TAJIK ELECTIONS: THE CAMPAIGN THAT WASN'T

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000165 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV TI SUBJECT: TAJIK ELECTIONS: THE CAMPAIGN THAT WASN'T REF: A) DUSHANBE 112; B) 09 DUSHANBE 1336 DUSHANBE 00000165 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Pro-Rahmon parties and MPs are well-positioned to expand their dominance of the Majlisi Namoyandagon in February 28 parliamentary elections. Opposition parties have waged lackluster campaigns, mostly relying on local officials to arrange their meetings with constituents. Independent media, on its heels after officials filed lawsuits against five newspapers for defamation, have given limited space to the campaign. The government has reneged on pledges to accredit non-partisan observers and facilitate debates on national television. Few single-mandate districts will be competitive, with at least one race a lock for a new, pro-government "pocket party". END SUMMARY ODIHR: POOR FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTIONS ¶2. (SBU) On February 4, the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) briefed diplomats on its initial assessment of Tajikistan's parliamentary election campaign. ODIHR Chief Artis Pabriks said Tajikistan does not have a solid legal framework for elections because it did not adopt any of ODIHR's recommendations to improve its elections law. There is no central voter register and election law does not provide for officials to issue observers copies of election results after they complete their vote counts. Pabriks said the CCER promised to direct local polling stations to post a copy of vote totals for public viewing. ¶3. (SBU) The CCER informed ODIHR it will not accredit non-partisan local observers to monitor elections, despite CCER Chief Boltuyev's oral commitments to Ambassador Gross and the OSCE (Reftel B). Pabriks welcomed President Rahmon's public commitments to be "guarantor" of free elections, but noted that state media has covered the government's Roghun campaign far more than elections. Overall media coverage of the campaign has been "low-key." The CCER has not yet allotted political parties and candidates their 30 minutes and 15 minutes of respective airtime to address voters on national television. Independent print media has published interviews with opposition party leaders, but have not been able to focus on election coverage since government officials sued five newspapers for slander in three separate cases. PUBLIC DOESN'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT PARTIES, BUT LIKES THE PDPT ¶4. (SBU) Lack of coverage of opposition political parties has been good to the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT). A public opinion poll by the USAID-funded International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) reported that nine out of ten voters had a positive impression of the ruling party. However, almost half said they do not have enough information to make a wise voting decision. Nine of ten said they heard little or nothing about the February 28 polls. Seven in ten are unaware of any party's platform. Voters' biggest concerns were electricity supply and corruption, with nearly nine in ten calling corruption a serious problem. 63% said they voted in the 2005 parliamentary election--well below the CCER's turnout figure of 92.5% and above ODIHR's estimates that the real turnout was around 30%. (NOTE: These statistics should be considered with some skepticism; some Tajiks may be hesitant to criticize the ruling party when interviewed by a pollster. END NOTE) PARTIES WAIT FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS TO TELL THEM WHEN TO CAMPAIGN ¶5. (SBU) Officials are required to release a schedule of political meetings for each candidate to meet with voters. Most candidates wait for officials to arrange these events. Although candidates are allowed to organize their campaign events independently, many opposition candidates rely entirely on these official meetings to reach the public, arguing that traditional voter outreach is not possible in Tajikistan. Candidates generally have not gone into the markets to shake hands, meet voters, and hand out party literature. For the most part, party leaders have waged their campaign by attending roundtables and DUSHANBE 00000165 002.2 OF 003 giving interviews to independent newspapers. Opposition parties have not launched visible marketing campaigns, put up fliers, or held large, public rallies, citing lack of financing and their belief that the government would not permit them to do so. ¶6. (SBU) A locally engaged Embassy employee, Muhibulloh Qurbon, running in Isfara district as an Islamic Renewal Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) candidate, said that local officials have arranged several meetings for him to interact with voters. Separately, however, officials have gathered community leaders and asked them to encourage residents in Isfara to vote for the PDPT. PDPT, POCKET PARTIES SET TO DOMINATE ¶7. (SBU) The ruling party will maintain or expand its current majority in the Majlisi Namoyandagon and be joined by at least one new pro-government "pocket party", according to Abdughani Mamadazimov, head of Tajikistan's National Association of Political Scientists (NAPS). He predicted that the IRPT would likely keep its two party-list seats, but had a chance to win one or two individual mandate races. Most Tajiks viewed the IRPT as an "Islamist" party, despite Party Chairman Kabiri's efforts to play down religious elements of the IRPT's platform. "They know that the PDPT stands for electricity, Roghun, the President, and stability. They think the IRPT are the people that started the civil war." State media has recently aired Tajik civil war documentaries that the IRPT complains associates them with Islamist rebels. ¶8. (SBU) Mamadzazimov predicted the Agrarian Party of Tajikistan (APT) and Party of Economic Reforms (PER),both created by the government since the last election, also would win seats. The Communists would likely lose a couple of their five seats. Post's district-by-district analysis of the 41 single-mandate races predicts that only 8 to 10 races would be competitive in a free and fair poll. In most districts, PDPT candidates are running against only token opposition (little known independents, APT, or PER candidates). In several districts, only the PDPT is running candidates. Mamadzazimov said that most voters knew that elections were scheduled for February 28, but few had any idea what they were for or who would be running. NO NATIONAL DEBATES OR INDEPENDENT LOCAL OBSERVERS ¶7. (SBU) The European Union funded NAPS to organize nationally broadcast pre-election debates on state television and train 800 local, non-partisan observers to monitor the elections. On both counts, the government broke its oral commitments to facilitate these initiatives. NAPS was unable to get state television to agree to broadcast debates. While television officials did not reject the proposal outright, they effectively quashed the plan with bureaucratic delays and requirements. IFES was also unable to arrange a party debate on state television. The CCER explained that because there is no specific legal provision for accreditation of non-partisan observers, they would not accredit NGO-representatives trained by NAPS. NAPS is now focusing on training local party observers. ¶8. (SBU) Based on Post's analysis of single-mandate races, we will deploy Embassy monitors to eight target districts where competitive opposition candidates are running. The Embassy plans to deploy 32 U.S. and Locally Engaged Staff, including four U.S. staff members who will be accredited as ODIHR locally recruited observers. The CCER gave an oral commitment to accredit both U.S. and Locally Engaged Staff. The Embassy plans to deploy observers to Rudaki district, Rasht district, Konibodom district, Kulob district, Gorno Badakhsan, and three districts in Dushanbe. ¶9. COMMENT: Given the public's lack of awareness of opposition parties due to the lack of election coverage by state and independent media, the government does not need to commit DUSHANBE 00000165 003.2 OF 003 widespread fraud to secure another majority for the PDPT and pocket parties, although fraud is likely in close races. By torpedoing plans for a nationally televised debate and limiting media election coverage, the government has managed to keep the public ignorant of political discourse. The political parties have done little to change the status quo; they are so accustomed to being denied the opportunity to interact with voters that they make little effort to get out and meet the people. The CCER's refusal to accredit independent observers, after pledging otherwise to the Embassy, is a reminder that it should not be taken too seriously when it makes commitments to conduct free and fair elections. END COMMENT QUAST