IMPACT OF ROGHUN CAMPAIGN ON U.S. ASSISTANCE GOALS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000171 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID EFIN ECON SOCI PHUM TI SUBJECT: IMPACT OF ROGHUN CAMPAIGN ON U.S. ASSISTANCE GOALS REF: A. A: 09 DUSHANBE 1364 B: 09 DUSHANBE 1443 C: DUSHANBE 52 ¶B. D: 09 DUSHANBE 1113 E: DUSHANBE 67 F: DUSHANBE 103 DUSHANBE 00000171 001.2 OF 003 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID EFIN ECON SOCI PHUM TI REFS: ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Tajik government stresses electricity shortfalls as a serious threat to living standards and economic growth, and rightly so, but refuses to confront key causes of the shortfall, or to pursue to the most effective solutions. Instead, it insists that building mega-hydro-project Roghun dam is the top priority. The Tajik government's campaign to force people to contribute to building the dam is undermining U.S. assistance goals. It is increasing and legitimizing corruption. It violates citizens' rights and further weakens the rule of law. It is exacerbating poverty and household vulnerability and diverting resources from health and education. It is making a bad business climate worse and reducing confidence in the banks. Government revenues and expenditures are even less transparent. This negative impact on U.S. goals across the board raises serious concerns, and we may need to re-examine some of our assistance in light of these effects. End Summary. Power Shortages, For Some ¶2. (SBU) It is no secret the Soviet-designed power and water systems in Central Asia put Tajikistan in a difficult position, with power surpluses in summer and power shortages in winter. Prickly relations with neighboring Uzbekistan limit seasonal power-sharing, and the Tajiks ration power each winter, making most modern business and industry impossible in most of the country (ref A). This lowers living standards and limits economic growth. Much of the problem would be ameliorated if the large quasi-state-owned Talco aluminum plant, which consumes at least 40% of Tajikistan's power, were shut down or at least if its energy fees and revenue structure were revaluated. Not only does the plant consume power that could be used by homes, schools, business and industry, it pays a below-cost price for power, keeping the state power company Barqi Tojik broke and unable to maintain the system or to reinvest in new production. Despite its low tariffs, Talco still owes several million dollars in back fees. The government emphasizes that Talco is an importance to the country's GDP and the national budget as aluminum is Tajikistan's biggest export. However, the profits Talco earns off subsidized power go mainly offshore to a small elite. Talco's official revenues are not a major contributor to the budget. The government also could look to other projects that are on the table or under development, most with foreign financing, that could provide energy fairly quickly, but all of these require an economic price be paid for the power produced. Instead, the government has staked everything on the wholly Tajik-owned, government-controlled Roghun hydroelectric project, which even in the best case would take many years to complete. Dams Before People ¶3. (SBU) Despite some of the lowest spending as a percentage of GDP for health and education in the world, the government each year has increased budget funds to build Roghun. In the current IMF program, the government undertook to maintain social spending despite shortfalls, and to hold Roghun spending below $140 million. In November, with tensions high as Uzbekistan announced plans to pull out of the Central Asian grid, President Rahmon enlisted the nation to build Roghun, calling on all citizens "with the means to do so" to buy Roghun shares to finance construction. The campaign struck a chord, and many people expressed a genuine desire to contribute. In January, when shares went on sale, however, it quickly became clear the DUSHANBE 00000171 002.2 OF 003 campaign was voluntary in only the loosest sense. Many people, especially government employees, soon found that contributions were mandatory and a failure to contribute carried severe consequences (Refs B and C). As the campaign continues, it is undermining many goals of U.S. assistance. Feeding, Legitimizing Corruption at the Expense of Rule of Law ¶4. (SBU) Government employees have been at the sharp end of the campaign, expected to contribute several months' salary or even the equivalent of their annual salaries. More disturbingly, judging by the targets given some employees in corruption-prone sectors, the government clearly expects them to exploit their positions. Government employees are tasked with "encouraging" citizen to contribute. To pay for their Roghun contributions, employees are increasing their demands for bribes, demanding funds from those down the supervisory chain, and refusing to provide government services to those who do not contribute to the campaign. People report being unable to buy plane tickets, register cars, enter or leave the country, keep a market stall or even stay open as a business without making a contribution. According to one unverified but credible rumor, Customs officers have been given a daily quota. Corruption is not just accepted or expected, but demanded. The average person now doesn't just pay a bribe to get services, he must buy a share of Roghun or lose a job, have a business closed, or be denied crucial government services. A Roghun tax is added to the price of goods and services explicitly or implicitly, but the amounts paid by whom and for what are fuzzy. Already weak due process is becoming weaker. Few dare object to Roghun extortion for fear of being tarred as unpatriotic or other consequences. Blood from Stones ¶5. (SBU) The nearly $200 million raised so far is about 3% of GDP. Much of it can't be spent right away and