Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10DARESSALAAM57
2010-01-26 10:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Cable title:
FM MEMBE ON AU SUMMIT (LIBYA, FRANCE, AND SOMALIA)
VZCZCXRO7918 RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHDR #0057 0261035 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 261035Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9254 INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1528 RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1560 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0056 RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 3083 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0104 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0003 RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 3361 RHMFISS/CJTF HOA//J3
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 000057
SIPDIS
AF/E FOR TREADWELL, INR FOR EHRENREICH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL TZ SO LY FR MA
SUBJECT: FM MEMBE ON AU SUMMIT (LIBYA, FRANCE, AND SOMALIA)
REF: A. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 96
B. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 301
C. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 869
D. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 516
Classified By: Ambassador Alfonso E. Lenhardt for reasons 1.4 (b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 000057
SIPDIS
AF/E FOR TREADWELL, INR FOR EHRENREICH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL TZ SO LY FR MA
SUBJECT: FM MEMBE ON AU SUMMIT (LIBYA, FRANCE, AND SOMALIA)
REF: A. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 96
B. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 301
C. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 869
D. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 516
Classified By: Ambassador Alfonso E. Lenhardt for reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Bernard Membe previewed for
Ambassador Lenhardt his expectations of the upcoming African
Union Summit January 25. Membe expressed concern about a
Libyan move to retain the AU Chair, which Tanzania would
oppose. He criticized the French role in Madagascar and
elsewhere on the continent and put out a feeler on possible
U.S. support for Tanzanian training of Somali troops. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) FM Membe said Tanzania was concerned with Libya's
resistance to Malawi assuming the AU Chair. He said Qaddafi
wanted a second term to transform the AU into a continental
government, with the further aim of giving Qaddafi a UN
Security Council seat with veto power. Membe said Tanzania
opposed a second term for Qaddafi, which had no
justification. He said Libya's fallback plan was to pull out
of the AU, along with 21 other countries. Membe added that
Qaddafi was pushing for member states to ratify the amendment
to the Constitutive Act that would enable the AU Commission
to become an Authority. Membe suggested that many had not
done so because of Qaddafi's pressure for a continental
government.
3. (C) Membe turned to a discussion of "hot spots," with a
particular attention to the negative influence of France. On
Madagascar, Membe said he suspected the French were "putting
their hands in" to complicate the situation. He said
Rajoelina was resisting the appeal to comply with the
Chissano recommendations for a transitional government and
was insisting on running the transition himself, without a
coalition. Membe asserted SADC would retain its sanctions on
Madagascar. Membe went on to assert that the French have
maintained control of security and intelligence matters in
their former colonies since independence and are still
recruiting and training intelligence officers for those
countries. He added that all the recent African coups had
occurred in Francophone countries (Note: he included
Lusophone Guinea-Bissau. End Note.): "We don't know why but
we fear France is responsible." He said SADC might "point a
finger" at France during the Summit. (Comment: This is not
the first time Membe has spoken ill of the French. See ref
b.)
4. (C) Membe concluded by touching on Somalia, where he said
things were going well. He said he had called the Turkish
Foreign Minister to advise letting the "International Contact
Group" to conclude its work (ref c). Membe noted the Summit
would discuss sanctions on Eritrea and ways to improve
security in Somalia, including working with Nigeria, Ghana,
Senegal and Malawi to fill AMISOM's gap of six thousand
troops. Recalling that Tanzania had offered to train one
thousand Somali soldiers in 2008, Membe said Somalia was
preparing to send a delegation to Tanzania to discuss the
training again. He asked whether the U.S. could provide
logistic and financial support for the training, as we had
offered in the past. (Comment: When this issue last surfaced
seriously in 2007, U.S. support was contingent on the
government of Somalia providing a clan-vetted list of
officers to be trained, which never materialized. Moreover,
the U.S. proposal in 2007 was to support training 250
officers, not 1000. With Tanzania now committed to training
Congolese troops for MONUC, the capacity of the Tanzanian
Peoples Defense Force to train Somalis as well may be
limited. See ref d and prior.)
LENHARDT
SIPDIS
AF/E FOR TREADWELL, INR FOR EHRENREICH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL TZ SO LY FR MA
SUBJECT: FM MEMBE ON AU SUMMIT (LIBYA, FRANCE, AND SOMALIA)
REF: A. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 96
B. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 301
C. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 869
D. 2009 DAR ES SALAAM 516
Classified By: Ambassador Alfonso E. Lenhardt for reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Bernard Membe previewed for
Ambassador Lenhardt his expectations of the upcoming African
Union Summit January 25. Membe expressed concern about a
Libyan move to retain the AU Chair, which Tanzania would
oppose. He criticized the French role in Madagascar and
elsewhere on the continent and put out a feeler on possible
U.S. support for Tanzanian training of Somali troops. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) FM Membe said Tanzania was concerned with Libya's
resistance to Malawi assuming the AU Chair. He said Qaddafi
wanted a second term to transform the AU into a continental
government, with the further aim of giving Qaddafi a UN
Security Council seat with veto power. Membe said Tanzania
opposed a second term for Qaddafi, which had no
justification. He said Libya's fallback plan was to pull out
of the AU, along with 21 other countries. Membe added that
Qaddafi was pushing for member states to ratify the amendment
to the Constitutive Act that would enable the AU Commission
to become an Authority. Membe suggested that many had not
done so because of Qaddafi's pressure for a continental
government.
3. (C) Membe turned to a discussion of "hot spots," with a
particular attention to the negative influence of France. On
Madagascar, Membe said he suspected the French were "putting
their hands in" to complicate the situation. He said
Rajoelina was resisting the appeal to comply with the
Chissano recommendations for a transitional government and
was insisting on running the transition himself, without a
coalition. Membe asserted SADC would retain its sanctions on
Madagascar. Membe went on to assert that the French have
maintained control of security and intelligence matters in
their former colonies since independence and are still
recruiting and training intelligence officers for those
countries. He added that all the recent African coups had
occurred in Francophone countries (Note: he included
Lusophone Guinea-Bissau. End Note.): "We don't know why but
we fear France is responsible." He said SADC might "point a
finger" at France during the Summit. (Comment: This is not
the first time Membe has spoken ill of the French. See ref
b.)
4. (C) Membe concluded by touching on Somalia, where he said
things were going well. He said he had called the Turkish
Foreign Minister to advise letting the "International Contact
Group" to conclude its work (ref c). Membe noted the Summit
would discuss sanctions on Eritrea and ways to improve
security in Somalia, including working with Nigeria, Ghana,
Senegal and Malawi to fill AMISOM's gap of six thousand
troops. Recalling that Tanzania had offered to train one
thousand Somali soldiers in 2008, Membe said Somalia was
preparing to send a delegation to Tanzania to discuss the
training again. He asked whether the U.S. could provide
logistic and financial support for the training, as we had
offered in the past. (Comment: When this issue last surfaced
seriously in 2007, U.S. support was contingent on the
government of Somalia providing a clan-vetted list of
officers to be trained, which never materialized. Moreover,
the U.S. proposal in 2007 was to support training 250
officers, not 1000. With Tanzania now committed to training
Congolese troops for MONUC, the capacity of the Tanzanian
Peoples Defense Force to train Somalis as well may be
limited. See ref d and prior.)
LENHARDT