DJIBOUTI: SCENESETTER ON SECURITY ISSUES FOR ASD VERSHBOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 000037

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/E AND AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
SECDEF FOR ASD VERSHBOW AND DASD HUDDLESTON
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/19
TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL PHSA DJ SO AU YM ER IR
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: SCENESETTER ON SECURITY ISSUES FOR ASD VERSHBOW

REF: 10 DJIBOUTI 31; 10 DJIBOUTI 3; 09 DJIBOUTI 1247
09 DJIBOUTI 1205; 09 DJIBOUTI 1152; 09 DJIBOUTI 1035; 09 DJIBOUTI 919
09 DJIBOUTI 895; 09 DJIBOUTI 761; 09 DJIBOUTI 551; 09 DJIBOUTI 453

CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S.
Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(A),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Embassy Djibouti warmly welcomes Assistant
Secretary of Defense Vershbow and his party to Djibouti. A stable,
moderate Muslim ally, Djibouti not only hosts Camp Lemonnier -- the
only U.S. military base in Africa -- but also key USG broadcasting
facilities used by Arabic-language Radio Sawa and the Voice of
America Somali Service, the only USAID Food For Peace warehouse for
pre-positioned emergency food relief outside CONUS, and naval
refueling facilities for U.S. and coalition ships. Situated
between Somalia and Eritrea, and adjacent to the Gulf of Aden,
Djibouti's key political-military concerns currently focus on
providing diplomatic and military support to Somalia's Transitional
Federal Government (TFG),led by President Sheikh Sharif; as well
as on countering the persistent threat from Eritrea's continued
occupation of Djiboutian territory along their common border, and
from ethnic Afar rebels suspected to have infiltrated Djibouti from
training camps in Eritrea. In recent months, the Djiboutian
leadership has also grown increasingly concerned about developments
in Yemen, which is just 18 miles across the Bab-el-Mandeb strait.
Despite the relatively small size of its armed forces
(approximately 5,000),Djibouti is making significant contributions
to promoting regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa:
actively engaged in providing basic military training to Somali TFG
recruits; monitoring Djibouti's border with Eritrea; recently
completed hosting and participating with other critical regional
partners like Rwanda and Uganda in the first large-scale field
training exercise involving the African Union's East Africa Standby
Force (EASF),also known as the East Africa Standby Brigade
(EASBRIG); and has committed to send 450 troops to participate in
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Bilateral
engagement with Djibouti remains robust: construction of a USD 120
million New Embassy Compound is now underway, scheduled for
completion in 2011; and the first resident defense attache (DATT)
arrived in September 2009. In September 2009, the bilateral
agreement on access to and use of Camp Lemonnier was renewed
through an exchange of diplomatic notes between the USG and the
GODJ, with no change in terms, for the years 2010-2015. END
SUMMARY.



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URGENT NEED TO BOLSTER SOMALI TFG FORCES

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2. (C) Djibouti has provided significant diplomatic and military
support to the TFG in neighboring Somalia, a country with whom a
majority of the Djiboutian population shares a common language and
ethnicity. Djibouti was instrumental in garnering international
support for TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and hosted
UN-sponsored Somali reconciliation talks from May 2008 to January

2009. This "Djibouti Peace Process" culminated in President
Sharif's inauguration at Djibouti's Kempinski Hotel in January
2009, in the presence of international observers (including the
U.S. Special Envoy for Somalia). These efforts were opposed by
Hassan Dahir Aweys, formerly head of the Asmara-based extremist
wing of the Alliance of the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS),and now
head of Hizb al-Islam.


3. (C/NF) The security conditions in Mogadishu have made
strengthening military support of the TFG one of Djibouti's highest
priorities (ref F). Djiboutian plans to assist with the military
training of up to 1,000 TFG recruits have involved the most senior
GODJ principals--including President Guelleh and the CHOD, Major
General Fathi Ahmed Houssein. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali
Youssouf has informed the USG that the GODJ provided at least two
shipments of weapons to the TFG in May 2009 (IIR 6 830 010009). At
the direction of President Guelleh, beginning July 5, the GODJ
began airlifting TFG recruits from cantonment areas in Mogadishu to
Djibouti for basic military training, using charter aircraft.




