Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10DJIBOUTI35
2010-01-19 06:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:  

EMBASSY DJIBOUTI HOLDS EAC TO DISCUSS TERRORISM AND VISAS

Tags:  ASEC CVIS PTER PINR DJ 
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VZCZCXRO1249
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHDJ #0035 0190634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 190625Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1248
INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 000035 

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/19
TAGS: ASEC CVIS PTER PINR DJ
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DJIBOUTI HOLDS EAC TO DISCUSS TERRORISM AND VISAS
VIPER PROGRAM

REF: 10 STATE 2602; 09 STATE 132497

CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S.
Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(D),(G)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 000035 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/19 TAGS: ASEC CVIS PTER PINR DJ SUBJECT: EMBASSY DJIBOUTI HOLDS EAC TO DISCUSS TERRORISM AND VISAS VIPER PROGRAM REF: 10 STATE 2602; 09 STATE 132497 CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(D),(G) ¶1. (SBU) Per ref A, Post convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting on January 13 to review VISAS VIPERS procedures. Attendees included: DCM (chair),CONS/PD, ORA, MGT, NCIS, OBO, acting RSO, DATT, and USAID. ¶2. (U) EAC members reviewed the purpose and procedures for "VISAS VIPER" reporting, and received copies of written guidance on VISAS VIPERS (9 FAM 40.37 Notes). In light of recent events, the need for full participation was stressed, and all sections were encouraged to refer any questions relating to the program to the Consular Section and/or RSO for clarification. ¶3. (C) EAC members discussed current terrorism issues in the region, including recent unconfirmed state-run media reports of a January 9 attack on a Djiboutian military vehicle at Daoudaouya, Golodaba sector, Yoboki, which reportedly wounded 4 troops. The consensus of the EAC was that current travel warnings and the Embassy's current heightened security posture were sufficient at this time. EAC members highlighted the mission's requirement that mission personnel seeking to travel outside the capital provide advance notification to the RSO. In the event that reports of attacks on vehicles (e.g., from grenades or mines) were later substantiated, the EAC proposed additional coordination with host country security authorities, to provide police or national gendarmerie escorts while traveling in affected areas. ¶4. (U) Point of contact is acting RSO, D. Ryan Williams. SWAN

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