will finance imports, which means the money has been withdrawn from the economy. It is reducing household income and domestic demand and increasing household debt. In an economy under pressure from the global financial crisis, with remittances down a third, the government's pro-cyclical action exacerbates the slowdown in economic growth and increases poverty -- exactly opposite the intent of U.S. and international assistance. After two tough years, the Tajik population is vulnerable to even small income shocks. The fall in remittances affected many households, and the government last year pleaded with donors to fill the gap to prevent a devastating decline into poverty. On the whole donors complied, but the size of the Roghun campaign almost exactly wipes out the donor contributions meant to support the social sector and the poorest. Some households reportedly are taking on debt to buy Roghun shares, making households more vulnerable and reducing funds for consumption and productive activity. With teachers, doctors, and other medical staff among those having salaries withheld for Roghun, de facto social sector spending has been affected. Further, Health Ministry staff has appealed to USAID and other donors for more assistance because Roghun contributions are reducing peoples' ability to pay for healthcare. Students must pay to sit exams, get grades, and other education documents. The Business Climate Gets Worse ¶6. (SBU) Though the government took steps to improve its "Doing Business" ranking last year (ref D),the Roghun campaign reversed the progress. Businesses of all kinds have faced the hard sell. Foreign companies, barred by law from buying shares, have been told their licenses and other necessary documents depend on local employees contributing generously. Many companies say Roghun contributions will wipe out their investable funds and limit current operations. Small shops and marketers have been threatened with closure and in some cases closed for failure to contribute enough. People are seeking loans from microcredit organizations to buy Roghun shares. Rumors are rampant that a cut ranging from 3-25% is being DUSHANBE 00000171 003.2 OF 003 deducted from remittances and electronic fund transfers (EFTs). While the government has denied it, Embassy vendors are becoming increasingly reluctant to accept EFTs. True or not, people believe it, undermining already shaky confidence in the banks. Murkier Still ¶7. (SBU) The Roghun campaign is making opaque government finances even murkier. While the government now is reporting the amount raised through the Roghun campaign, it is not clear from where or whom most of the money is coming. The funds go to an off-budget account at a bank controlled by a presidential brother-in-law with some transferred to the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank, but details are scant. Some unknown portion of the money raised has come from government funds -- withheld from government salaries, appropriated by government employees to cover their contributions, or diverted from government revenue. Roghun joins Talco and Barqi Tojik as another government entity that lots of government money will flow to, from, and through without real accountability. Meanwhile, the value of the Roghun shares and rights of the shareholders are utterly undefined. Taking Steps ¶8. (SBU) Donors have raised some of these concerns to the government in a letter from the Donors Coordinating Committee to the Prime Minister. The IMF knows our concerns and the current Mission is looking at how the campaign is impacting poverty and growth (Refs E and F). One of the IMF questions to us was whether bilateral donors are concerned enough about the impact of the Roghun campaign to reevaluate any bilateral assistance. Donors have trodden carefully on the Roghun issue, not wanting to provoke an unproductive, nationalism-fueled accusation that they are obstructing Tajikistan's interests. How We Should Respond ¶9. (SBU) Comment: It is already difficult in Tajikistan to make progress toward many of our goals. A government campaign that directly undermines key goals raises serious issues for some of our programs. Our steps to improve the business climate or strengthen the banking sector are being overwhelmed by negative government action. In health and education, we are perilously close to a situation where the government sees these as responsibilities that it can foist on to donors while it diverts government money to projects in which officials have a financial interest. Our insistence that the government improve financial transparency as a condition of assistance is becoming ever more hollow as increased opacity bears no consequences. We should raise our concerns about the impact of the Roghun campaign on U.S. assistance goals directly with the government; seek an end to the current campaign, and concrete steps to ameliorate some of damage, including steps to improve transparency. We should push the government to commit to restructure Barqi Tojik to be transparent, commercial, and recover costs. This is essential to the energy sector and we can provide concrete assistance if they agree. If the government does not respond reasonably to our concerns, we should consider visibly halting some program as a direct response to specific concerns we have about the impact of Roghun on our goals. We need to demonstrate to the government, and to the public, that there are limits to what we will accept. While we face the potential accusation of undermining Tajikistan by lack of genuflection to Roghun as the savior of national sovereignty, if we allow Roghun to become a sacred crow that justifies any and all government behavior, we head down a much more dangerous path. We should not neglect the role of Talco in Tajikistan's electricity issues, as it lays at the heart of the problem, the solutions, and the motivations for government action. End comment. QUAST