4. (C) Somali TFG Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar has
highlighted Djibouti's training of TFG recruits as a critical
element in achieving the TFG's aim of training up to 3,000 recruits
to form a new Somali army (ref G). The Djiboutian Armed Forces
(FAD) trained approximately 463 Somali military recruits at the
FAD's "President Gouled" Military School, its primary training
center, located in Hol Hol, 45km southwest of Djibouti's capital.
Training began in early July 2009 and was completed in mid-October

2009. FAD instructors provided the recruits with basic infantry
training; live-fire training commenced July 26, 2009. Senior U.S.
officials, including VADM Moeller, visited the Hol Hol site on July
12, 2009. CJTF-HOA delivered material items (including tents,
cots, and water tanks) to Hol Hol, to support Djiboutian training
efforts, and State Department Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds
were used to backfill kit and equipment provided by the Djiboutians
to the Somali trainees.




5. (C) Separately, French forces in Djibouti (FFDJ) trained an
additional 150 TFG forces at French facilities in Arta,
approximately 40km west of the capital. Upon completion of their
training in September 2009, these recruits were moved to Hol Hol
for integration with the 463 TFG soldiers receiving training from
the Djiboutian military. All the recruits returned to Somalia in
October 2009. A second tranche of TFG recruits is also scheduled
to be trained by the Diboutian military, but there are no specifics
currently available.



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ACOTA

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6. (C) In September 2009, Djibouti became the 25th African partner
in the Africa Contingency Operations and Training Assistance
(ACOTA) program. According to Djiboutian Foreign Minister Youssouf
and the FAD, Djibouti is considering deploying a battalion of
troops (approximately 400-450 troops) to Mogadishu, in support of
AMISOM (ref C). It has also discussed sending 4-5 mid- to
senior-level officers to AMISOM as interpreters/advisors. The
Djiboutian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that after a
review it has been determined that there is no legal impediment
barring frontline states bordering Somalia to contribute forces.
ACOTA moderated a Training Strategy Conference (TSC) in Djibouti
from 11-14 January 2010 with Djiboutian civilian and military
officials, to determine the way ahead for participation in AMISOM
and other multilateral peacekeeping operations.



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UNSCR SANCTIONS ERITREA FOR BORDER STANDOFF

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7. (C) Despite condemnation by the international community (e.g.,
AU, IGAD, UNSC, LAS, OIC),the Eritrean military continues to
occupy fortified positions on Djiboutian territory at Ras Doumeira,
nearly two years after June 2008 hostilities. Djibouti reports 19
FAD troops remain missing in action, including a prominent colonel;
coincidentally, Djibouti is holding 19 Eritreans as POWs. The ICRC
reports that the 19 POWs in Djiboutian custody are in good
condition; Eritrea has refused to acknowledge that it is holding
any POWs from Djibouti (ref J). Approximately 30 per cent of
Djibouti's relatively modest (5,000-strong) military remains
deployed at the border with Eritrea; Djibouti's Prime Minister has
publicly asserted that this continued deployment costs USD 5
million/month, a figure that IMF officials assess may be accurate.
To help reduce the necessity of maintaining so many Djiboutian
troops along the border, the USG has provided imagery-derived
analyses of Eritrean troop locations at the border to Djiboutian
officials.




8. (C) Djibouti also asserts that it has captured several ethnic
Afar rebels who infiltrated Djibouti to conduct subversion, after
being trained at camps in Eritrea (refs A, I).




9. (C) On the diplomatic front, Djibouti has sought international
sanctions against Eritrea for its military occupation of Djiboutian
territory, as well as for its support of al-Shabaab extremists in
Somalia. On 23 December 2009, the United Nations Security Council
passed Security Council Resolution 1907, imposing an arms embargo
on Eritrea, as well as travel restrictions and a freeze on the
assets of its political and military leaders.



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CONCERN OVER YEMEN

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10. (C) Over the past several months, GODJ leadership has expressed
growing concern over developments in Yemen (ref B). Djibouti has a
small ethnic-Yemeni population (less than 5 percent),is less than
18 miles from Yemen across the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, and sees
frequent movement of people and goods between the two countries.
In addition to fears they will be caught between two centers of
extremism--Somalia and Yemen--the Djiboutians believe that Houthi
rebels are also benefiting from Iranian assistance provided with
the support of Eritrea. Djibouti is supportive of measures to
reinforce Yemeni President Saleh's government and act against
terrorist targets.



