CONGRESSMAN HASTINGS' JANUARY 7 MEETING WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DAMASCUS 000019

H PASS
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM IR LE IZ TU SY
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN HASTINGS' JANUARY 7 MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT ASAD

REF: DAMASCUS 00008

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Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Congressman Alcee Hastings met President
Bashar al-Asad on January 7 for a cordial one-hour discussion
on how the U.S. and Syria might improve regional stability.
During the meeting, the congressman told the president he
would advocate for Syria to be granted observer status with
the Mediterranean Partnership of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly
(OSCE-PA). In addition, he expressed interest in having a
Syrian national serve as one of his interns at some point in
the future, an offer the president clearly viewed favorably.
Asad covered familiar ground substantively on regional
stability, peace talks with Israel, Syrian views on Iraq,
support for refugees, and Iran's nuclear program. He
appeared to show even more openness than he had with CODEL
Gregg (reftel) on the subject of reopening the Damascus
Community School. End Summary.

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Welcomes and Thanks Set Positive Atmospherics
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2. (S) President Asad welcomed Congressmen Hastings' visit
and noted how important it was for U.S. officials to come and
gain a fuller understanding of the country, its people and
culture, so as to have the appropriate context within which
to analyze "the facts." "The media," Asad said, "has not
conveyed an accurate message. Don't read the facts, see
them," he emphasized. Congressman Hastings, for his part,
agreed these visits were positive and essential to forming a
balanced assessment of the issues. He thanked Asad for
cooperating with the U.S. Embassy, which he said was working
hard to improve bilateral relations, and praised Syria's
ambassador to the U.S., Imad Mustafa, "for doing an
extraordinary job" He also expressed his condolences over
the death of the president's brother Majd.

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International Fora and Exchanges
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3. (S) The congressman initiated the conversation by noting
his strong commitment to multilateral fora and his past
presidency of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE-PA). In his current
role as an appointed Special Representative of the OSCE-PA,
the congressman stated he would advocate for Syria to be
granted observer status to the OSCE-PA Mediterranean
Partnership. Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, and
Jordan all had observer status, the congressman pointed out,
adding that he offered the same advocacy to Libya and would
do the same with President Sleiman when he met with him in
Beirut following his trip to Damascus. Congressman Hastings
told Asad he also felt granting observer status to the
Palestinians would be beneficial to all, and while this was
not the prevailing sentiment in the OSCE-PA, there were other
strong supporters.


4. (S) Picking up on the president's argument on the value of
"visits," Congressman Hastings invited Asad to send a young
adult intern to his office, observing that in the past he had
hosted interns from around the world, including Finland,
Germany, France, Slovenia, Kazakhstan, many of whom had gone
on to leadership roles in their respective countries. The
president thought the idea an excellent one and speculated he
might even like to send someone from his own office to intern
with the congressman.

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Regional Stability
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5. (S) Responding to Congressman Hastings' question on how
Syria viewed enhancing regional stability as well as the U.S.
surge in Afghanistan, Asad cautioned that while the U.S. is
indisputably an international player, the nation's officials
often fail to see how myriad problems are linked and instead
mistake "a part for the whole." "In Iraq, for example," the
president stated, U.S.-Syrian engagement had primarily
centered on border security discussions, "but this problem is
a result of other problems." In discussing Iraq, Lebanon,
Palestinians, the peace process, "and even Pakistan, you have
to see the linkages."


6. (S) Asad told the congressman that during his December 30
meeting with a bipartisan CODEL Gregg (reftel),he had argued
President Obama represented a "new opportunity" for regional
peace. Knowing full well some CODEL Gregg members were
Republicans, Asad recounted how he admonished the CODEL to
seize the opportunity, for no one else could move the process
forward. Of course the problem for any American president,
he continued, was the four-year term, the first year of which
was spent learning the job and the fourth year on
campaigning. Such time constraints left only two years for
managing the complicated array of regional problems.
Constraining Obama even further, Asad lamented, was the
unmanageable "fireball" left behind by the previous
administration.


7. (S) Terrorism, Asad remarked, remained the most
significant regional challenge for the international
community. "Terrorism is a result of extremism, which in
turn is a result of desperation," Asad said. "We can't solve
it all at once, but if we begin to work on any one element of
the problem, we can positively affect the other elements and
move forward." Congressman Hastings later queried the
president on possible cooperation with other countries,
especially Russia, on regional stability. Asad replied that
while Syria had "good relations" with Russia and that his
government welcomed "anyone interested in peace," he could
not speculate on what role Russia might play regionally until
Russia first "defined a role for itself." Asad pointed to
Turkey as a prime example of a country that in defining its
mission was able to bring about positive change -- namely,
the four rounds of indirect Syrian-Israeli peace talks. When
the congressman expressed interest in any growing role China
might have regionally, Asad said he had met the Chinese and
Japanese Middle East envoys, "but they don't do anything."
He added that his government was "looking for initiatives."

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Afghanistan
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8. (S) Noting the U.S. was actively going forward in
Afghanistan, Congressman Hastings asked Asad for his views on
Afghanistan's future prospects. Asad replied he had
predicted from the outset that the U.S. would not solve the
problem of terrorism by invading Afghanistan. The U.S. would
succeed in the beginning, he claimed to have forewarned, but
later it would bog down. Asad offered the analogy of cancer
to illustrate his point: "if you just cut it, it will spread
faster; you have to extract the whole thing at once." He did
not elaborate, however, on what an "extraction" of this sort
would entail.

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Peace Process
--------------

9. (S) "We need a partner," Asad implored, "but if Israel is
not serious, there can be no progress." Not having a
partner, Asad continued, did not mean there was nothing to be
done. Taking a long view of the process, Asad contended it
was less a matter of "who" was in government, than how the
process unfolded. Peace negotiations required building
lasting relationships and should avoid focusing on discrete
victories. During the negotiations of the 1980s and 1990s,
which led to the Madrid Peace Conference and the Oslo Accord,
nothing was ever "institutionalized," the result being that
the two events never produced lasting results. Even the
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Asad asserted, failed
in that the two countries were against one another, as
everyone in the region knew.


10. (S) The president maintained indirect talks were still an
indispensable first step to avoid the failure of the 1990s.
Indirect talks allowed for working-level contacts to build a
solid, institutional framework in advance of direct
negotiations between principals. Turkey had been ideal
because (1) it was geographically close, and (2) the U.S. had
not been interested in playing a role. "We know what the
deal is--land for security," Asad said. "I'll define the
land and they (Israel) will define security. I have six
points on the border to discuss; they have six points on
security. Establishing these criteria was the purpose of
Turkey." Syria was ready to return to Turkish mediation if
Israel were a willing partner. Asad cautioned, however, that
moving from indirect to direct talks would require the U.S.
and its international security guarantees. First, though,
the U.S. had to convince Israel to resume indirect talks in
Turkey.

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Iraq--The Failed Debate
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11. (S) The debate on stability in Iraq had been misguided in
the past on two key points, Asad posited. First, the U.S.'s
approach to the insurgency had been couched in the language
of "civil war." He admitted some of Iraq's violence was
driven by sectarian concerns; however, he argued the overall
secular fabric of Iraqi society would hold for the near
future. In the longer term, though, it could disintegrate,
he warned. Were this to happen, Asad intoned, "a domino
effect" of civil wars would spread across the region, causing
decades of unrest. A second distortion in U.S. debate on
Iraq was the false binary of "leave or not leave," which
masked the more pressing question of "how to leave." Trying
to determine which choice would produce more chaos was a
false one; the real debate should have been about how to
implement a political process that would militate against
chaos-producing conditions. Asad commended Obama's decision
to withdraw from Iraq, implying that this policy shift gave
him the political cover to support U.S. initiatives in a way
he could not do previously. "Now I can help," he said.

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Iraq--A Reconciliation Conference?
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12. (S) A reconciliation between Iraqi factions was
necessary, Asad continued, and initially the Syrians had
thought Prime Minister Maliki could bring one about.
Unfortunately, "Maliki fought with everyone," undermining any
possibility for internal accord, Asad said. The next step,
he believed, was for Iraq to host an international conference
that would include not only relevant international

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interlocutors, but representatives of all internal parties,
including the Ba'athists. Such a conference, he declared,
would be the basis for a new constitution, the first step
toward creating stability in the country.


13. (S) Asad implied Syria had unique and relevant experience
on reconciliation issues because of its long involvement in
Lebanon, whose history of political violence was much longer
and more complicated than Iraq's. Presumably referring to
the 1989 Taif Agreement, Asad recounted how during the years
of Lebanese civil war, there were "300 cease-fires," but only
when an international conference accompanied the cease-fire
did the peace finally hold. A conference in Iraq was, he
confessed, a "temporary solution," but one that could serve
as "springboard" for the next, longer-term solution.

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Iraq--Border Security
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14. (S) Returning to the subject of security along Syria's
border with Iraq, Asad complained about recriminations
leveled against Syria for putatively facilitating foreign
fighters. "If I did this, I would be shooting myself in the
foot," he exclaimed, adding that bringing terrorists into the
country made no sense if for no other reason that one would
run the risk of losing control of them. Asad pointed out
that terrorists did not need to be "smuggled" from one
country into another. "They have passports." Syria had
always been willing to cooperate with the U.S. on Syria, Asad
argued, pointing to the 2001 letter he wrote President Bush
pledging assistance on intelligence and security. U.S.
intelligence interlocutors had a lot of information, but
lacked the contextual knowledge for analyzing that
information, Asad asserted. "We had the most experience in
this."


15. (S) Reprising a theme he had sounded a week earlier with
CODEL Gregg, Asad argued the contrast in security along
Syrian-Turkish and Syrian-Iraqi borders was an object lesson.
The Syria-Turkey border was longer and the presence of the
PKK on both sides had made it more dangerous than Syria's
border with Iraq. Nevertheless, Syria had succeeded in
controlling its side of the border for two fundamental
reasons: in Turkey, Syria was dealing with an actual state
and a cooperative partner, unlike with Iraq. Congressman
Hastings acknowledged control of a long border was difficult
even under the best of circumstances, citing U.S. endeavors
to manage its border with Mexico.


16. (S) Border security, according to Asad, remained a less
significant issue for Syria than it did for the U.S. In the
interest of building a relationship, though, Asad said his
government was willing to engage on it. Special Envoy George
Mitchell visited, as did U.S. military delegations, and the
border issue was a topic of conversation, he observed, "but
then nothing happened." A/S Feltman told Vice Foreign
Minister Faisal Miqdad that the U.S. could not start
coordinating on the technical assessment because of pressure
from PM Maliki. "We don't understand this -- you control
Iraq," Asad ejaculated.

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Iraq--Refugees
--------------


17. (S) In the latter portion of the meeting, Congressman
Hastings steered the president toward the topic of Iraqi
refugees in Syria. The congressman acknowledged the burden
Syria bore in terms of supporting refugees, and noted that

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Jordan, too, had taken a step forward by accepting up to
40,000. He added that the time had come for the Iraqi
government to do something about the refugees' plight.
Echoing Asad's earlier connection of "desperation" and
"terrorism," the congressman argued the refugees'
displacement and poverty created the conditions for
terrorism. Given this, the congressman said, "how can we
best help you?" Asad agreed with the congressman's
assessment, adding these refugees could produce a
destabilizing influence in Iraq down the road, but the time
had come for Iraq, with a surplus of tens of billions of
dollars, to take some of the responsibility. Asad claimed
Iraq paid nothing toward refugee assistance, while the Syrian
government extended the same services and subsidies to them
as it did to its own people. Ultimately, though, Asad said
the key was education and Iraq should be building schools for
the refugees. "It's a political and a humanitarian problem,"
he continued. Iraq's political leadership, PM Maliki in
particular, lacked vision, he said. "The U.S. needs to see
this."

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Iran
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18. (S) Unprompted by the congressman, Asad outlined the same
Syrian position on Iranian nuclear enrichment as he had with
other CODELs. Iran, as signatory to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, had a right to pursue nuclear enrichment under IAEA
monitoring and Asad felt compelled to support Iran on this
point. The next step was to decide how much, by what
processes, and where Iran's uranium should be enriched.
Iran, Asad argued, was willing to enrich up to 20 percent for
medical purposes, which fell well below the 95 percent
enrichment threshold required for weapons-grade material.
The West, Asad complained, demanded all uranium be sent
outside the country for enrichment. "I told the Europeans
that if they don't change this, I cannot support it. I
wouldn't do that," the president said. Such a deal offered
no assurances to the Iranians they would ever get their
uranium back. Asad speculated Iran might be willing to ship
uranium for enrichment abroad in a gradual manner, and had
suggested to French President Sarkozy that perhaps Iran could
send a quarter or a third of its stockpiles abroad at a time.
Sarkozy, Asad claimed, had entertained the idea until the
U.S. quashed it. "Are we looking for a solution or a
problem? Attacking Iran is no solution," Asad concluded.

---
DCS
---


19. (S) Seizing on the theme of education, Congressman
Hastings remarked that the closure of the Damascus Community
School (DCS) was a problem not only for Embassy operations,
which certainly suffered in terms of recruiting new officers,
but for the Damascus community as a whole. He expressed his
hope the school might resume operations. Asad replied he had
not wanted to close the DCS, but after the U.S. attack on Abu
Kamal in October 2008, "We had to do something." Asad had
promised President Carter in late 2008 he would reopen it,
and still planned to do so. Reopening the DCS, he asserted,
should be done through a process. "Let's make it part of
improving the bilateral relationship." (Comment: Throughout
this portion of the discussion, FM Muallim was shaking his
head slowly and glaring at the Charge d'Affaires. End
comment.) Asad noted that as promised to S/E George
Mitchell, he re-opened the American Language Center.
"Mitchell left and then nothing happened," Asad remarked,
intimating a lack of reciprocal goodwill gestures on the part

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of the U.S. Asad continued, "There are no big obstacles to
opening the school. You'll be able to do it at any time."
The CDA noted reopening the school would take advance
planning. Asad replied, "You have the building and the
people, so it's not a big problem." CDA reminded the
president that all school employees had left the country, but
added he stood ready to work with the relevant ministries on
reopening the DCS at the earliest possible opportunity.


20. (C) U.S. participants:
CDA Charles Hunter
Congressman Alcee Hastings
Ms. Lale Malmaux, Chief of Staff for Congressman Hastings
Mr. Anthony Deaton, notetaker


21. (C) Syrian participants:
President Bashar al-Asad
Foreign Minister Walid Muallim
Two unnamed staff members


22. (SBU) CODEL Hastings did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.
HUNTER