airplanes of the
type were considered deployed no matter where they were located and
would be considered deployed until all of the type had been
converted.




20. (S) Siemon explained the U.S. concept of a deployed or
non-deployed heavy bomber only applied to those bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments. In the U.S. view strategic offensive arms
were considered to be nuclear equipped. Once a heavy bomber
equipped for nuclear armaments was converted so that it was no
longer equipped for nuclear armaments it was no longer subject to
the limit of the Treaty. It was no longer deployed. Siemon
believed there would only be a small number of non-deployed heavy
bombers in the new treaty and that small number would be equipped
for nuclear armaments but were either test heavy bombers or those
at a repair facility to receive maintenance. B-1Bs equipped for
nuclear armaments counted against the treaty aggregate limit for
deployed and non-deployed strategic vehicles. Once a B-1B was
converted it no longer counted against this limit. The U.S.
planned to convert all B-1Bs and Siemon indicated that the
conversion was scheduled to be completed during this calendar year.
Once the conversions were completed all B-1Bs, the entire type,
would no longer be subject to the Treaty.




21. (S) Kuznetsov did not understand how the U.S. concept
conformed to Paragraph 6 and 7 of Article III. He believed that
both converted and non-converted B-1Bs were of the same type, so
both should be subject to the limit of the Treaty until the last
one was converted. Dean clarified that Paragraph 6 referred to the
entire class of heavy bombers that the Treaty called a type. The
Treaty did not say that if one heavy bomber of a type was equipped
for nuclear armaments the entire type was equipped for nuclear
armaments. Lt Col Comeau explained how the U.S.-proposed Agreed
Statement on B-1B heavy bombers supported this concept. When
Kuznetsov questioned the heavy bombers at the Davis-Monthan CorE
Facility, Dean stated the Agreed Statement on the basing of
deployed heavy bombers at the CorE facility located at


Davis-Monthan AFB would justify this situation. Siemon emphasized
that the only way to remove a deployed heavy bomber from the
accountability of the Treaty was to eliminate or convert it. As
long as a heavy bomber was equipped for nuclear armaments it was
subject to the Treaty. The sides agreed to continue the discussion
at the next meeting.




22. (U) Documents provided:



- Russia:



-- Unofficial translation Proposal of the Russian Federation on
the term "warhead," dated February 16, 2010;



-- Unofficial translation Proposal of the Russian Federation on
changing the term "submarine base," dated February 16, 2010; and



-- Unofficial translation Proposal of the Russian Federation on
replacing the term "flight test" with a term "launch," dated
February 16, 2010.




23. (U) Participants:



UNITED STATES



Mr. Siemon

Mr. Connell

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Mr. Stickney

Mr. Taylor

Mrs. Zdravecky

Ms. Gross (Int)



RUSSIA


Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Mr. Kamenskiy

Mr. Trifonov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)




24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING