SFO-GVA-VIII: AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 05, 2010

S E C R E T GENEVA 000129 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 05, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 65 (SFO-GVA-VIII-009) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-019. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 05, 2010 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin met on February 5 to discuss the proposed agreed statements (Reftel). The Russian side agreed to continue discussions on all statements except for the rapid reload statement which they continued to claim was unnecessary since neither side possessed this capability, and the statement on the Leninsk Test Range which they argued was superfluous as the United States would receive adequate notifications about movement of missiles to the facility in Kazakhstan. The Russian side provided a copy of its proposed agreed statement on missile defense and proposed creating an agreed statement to ban the use of telemetry data exchanged under the START Follow-on (SFO) treaty to enhance the effectiveness of missile defense systems. End summary. ¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; U.S. SSGNs; Joint Basing; Trident I SLBMs; Rapid Reload; Leninsk Test Range; Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or Elimination Facility, Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; and Telemetry Data and Missile Defense. -------------- Converted B-1B heavy bomber -------------- ¶5. (S) Ilin stated the Russian side noticed changes from the previously provided agreed statement on converted B-1B heavy bombers and recommended the text be changed to include clear reference to which facilities the agreed statement applied. He continued that the agreed statement should be amended to include a detailed list of which heavy bombers and facilities would be included under this statement and a list of the excepted facilities, and that the included bombers and facilities are not only subject to the agreed statement but also the full scope of the treaty, its Protocols and Annexes. Ilin stated this was a legal issue and should be discussed by the delegation lawyers. Elliott said the U.S. side would consider the recommendation. ¶6. (S) Ilin stated the last sentence of paragraph (C) of the agreed statement should be altered to read "Each year no more than one such inspection shall be conducted at both bases," and that paragraph (D),subparagraph (i) duplicated procedures from the inspection protocol. Elliott responded that the initial version of the agreed statement was drafted prior to the development of the Type-2 inspection concept for eliminated facilities. The U.S. side would review the inspection protocol and revise the statement as necessary. Ilin stated previously discussed changes and several others had been incorporated into a draft Russian proposal that he provided to the U.S. side. Elliott said he would review the Russian proposal. -------------- U.S. SSGN -------------- ¶7. (S) Ilin reiterated his earlier comment on the proposed SSGN agreed statement that all items subject to agreed statements are also subject to the provisions of the treaty, its protocols and annexes, as applicable. He requested clarification on the definition of "SSGN" and Elliott agreed to provide it. Ilin recommended paragraph (A) of the proposed agreed statement be modified to include details of what would be demonstrated during the exhibition and asked where the SSGN would need to be located in order to be inspected. Elliott clarified that the agreed statement was drafted to utilize the coastlines and waters diagram for a submarine base and any SSGN located at a berth depicted on a coastlines and waters diagram or within five kilometers of the submarine base where the SSGN is based would be subject to inspection. Lt Col Goodman explained how coastlines and waters diagrams had been used during inspections under START. Ilin responded that that particular practice was well known and the Russian side understood this approach. ¶8. (S) Ilin raised the issue of installation of additional temporary shelters on SSGNs following pre-inspection restrictions. Elliott explained that following the initiation of pre-inspection restrictions, the United States would not be allowed to install additional temporary shelters. Additionally, he said the maximum number of temporary shelters that could be installed on an SSGN would be two. Ilin questioned the number of launchers to be inspected and stated he believed that Dr. Warner had almost agreed to allow inspection of two SSGN launchers. Elliot said the number of launchers to be inspected on the SSGN was not yet resolved. ¶9. (S) Ilin said the Russian side had drafted changes to the agreed statement to clarify their position on SSGNs and had provided it to the U.S. side. Elliott agreed to review the draft. Begin text: Agreed Statement U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs The Parties agree that the U.S. guided missile submarines, known to the United States of America as "SSGNs" and to the Russian Federation as "PLARK", shall be subject to the provisions contained in this Agreed Statement((.))1 ((, as well as to provisions of the Treaty and Protocol, with the exception of Article II, Paragraphs 1-4 of Article III, Article IX of the Treaty, and related provisions of the Protocol.))2 ¶1. In order to provide assurances that all four SSGNs of the United States of America are incapable of launching SLBMs, the following provisions shall apply to such submarines: (A) No later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall conduct an initial one-time exhibition of each of the four SSGNs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on such submarines are incapable of launching an SLBM. ((The procedures for such an exhibition shall be identical to those implemented during a conversion of an SLBM launcher conducted pursuant to paragraph 5 and of Section IV, Part Three of this Protocol.))2 (B) Subsequent to the completion of the initial exhibitions, the United States of America shall also provide periodic opportunities for the Russian Federation to confirm that none of the launchers on the four SSGNs have been reconverted to make them capable of launching SLBMs. In order to provide assurances that the launchers on such a submarine have not been re-converted and are incapable of launching an SLBM, the Russian Federation shall have the right, while conducting a Type One inspection at a submarine base, to inspect the designated launcher((s))2 of an SSGN if such a submarine is located ((within the area depicted on the coastlines and waters diagram))1 ((the submarine bases))2 of the submarine base during the period of inspection. The number of such inspections shall not exceed a total of six, during the duration of the Treaty, for all four SSGNs existing at the time of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall not exceed two inspections for each SSGN. (C) The inspection procedures for an SSGN shall be consistent with the procedures for conducting an inspection of an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed SLBM, in accordance with Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modifications: (i) The SSGNs at the designated submarine base shall be subject to pre-inspection restrictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol and shall be subject to inspection. After pre-inspection restrictions have been implemented, no temporary shelters((, each of which obstructs the viewing of four SSGN launchers,))1 shall be installed. If ((such))1 ((no more than two))2 temporary shelters were installed prior to the implementation of pre-inspection restrictions, the SSGN launchers under these shelters shall not be subject to inspection. The total of SSGN launchers obstructed from viewing because they are under such shelters on a single SSGN shall not exceed eight launchers. (ii) Upon arrival of the inspection team at the submarine base, and in addition to the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall provide written information on the number of SSGNs subject to inspection under the terms of this Agreed Statement and the number of launchers on those submarines; (iii) The location of each SSGN subject to pre-inspection restrictions shall be annotated on the coastline and waters diagram; (iv) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate ((one))1 ((two))2 launcher((s))2 on an SSGN for inspection, if such launchers are on a submarine located at that base, instead of ((one non-deployed SLBM launcher or one deployed SLBM launcher))1 ((one non-deployed SLBM launcher))2 as specified in subparagraph 7(b) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol; (v) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the inspectors that the designated launcher is incapable of launching an SLBM; and (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in an official inspection report prepared in accordance with the procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of this Protocol. ¶2. If the United States of America converts other SSBNs into SSGNs, such SSGNs shall be subject to the measures specified in this Agreed Statement, and an additional number of inspections will be agreed between the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. End text. -------------- Joint Basing OF HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶10. (S) Ilin expressed concern about the agreed statement on joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. He noted the U.S. side had removed the provision regarding visiting bomber information from the proposed text. The Russian side felt it had been agreed in a meeting with Dr. Warner that this information would be provided and therefore needed to be included in the joint statement. Ilin explained that while it was agreed that visiting heavy bombers were not eligible for inspection, the Russian side felt the information on them must still be provided. Elliott agreed to review the matter with Warner and ensure that the agreed statement was consistent with the inspection protocol. He added that the addition of unique identifiers on deployed heavy bombers would aid the inspecting Party in knowing which heavy bombers were visiting and which were based at the airbase. The Russian side provided a draft response on joint basing. Begin text: Agreed Statement Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments The Parties agree that, notwithstanding paragraph 8/9 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right at an air base to carry out joint basing of heavy bombers of a type equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers of the same type that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of this Protocol into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, until the last heavy bomber of such a type is converted into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. ¶1. All heavy bombers of such a type located at an air base shall be subject to inspection until the last such heavy bomber of a type equipped for nuclear armaments has been converted into a heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments. In this connection, inspections of heavy bombers declared during pre-inspection procedures to be equipped for nuclear armaments shall be conducted within the established annual inspection quota in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol (Type One inspections). During the same inspection heavy bombers of the same type declared to be equipped for non-nuclear armaments may be inspected to confirm that they have not been converted into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. (a) The inspection of an air base where heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and converted heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments are jointly based, shall be conducted in accordance with Part Five of this Protocol, with the following modified Type One inspection procedures: (i) If the inspection team has designated such an air base for inspection, in addition to the provisions specified in paragraph 6 of Section IV of Part Five of this Protocol, which apply to deployed heavy bombers, the inspection team shall also be informed of the number of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments currently located at that base. (ii) Both the heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and the heavy bombers of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments located at that air base shall be subject to the pre-inspection restrictions specified in paragraph 4 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol; (iii) Upon arrival at the air base, and in addition to the provisions specified in subparagraph 6(c) of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol, a member of the in-country escort ((shall annotate on the site diagram provided to the inspection team leader, the locations of each such declared heavy bomber of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments;))1 ((shall provide in writing information on the number and type of the heavy bomber, equipped for non-nuclear armaments, located at the air base at the time pre-inspection restriction were implemented. Furthermore, a site diagram of the airbase, annotated with the location of each such heavy bomber, equipped for non-nuclear armaments, shall be provided.))2 (iv) After pre-inspection procedures have been completed, the inspection team leader shall designate, in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Section VI of Part V of this Protocol, no more than three deployed heavy bombers ((equipped for nuclear armaments))2 depicted on the site diagram for inspection in accordance with paragraph ((13))1((12))2 of Section VI of Part Five of this Protocol; (v) In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, if so designated, no more than ((one))1((three))2 heavy bomber((s))2 of the same type equipped for non-nuclear armaments to confirm that such heavy bombers remain incapable of employing