SRI LANKA: PURGES IN THE MILITARY, POLICE - AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000081 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PURGES IN THE MILITARY, POLICE - AND MORE? COLOMBO 00000081 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Following President Rajapaksa's January 26 re-election, the leadership has undertaken purges of military and police officials believed to be loyal to Fonseka or perceived to be overly eager to uphold election laws against Rajapaksa campaign abuses. Contacts indicated that two senior military officers and 21 retirees had been arrested, and 14 other senior officers forced into retirement. Other contacts indicate that 150 police officials have been transferred. Senior military contacts loyal to the president explained the personnel shake-ups as implementing changes long-overdue that Fonseka had blocked as military commander, but outside observers interpret the changes as pay-backs and/or an effort to consolidate power. A senior MFA official feared similar purges would be forthcoming in his ministry, or even possibly a re-alignment of the MFA to put it under the authority of Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. END SUMMARY. PURGES IN THE MILITARY -------------- ¶2. (C) In the wake of the January 26 Presidential election, incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (the President's brother) and the Army commander moved quickly to replace senior Army officers seen as loyal to General Fonseka. On January 31, Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) Colonel Aruna Wanniarchchi confirmed to PolOff that at least two senior military officers and 21 retired officers and soldiers had been arrested for their perceived political alliance with General Fonseka, and for allegedly planning a coup with him against the Rajapaksas. (NOTE: DMI termed the retired officers and solders as deserters. END NOTE.) The government also moved to force 14 senior military officers into retirement since the election. This purge was said to be headed by the Senior Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police who heads the State Intelligence Service and the Chief of National Intelligence. Media has also reported that 150-plus police personnel have been transferred, and Post's local security investigator has confirmed the transfer or sidelining of senior police officials seen as loyal to Fonseka or a little too eager to enforce elections laws that inhibited the Rajapaksa campaign operation. There were indications by February 2 that the removal of allegedly disloyal government officials might extend beyond the security forces, as a senior MFA official expressed concern for his position, and an official of the Tourism Board resigned abruptly under unclear circumstances. ¶3. (C) There has been much speculation on the motives behind the military purge. No official explanation has been offered yet by the GSL to address complaints of heavy-handedness and politicization of the Army, although a senior SLA officer tried to explain the moves to DATT by noting that the post-election shuffle of senior Army officers was due to two factors. First, transfers had been long-overdue because Fonseka allegedly had prevented many key transfers while he still was in command, and Sri Lankan election regulations prohibited the security forces from transferring or promoting anyone until the campaign was over. Second, after Fonseka left active service the new Army Commander convened a board to review and consider "Redressals of Grievances" (ROGs) from Army officers who believed Fonseka had unfairly denied them opportunities for key operational command and staff assignments. ¶4. (C) Though both these arguments theoretically might have merit, few if any observers entertained the idea that these COLOMBO 00000081 002.2 OF 003 moves were motivated by anything other than vengeance and a desire by the president to consolidate his power. The government continues to maintain, however, that the military actions taken to reduce the influence of Fonseka loyalists were not a political vendetta. They have maintained a public stance that there was a very real threat from insurgents and Army deserters. DMI reiterated to PolOff that the arrests of the 21 security personnel were a move to crush General Fonseka's coup and assassination threats against the president. Perhaps tacitly admitting the reality of the situation though, the DMI said the future of Army officers who were suspected of being Fonseka loyalists was uncertain. POLICE OFFICIALS LOYAL TO FONSEKA SIDELINED -------------- ¶5. (C) Post's local-hire security investigator spoke on February 2 with Senior Deputy Inspector General Gamini Nawaratne, who was assigned to the Elections Commission. Nawaratne confirmed media reports that 150 police officers were being transferred because they had "showed bias" during the elections, which Nawaratne interpreted to mean they either had failed to provide support to the government's campaign or they had tried to prevent election fraud by the government. Nawaratne implied that the government was putting the transferred officers into positions where they could have less of an impact on the upcoming general election. Elections law in Sri Lanka prohibits transfers or promotions of military or government officials during an election campaign, and the general election campaign could start soon if the president were to dissolve parliament as expected. Key police personnel now thought to be trusted by the government include Senior DIGs Keerthi Gajanayake, Gamini Nawaratne, Nimal Mediwaka, Kingsley Ekanayake, and S.M. Wickramasinghe. CONCERNS FOR OTHER MINISTRIES -------------- ¶6. (C) In a meeting with PolOff on February 2, a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) official warned of future purges of other government officials in other line ministries. He noted that even the MFA might suffer, saying there was a possibility of the MFA being re-aligned to fall under the Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa's purview. According to the MFA official, who admitted he was concerned about his own job security, the president was "extremely unhappy with the MFA and its leadership" and would be "implementing the appropriate changes." COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) It is not unexpected that a victorious Rajapaksa would want to reward his ardent supporters at the expense of those in the government who appeared to support Fonseka. The latter may have been overt or simply upholding of elections laws when asked by the Rajapaksa campaign to do otherwise. The degree and severity of the dismissals currently going on, however, appear much deeper and more vindictive than usual by Sri Lankan historical standards. The military purge appears to have left the Army with officers that have proven their loyalty to the Rajapaksas and those will be too cowed to voice dissent. It is too early to tell whether the result of these changes will be simply a more loyal government that assists the Rajapaksa brothers in assuring their victory in upcoming general elections, or something more sinister and long-lasting. A number of long-time Post contacts appear frightened by the purge, with one senior military contact COLOMBO 00000081 003.2 OF 003 telling DATT not to contact him any longer, claiming that his phone was tapped by the government. Post's local-hire security investigator reported many of his usual contacts in the security forces suddenly were reluctant to speak with him over the phone and would either request a face-to-face meeting or refuse to speak. BUTENIS