SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000121 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 13, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY REF: 10 GENEVA 119 (SFO-GVA-VIII-033) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-046. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 13, 2010 Time: 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) During a meeting of the Notifications Working Group held at the U.S. Mission on February 13, the Russian side provided additional comments on Sections VI, Notifications Concerning Inspections and Exhibitions, and VII, Notifications Concerning Additional Messages and ((Activities of))2 the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)(Reftel). The Russian side requested clarification of U.S.-proposed changes and provided counter proposals. The two sides discussed in detail the notifications that would not be provided to or received from the respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NNRCs) but would instead be provided in writing by the inspection team leader during an on-site inspection. The two sides briefly discussed the status of the notification concerning new kinds of strategic offensive arms (SOA) and notifications concerning the exchange of telemetric information. End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VI: Notifications Concerning Inspections and Exhibitions; Section VII: Notifications Concerning Additional Messages and ((Activities of))2 the BCC. -------------- -------------- SECTION VI: NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING INSPECTIONS AND EXHIBITIONS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S) Col Petrov stated the two sides differed in small detail about the notification regarding the geographic coordinates of a reference point. He noted geographic reference points were established by the inspected Party; the notification occurred within an agreed upon timeframe following entry-into-force of the treaty and also after subsequent changes or additions to the initial information provided. The U.S. side proposed using a specified time period during which notifications of changes to the reference points would be sent. Both sides agreed to reconsider their respective proposed text. ¶6. (S) Regarding the notification of a change to the boundary of a facility specified on a site diagram, the sides disagreed on whether the time period for transmission of such notification should be stipulated. The U.S. side proposed including a time period for transmission, thus ensuring the change was provided to the inspecting Party in a reasonable time period. The Russian side argued that the notification could be provided anytime after agreement was reached. Mr. Smirnov opined that both sides should already be aware of this as the change would have been agreed within the BCC. Both he and Petrov recommended a process similar to the START Joint Compliance and Implementation Commission (JCIC) S-Series Joint Agreement be used. Additionally, Petrov referenced the JCIC Agreement concerning changes to the boundaries of site diagrams. Mr. Siemon acknowledged this fact, but reminded Petrov that JCIC Agreements did not carry forward in the new treaty. Both sides agreed to study the issue further. ¶7. (S) Both sides agreed in principle to a 30-day advance notification of an exhibition. Siemon indicated agreement by the U.S. side was predicated on agreement within the Inspections Protocol Working Group (IPWG). Smirnov acknowledged this and replied that sufficient lead time was necessary to put into place logistical support for the visiting inspection team. ¶8. (S) Significant discussion focused on the section referencing written notifications provided by the inspection team leader during on-site inspections. Siemon maintained clarity was necessary to ensure these notifications were not confused with notifications transmitted through the respective NRRCs. Additionally, the two sides agreed to reference these notifications as subparagraphs to a new paragraph. Begin Text: "The following notifications shall not be transmitted through the respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers but shall be provided by the inspection team leader in writing during on-site inspections." End Text. ¶9. (S) The sides agreed this formulation satisfied the obligation in treaty Article VIII requiring each Party to use the NRRC to transmit and receive notifications unless otherwise provided for in the treaty. Notifications concerning site designation, intent to conduct a sequential inspection, cancellation of an inspection, and designation of an item of inspection, would now be subparagraphs. The specific format for these notifications would be determined during treaty annex, i.e., Tier III, discussions. ¶10. (S) LT Sicks stated the U.S.-proposed annex to the Inspection Protocol required site designation to occur no later than 4 hours after arrival at the point of entry (POE). This was the case for the initial inspection in addition to sequential inspections when the inspection team chose to return to the POE. In cases when the inspection team chose to conduct a sequential inspection without returning to the POE, the site designation would occur prior to the completion of the post-inspection activities. Under this concept, notification of a date and time for a declaration of the next inspection site would not be needed. Such a notification could be deleted. The Russian text requiring a site designation no later than 12 hours after return of the inspection team to the POE would also be removed. Petrov and Smirnov agreed to the U.S.-proposed text. ¶11. (S) No significant changes were made to the notification regarding cancellation of an inspection or to the notification concerning the designation of an item intended for inspection. The U.S. proposed removing "Type 1" from the notification to ensure it captured both Type 1 and Type 2 inspections. Initially, Smirnov stated that was not required. However, after further discussion between Maj Johnson and Petrov, both sides agreed to bracket the text for further study. -------------- -------------- SECTION VII: NOTIFICATIONS CONCERNING ADDITIONAL MESSAGES AND ((ACTIVITIES OF))2 THE BCC -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S) The Russian side agreed to the U.S.-proposed text calling for a notification of a request for clarification of a notification, paragraph six. Both sides then agreed paragraphs 1-6 in this section were ready to be referred to the Conforming Group. The remaining notifications covering new types and kinds, mobile launchers, throw weight, cooperative measures, and telemetric data remained in U.S. brackets. The Russian side proposed creating a new section with a placeholder title on telemetry notifications, entitled: "Section VIII: Notifications Concerning Exchange of Telemetric Data." Smirnov suggested moving the notification concerning the development of a new kind of SOA to Section II, Notifications Concerning Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms as U.S.-proposed text. Siemon responded Smirnov should first review the notification and provide comments. ¶13. (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side would provide a new version of the joint draft text at the next meeting. Siemon proposed sending the text to the Conforming Group following a final review by both sides in the very near future as many brackets throughout the text had been resolved. Smirnov agreed and proposed conducting a small group, pre-conforming meeting early the following week. Siemon agreed. ¶14. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶15. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Siemon Mr. Dean Mr. Dwyer Dr. Fraley Mr. Hanchett Maj Johnson LT Sicks (RO) Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Smirnov Mr. Ivanov Lt Col Lyzsovskiy Col Petrov Mr. Voloskov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING