DJIBOUTI: S/CT AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN AND GODJ NATIONAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 000199

SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT AND AF/RSA
NAIROBI FOR S.MADSEN
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/22
TAGS: PTER PINS PREL EAID MASS DJ SO ER YM
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: S/CT AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN AND GODJ NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSS ERITREA, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA

REF: 10 DJIBOUTI 13

CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S.
Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Djibouti's key security concerns include Eritrean
sponsorship of al-Shabaab fighters as well as ethnic-Afar rebels,
al-Qa'ida forces allying with al-Houthi rebels in neighboring
Yemen, and maintaining the loyalty of Somali TFG forces combating
Islamic extremists, according to Djiboutian National Security
Advisor Hassan Said Khaireh. The presence of over 5,000 foreign
troops (nearly half of whom are U.S. forces at Camp Lemonnier)
raises concern among Djiboutian security officials that terrorists
may attempt to target Djibouti. Key areas where Djibouti seeks USG
assistance to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities include:
border protection (e.g., equipment to screen travelers from
neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia),training of personnel;
establishment of a laboratory for analysis; and material support
for counterterrorism forces (e.g., vehicles, arms, and equipment).
END SUMMARY.




2. (U) On January 28, S/CT Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Ambassador Daniel Benjamin met with Hassan Said Khaireh, who is
triple-hatted as Djibouti's National Security Advisor, Director of
Djibouti's National Security Service (DNSS),and head of President
Ismail Omar Guelleh's Office of Military Affairs. Ambassador
Swan, S/CT Mark Thompson, and DCM (note-taker) accompanied
Ambassador Benjamin. Hassan Said was accompanied by Abdillahi
Mohamed Abdillahi, deputy director of the DNSS.




3. (S/NF) Also accompanying Ambassador Benjamin's party were GRPO
chief; COL Rich Clarke, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)
J-3; and MAJ Craig Miller, JSOC Liaison to S/CT.



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DJIBOUTI FEARS THREAT TO ALLIED MILITARY FORCES

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4. (S/NF) Hassan Said expressed appreciation for the USG's close
collaboration with the Government of Djibouti (GODJ). He welcomed
Amb. Benjamin's visit, noting that President Guelleh had directed
him to "sensitize" the USG delegation to the threats Djibouti
faced. Djibouti's counterterrorism efforts had begun, Hassan Said
noted, in 1991. Since 2001, Djibouti had welcomed working with the
United States, France, other European countries, and Asia. There
were now more than 5,000 foreign troops in Djibouti representing a
possible target for terrorists, including extremists from
neighboring Yemen and Somalia. To counter such threats, the GODJ
not only partnered with U.S. and European allies, but also
exchanged threat information with other authorities in the region
(including Somalia, Somaliland, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen).
Liaison with security services of neighboring countries had led to
success in detaining suspects, as well as to deterring or stopping
potential threats. As the GODJ was responsible for protecting
expatriate members of the diplomatic and international community in
Djibouti, it needed to work with foreign intelligence services and
foreign militaries to guarantee security.




5. (C) Since 2009, piracy off the coast of Somalia had also become
an issue for concern, Hassan Said added, further exacerbating fears
that Djibouti was a target for terrorists and other hostile
elements. (NOTE: Djibouti plays a prominent role in supporting
international counterpiracy efforts, not only as a venue for key
conferences organized by the International Maritime Organization,

DJIBOUTI 00000199 002 OF 004


but also by hosting the European Union's "Atalanta" counterpiracy
naval task force, and by hosting the historic deployment of
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces destroyers and P-3 maritime
surveillance aircraft since May 2009. END NOTE.)




6. (C) To address "all the facets of terrorism in the region," the
GODJ had created a rapid intervention force. However, Djibouti's
limited resources meant it could not fight terrorism alone;
Djibouti therefore called on the United States as a key partner to
provide assistance. Djibouti also sought assistance from other
countries, including "friendly" Arab states, Hassan Said noted.



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AREAS FOR USG COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE

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7. (C) Hassan Said identified the following areas as priorities for
possible donor assistance from the USG:

-- border protection: specifically equipment to screen the large
number of trucks and other vehicles traveling from neighboring
Somalia and Ethiopia;

-- training of personnel: for those responsible for monitoring
cross-border movements; the GODJ also seeks training in explosives
detection;

-- establishment of a laboratory, to support scientific analysis;

-- vehicles, arms, and equipment: to provide the GODJ with the
"means of intervention" (vehicles were needed to transport GODJ
security service components responsible for anti-terrorism
functions, including the National Gendarmerie's Intervention Group
(GIGN) and the newly established coast guard);

-- other unidentified "preventive measures" that could be employed
by GODJ security forces.




8. (C) Hassan Said highlighted his concern that the USG had
sometimes been "tardy" in its response to previous host country
requests. In response, Amb. Benjamin concurred that the USG's
budgeting and planning processes were lengthy.