nuclear armaments; and (vi) The conduct of such an inspection shall be recorded in an official inspection report prepared in accordance with the procedures provided in Section X of Part Five of this Protocol. ((2. The application of this Agreed Statement with respect to each specific type of heavy bomber shall be agreed within the Bilateral Consultative Commission.))2 End text. -------------- Trident i SLBMs -------------- ¶11. (S) Ilin said the Trident I agreed statement must be a unilateral statement since Trident I SLBMs were U.S. items and their usage would be determined by the United States. Ilin continued that their intended purpose must be indicated in the unilateral statement. Elliott countered that the proposed agreed statement clearly indicated that the SLBMs shall not be used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty and this language covered any usage other than use as an SLBM. Ilin provided a draft Russian proposal and Elliott agreed to review it. Begin text: ((Agreed Statement))1((Unilateral Statement of the United States of America))2 Trident I SLBMs ((Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that,))1 ((The United States of America declares that))2 Trident I SLBMs, which were contained in Ohio-class submarines, ((are no longer existing types))1 ((have been retired))2 and their launchers have been converted((.))1 ((to launch sea-based cruise missiles.))2 The remaining Trident I SLBMs shall not be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. ((These SLBMs will be launched from land-based launchers.))2 End text. -------------- Rapid Reload -------------- ¶12. (S) Gen Poznikhir stated the only conclusion the Russian side could draw from the proposed agreed statement on rapid reload was that the United States still considered the Russian Federation an enemy and the United States did not rule out the possibility of nuclear war with Russia. Poznikhir argued that if only one state had the capability to rapidly reload its ICBMS or SLBMs then that state would have an advantage. It was the Russian position that the concept of rapid reload was a hold-over from the Cold War. Additionally, he said, it would be impossible to imagine rapid reload of ICBMs or SLBMs actually occurring following a nuclear exchange. Poznikhir added that Russia did not possess, nor did they plan to develop, the capability to conduct rapid reload of its strategic nuclear forces and that the only side which possessed this ability was the United States with its SLBMs stored in loading tubes at its submarine bases. Elliott countered that both Secretary Clinton and President Obama had stated that the United States did not consider the Russian Federation an enemy, and did not think that nuclear war was likely. Ilin concluded that the Russian side thought this should be a unilateral statement, rather than an agreed statement, but had, nevertheless, provided proposed changes to the agreed statement. -------------- Leninsk Test range -------------- ¶13. (S) Regarding the proposed agreed statement on the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan, Gen Orlov explained that the range was not a Russian facility and it was not located within the territory of the Russian Federation. He continued that the United States fully understood that the facility was used for peaceful purposes and that the United States would be able to track the transfer of missiles to this facility through notifications for movements and notifications of flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs. Orlov compared this transfer to that of the United States transferring SLBMs to the United Kingdom. He said the Russian side would never know if a missile that was transferred to the United Kingdom by the United States had been launched. He argued that since the proposed Leninsk agreed statement required that this information be provided by Russia, there was a lack of parity. Orlov suggested ending the discussion on this agreed statement. ¶14. (S) Mr. Trout countered that in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 11, "Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party," and that according to this provision the Russian Federation could not send ICBMs to Leninsk unless there was an agreement to allow it. Trout continued that the proposed agreed statement was an attempt to allow the Russian side to continue its established pattern of operation. Ilin concluded this discussion and stated that the U.S. side would receive notifications when ICBMs are transferred to Leninsk. He added there was considerable sensitivity on the Russian side with regard to this issue. -------------- -------------- Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the Conversion or Elimination Facility, Davis-Monthan air force base -------------- -------------- ¶15. (S) Elliott stated that the discussion of definitions for "deployed" and "non-deployed" heavy bombers was still in progress and the result of that discussion could possibly eliminate the need for the proposed agreed statement on the basing of deployed heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination facility located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. The sides deferred discussion on the statement pending resolution of the definition of "deployed heavy bomber." -------------- Telemetry data AND missile defense -------------- ¶16. (S) Ilin noted the Russian side had twice, on December 15 and 31, 2009, presented the U.S. side with a proposed agreed statement on banning the use of telemetry data to improve missile defense capabilities and the U.S. side had yet to respond. Ilin provided another copy to Elliott for the U.S. side to review. Ilin said it would benefit both sides to create an agreed statement declaring that both sides could not use telemetry data exchanged under the SFO treaty to upgrade their missile defense capabilities. He said the Russian side would draft and provide this statement. ¶17. (U) Documents provided: - Russia: -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Movements of ICBMs to and from the Leninsk Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, dated February 5, 2010; -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Trident I SLBMs, dated February 5, 2010; -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments, dated February 5, 2010; -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, dated February 5, 2010; -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers, dated February 5, 2010; -- Russian Proposal on Agreed Statement - Rapid Reload, dated February 5, 2010; and -- Russian Proposal on Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense, dated December 15, 2009. ¶18. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Elliott Mr. Ahlm (RO) Mr. Dean Lt Col Goodman LT Lobner Mr. Trout Ms. C. Smith (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Luchaninov Gen Orlov Gen Poznikhir Col Ryzhkov Gen Venevtsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶19. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING