Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10COLOMBO46
2010-01-21 13:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN SRI LANKA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000046 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN SRI LANKA

COLOMBO 00000046 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

VIEW FROM THE EAST
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000046 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE SUBJECT: ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN SRI LANKA COLOMBO 00000046 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) VIEW FROM THE EAST -------------- ¶1. (C) A contact who works on human rights issues in Eastern Sri Lanka and serves on Chief Minister Pillayan's staff, provided an international group with her perspective on elections in the East. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRAUD -------------- ¶2. (C) Transfer of ballot boxes from polling stations was the weakest link in fraud prevention -- particularly when transported by boat or helicopter. During the provincial elections, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) reportedly had boxes waiting in boats to switch with the actual ballot boxes. While each candidate would be permitted observers during the counting process in upcoming elections, a GSL-selected Senior Polling Officer was responsible for the boxes, and there would be no monitoring of the handover, transport, and receipt. Our contact urged diplomatic pressure to allow observers/monitors access to this process. ¶3. (C) Some people in Jaffna, the East, and pro-Fonseka areas of Colombo, had received polling cards with a blank space or Xs where the identification number should be. In theory, people could still vote with such a card with a valid identification card, but interlocutors were skeptical about this in practice. ELECTION DAY MONITORING SYSTEM -------------- ¶4. (C) Election monitoring groups reportedly planned to pass information on irregularities up their own chains for reporting to GSL-designated police officers. These police officers were to be responsible for intervening in alleged fraud -- whether and how they would act on the information they receive remained to be seen. The Sri Lankan Human Rights Commission would document irregularities reported by monitors but not intervene in ongoing activities. Interlocutors indicated that many civil society groups were too intimidated to conduct election monitoring. ¶5. (C) The importance of international presence in contentious areas was stressed. Even if internationals could not actively monitor, their visible presence could have a strong positive impact on fraud and violence. Norway was considering observers to the field (but did not say where). The international NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce planned to observe in areas where it had offices: Jaffna, Vavuniya, and Batticaloa. PILLAYAN FEELING THE HEAT -------------- ¶6. (C) While Pillayan was publicly supporting Rajapaksa, he remained frustrated with his limited power to appoint local authorities and take decisive action in his role as Chief Minister. Fonseka's campaign had reached out for Pillayan's support. The GSL knew that Pillayan could shift his allegiance and was tapping his phones and keeping military personnel around him at all times to track his conversations. ¶7. (C) In general, Tamils in the East were disappointed with Pillayan. In their view, he switched from advocating for Tamil concerns to campaigning for a candidate who did not appear aligned with Tamil interests. Asked recently by village leaders why he was supporting Rajapaksa, Pillayan COLOMBO 00000046 002.2 OF 002 responded "gratitude." The leaders retorted that this must be personal gratitude and asked "what about us?" Our contact judged that Tamils in the East would vote for Fonseka or not vote at all. POST ELECTION PREDICTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) Our contact predicted that targeted violence would follow the election, regardless of who won, but did not foresee generalized violence in the East. She expected that if Rajapaksa were to win, the Governor of the East would remain in place. The Government Agent (GA) of Trincomalee would be ousted because of his military background and rumors that he has been in discussion with Fonseka. (NOTE: The GA expressed his support for Rajapaksa in a December meeting with Emboffs. END NOTE.) BUTENIS

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