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TOP CONCERNS: AL-SHABAAB, YEMEN, ERITREA

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9. (C) Djibouti's greatest security concern, according to Hassan
Said, was al-Shabaab and other Islamic groups -- including Hisbul
Islam and even Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) -- who could exert
undue influence on Djibouti's (moderate Islamic) population. A
priority for the GODJ was therefore identifying those who sought to
radicalize the population by establishing madrassas or similar
institutions. Such radicalization was already evident in Somalia,
where Somalis who had travelled to Yemen and Pakistan for 4-6
months of "religious instruction" had received ideological
indoctrination.

DJIBOUTI 00000199 003 OF 004



10. (S) As for Saudi influence on mosques, Hassan Said observed
that in mid-2007 the GODJ had expelled a Saudi diplomat
(al-Kouflehli, NFI) who had headed the Saudi Islamic Institute in
Djibouti. While declared persona non grata by the GODJ, the former
Saudi diplomat now ran relief operations in Ethiopia's Ogaden
region; a dual Sudanese-Djiboutian national who headed a Saudi NGO
remained in contact with him, Hassan Said added.




11. (C) Yemen was also a key concern for Djibouti, due to the
presence of al-Qa'ida, as well as the threat of southern secession.
Al-Houthi rebels had forged an alliance with al-Qa'ida forces,
Hassan Said asserted, as demonstrated by the large number of
al-Qa'ida representatives found in regions controlled by al-Houthi
(e.g., Sa'dah). Houthi businessmen reportedly financed
tuition-free universities that fostered extremists, and al-Qa'ida
financed non-Yemeni students (including French nationals and other
Europeans) to study at universities in Yemen.



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ERITREA TRAINING AL-SHABAAB AND AFAR REBELS

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12. (S) Eritrea represented another threat to Djibouti's security,
Hassan Said observed, particularly as it continued to construct
military fortifications on Djiboutian territory (at Ras Doumeira)
occupied since at least June 2008. Despite international
condemnation from the United Nations Security Council, the European
Union, IGAD, the African Union, and others, Eritrean troops still
had not withdrawn (as Djiboutian troops had) to establish a neutral
"no-man's land". Hassan Said asserted that there were links
between al-Shabaab and Eritrea: Djiboutian diplomats in Cairo had
reported encountering Somali youth who had been trained in Eritrea,
by the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE),for operations in
Djibouti, and who were members of al-Shabaab. Such Somalis trained
in Eritrean camps needed to be returned to Somalia, Hassan Said
added.




13. (C) Eritrea was attempting to reestablish an Afar-dominated
liberation front to destabilize Djibouti, and was also training
ethnic-Afar rebels in Eritrea, Hassan Said stated. Noting the
1994 and 2000 peace agreements that had ended the civil war between
the ethnic-Somali dominated Djiboutian administration and the
ethnic-Afar rebel group, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and
Democracy (FRUD),Hassan Said observed that Eritrea was training
militant Afars from Ethiopia and Eritrea--as there was insufficient
support for the rebel cause among Afars in Djibouti.




14. (C) Questioned about his outlook for neighboring Somalia,
Hassan Said responded that one key mechanism for addressing
counterterrorism in Somalia was simply securing adequate financial
resources. Specifically, funds were needed to pay wages to the
Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) troops. Despite its own
extremely limited resources, Djibouti had provided assistance to
the TFG, including training several hundred TFG troops to serve as
a "vanguard" for a revitalized national army of Somalia. He noted
that Sudan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia were among those countries now
providing material support to the TFG. As a result, the TFG was
now preparing an operation to "decimate the Islamicists," he

DJIBOUTI 00000199 004 OF 004


declared.




15. (C) COMMENT. Despite Djibouti's status as the most stable
country in the Horn of Africa, Djiboutian security officials remain
vigilant in the face of suspected Eritrean-sponsored rebel
activity, al-Shabaab threats from neighboring Somalia, and the
presence of al-Qa'ida forces in neighboring Yemen. A small country
with limited resources, Djibouti has nevertheless placed itself at
the forefront of international efforts to promote regional
security. Djibouti's diplomatic and military support for Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government (ranging from hosting UN-sponsored
"Djibouti Process" peace talks, to training TFG troops, and
publicly committing to deploy a battalion to support AMISOM); its
hosting of international counterpiracy contingents (e.g., from the
EU and Japan); and its hosting of U.S. and French bases, including
Camp Lemonnier, the only U.S. military base in Africa - underscore
President Guelleh's active support for strategic goals that advance
U.S. interests. These activities, however, have also raised the
profile of Djibouti, and the concern that terrorist elements may
find Djibouti an irresistible target, if its counterterrorism
capabilities are not strengthened. END COMMENT.




16. (U) This cable was cleared by S/CT.
SWAN