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EASBRIG FTX NOVEMBER 2009

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11. (C) Despite the security challenges posed by its immediate
neighbors, Somalia and Eritrea, Djibouti hosted a large-scale field
training exercise (FTX) on behalf of the African Union's East
African Standby Force, from 30 November to 4 December 2009. The
FTX involved approximately 1,500 troops as well as 400 support
personnel. Participating countries (either sending troops or
observers) included Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia,
Sudan, Comoros, and Seychelles. The EASBRIG military commander is

Brigadier General Osman Nour Soubagleh (one of four flag officers
in the Djiboutian military). The GODJ received US, French, and
other donor support for the FTX to include tents, sanitation
equipment (e.g., portable toilets),and support for site
preparations (ref H). A USG contribution of nearly $2 million from
the AFRICOM Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund was gratefully
received by the Djiboutians and helped reinforce our security
partnership (ref D). The FTX was completed successfully and the
after action review is ongoing.



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BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT TO STRENGTHEN MARITIME CAPABILITIES

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12. (C) The Embassy manages a wide array of security assistance
projects aimed at strengthening Djibouti's maritime capabilities,
including:

-- the provision of patrol boats to the Djiboutian Navy;

-- the December 2008 completion of the USD 14 million FMF-financed
Obock naval pier (approximately 75 km south of the strategic
Bab-al-Mandeb Strait); and

-- ongoing installation of an USD 8 million Regional Maritime
Awareness Capability (RMAC),comprising AIS, coastal radar, and the
establishment of an operations center for the Djiboutian Navy. The
RMAC installation is scheduled to be completed 28 January 2010.

-- In addition, the Embassy is coordinating with the U.S.
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Safety Administration
(DOE/NNSA) on a USD 6-10 million "Megaports" project to install
sensors at the Port of Djibouti's new Doraleh Container Terminal,
which will detect the transshipment of radioactive materials (09
DJIBOUTI 453). Construction is slated to begin in 2010.

-- General Ward's participation in a July 30, 2009, ribbon-cutting
ceremony with the Commander of the Djiboutian Navy, COL Abdourahman
Aden Cher, marked the launch of a U.S. Navy harbor security unit at
the Port of Djibouti to provide improved force protection to
visiting U.S. ships. This concurrence was codified in a formal MOU
signed between COL Cher and the Camp Lemonnier commanding officer
(09 DJIBOUTI 449).

-- In October 2009, a full-time U.S. Navy liaison officer (O-3
level) completed a three-month assignment to Djiboutian Navy
headquarters--fulfilling a long-term request by Djiboutian Navy
Commander, COL Cher, for a USN LNO. To date, the position has not
been backfilled.



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COUNTER-PIRACY HUB

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13. (U) Djibouti continues to serve as a key hub for international
counter-piracy operations, including the European Union's
"Atalanta" naval task force, the NATO Standing Maritime Group I,
Combined Task Force 151, and a historic overseas deployment by the
Japanese military. The foreign ministers of Japan and Djibouti
signed a bilateral status of forces agreement (SOFA) in Tokyo on
April 4, 2009. Beginning on May 31, 2009, Japan deployed
approximately 150 Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) troops to Camp
Lemonnier, to support two P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft
conducting counter-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia. In

addition, Japan has deployed two destroyers to Djibouti for
counter-piracy operations (09 DJIBOUTI 255).




14. (C) Japanese diplomats report that Japan seeks to establish its
own military base in Djibouti, in the vicinity of Camp Lemonnier,
due to plans for a long-term presence in Djibouti. According to
Japanese contacts, strategic interests led to Japan's parliament
revising the constitution to expand the Japanese contingent's rules
of engagement; approximately 10 per cent of international shipping
going through the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait is Japanese, including all
of Japan's automobile exports to Europe. Djibouti and Japan have
not yet concluded any new basing agreement, but consultations are
ongoing.



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CAMP LEMONNIER AGREEMENT RENEWED

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15. (C) During a visit in mid-June 2009, DASD Huddleston verbally
informed Foreign Minister Youssouf of the USG's intent to exercise
its option to renew the May 2006 Implementing Arrangement, for
access to and use of Camp Lemonnier (ref I). The May 2006
Implementing Arrangement (signed in Washington, DC, by then DASD
Whalen) was due to expire September 30, 2010. However, it was
extended in September 2009 for a five-year period (i.e., 2010-2015)
"without renegotiation of terms or compensation" when the U.S.
Embassy provided written notice in a formal diplomatic note to the
GODJ. The GODJ accepted the extension with no change in current
terms or compensation (ref E).
SWAN