Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10COLOMBO46
2010-01-21 13:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:
ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN SRI LANKA
how-toVZCZCXRO4083 OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHLM #0046/01 0211321 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211321Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1142 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2280 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9302 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7557 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5382 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3717 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 5307 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0168 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0829 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4429 RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9865 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 7152 RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0163 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0010 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000046
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN SRI LANKA
COLOMBO 00000046 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
VIEW FROM THE EAST
-------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000046
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN SRI LANKA
COLOMBO 00000046 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
VIEW FROM THE EAST
--------------
1. (C) A contact who works on human rights issues in Eastern
Sri Lanka and serves on Chief Minister Pillayan's staff,
provided an international group with her perspective on
elections in the East.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRAUD
--------------
2. (C) Transfer of ballot boxes from polling stations was the
weakest link in fraud prevention -- particularly when
transported by boat or helicopter. During the provincial
elections, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) reportedly had
boxes waiting in boats to switch with the actual ballot
boxes. While each candidate would be permitted observers
during the counting process in upcoming elections, a
GSL-selected Senior Polling Officer was responsible for the
boxes, and there would be no monitoring of the handover,
transport, and receipt. Our contact urged diplomatic
pressure to allow observers/monitors access to this process.
3. (C) Some people in Jaffna, the East, and pro-Fonseka areas
of Colombo, had received polling cards with a blank space or
Xs where the identification number should be. In theory,
people could still vote with such a card with a valid
identification card, but interlocutors were skeptical about
this in practice.
ELECTION DAY MONITORING SYSTEM
--------------
4. (C) Election monitoring groups reportedly planned to pass
information on irregularities up their own chains for
reporting to GSL-designated police officers. These police
officers were to be responsible for intervening in alleged
fraud -- whether and how they would act on the information
they receive remained to be seen. The Sri Lankan Human
Rights Commission would document irregularities reported by
monitors but not intervene in ongoing activities.
Interlocutors indicated that many civil society groups were
too intimidated to conduct election monitoring.
5. (C) The importance of international presence in
contentious areas was stressed. Even if internationals could
not actively monitor, their visible presence could have a
strong positive impact on fraud and violence. Norway was
considering observers to the field (but did not say where).
The international NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce planned to
observe in areas where it had offices: Jaffna, Vavuniya, and
Batticaloa.
PILLAYAN FEELING THE HEAT
--------------
6. (C) While Pillayan was publicly supporting Rajapaksa, he
remained frustrated with his limited power to appoint local
authorities and take decisive action in his role as Chief
Minister. Fonseka's campaign had reached out for Pillayan's
support. The GSL knew that Pillayan could shift his
allegiance and was tapping his phones and keeping military
personnel around him at all times to track his conversations.
7. (C) In general, Tamils in the East were disappointed with
Pillayan. In their view, he switched from advocating for
Tamil concerns to campaigning for a candidate who did not
appear aligned with Tamil interests. Asked recently by
village leaders why he was supporting Rajapaksa, Pillayan
COLOMBO 00000046 002.2 OF 002
responded "gratitude." The leaders retorted that this must
be personal gratitude and asked "what about us?" Our contact
judged that Tamils in the East would vote for Fonseka or not
vote at all.
POST ELECTION PREDICTIONS
--------------
8. (C) Our contact predicted that targeted violence would
follow the election, regardless of who won, but did not
foresee generalized violence in the East. She expected that
if Rajapaksa were to win, the Governor of the East would
remain in place. The Government Agent (GA) of Trincomalee
would be ousted because of his military background and rumors
that he has been in discussion with Fonseka. (NOTE: The GA
expressed his support for Rajapaksa in a December meeting
with Emboffs. END NOTE.)
BUTENIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN SRI LANKA
COLOMBO 00000046 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
VIEW FROM THE EAST
--------------
1. (C) A contact who works on human rights issues in Eastern
Sri Lanka and serves on Chief Minister Pillayan's staff,
provided an international group with her perspective on
elections in the East.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRAUD
--------------
2. (C) Transfer of ballot boxes from polling stations was the
weakest link in fraud prevention -- particularly when
transported by boat or helicopter. During the provincial
elections, the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) reportedly had
boxes waiting in boats to switch with the actual ballot
boxes. While each candidate would be permitted observers
during the counting process in upcoming elections, a
GSL-selected Senior Polling Officer was responsible for the
boxes, and there would be no monitoring of the handover,
transport, and receipt. Our contact urged diplomatic
pressure to allow observers/monitors access to this process.
3. (C) Some people in Jaffna, the East, and pro-Fonseka areas
of Colombo, had received polling cards with a blank space or
Xs where the identification number should be. In theory,
people could still vote with such a card with a valid
identification card, but interlocutors were skeptical about
this in practice.
ELECTION DAY MONITORING SYSTEM
--------------
4. (C) Election monitoring groups reportedly planned to pass
information on irregularities up their own chains for
reporting to GSL-designated police officers. These police
officers were to be responsible for intervening in alleged
fraud -- whether and how they would act on the information
they receive remained to be seen. The Sri Lankan Human
Rights Commission would document irregularities reported by
monitors but not intervene in ongoing activities.
Interlocutors indicated that many civil society groups were
too intimidated to conduct election monitoring.
5. (C) The importance of international presence in
contentious areas was stressed. Even if internationals could
not actively monitor, their visible presence could have a
strong positive impact on fraud and violence. Norway was
considering observers to the field (but did not say where).
The international NGO Nonviolent Peaceforce planned to
observe in areas where it had offices: Jaffna, Vavuniya, and
Batticaloa.
PILLAYAN FEELING THE HEAT
--------------
6. (C) While Pillayan was publicly supporting Rajapaksa, he
remained frustrated with his limited power to appoint local
authorities and take decisive action in his role as Chief
Minister. Fonseka's campaign had reached out for Pillayan's
support. The GSL knew that Pillayan could shift his
allegiance and was tapping his phones and keeping military
personnel around him at all times to track his conversations.
7. (C) In general, Tamils in the East were disappointed with
Pillayan. In their view, he switched from advocating for
Tamil concerns to campaigning for a candidate who did not
appear aligned with Tamil interests. Asked recently by
village leaders why he was supporting Rajapaksa, Pillayan
COLOMBO 00000046 002.2 OF 002
responded "gratitude." The leaders retorted that this must
be personal gratitude and asked "what about us?" Our contact
judged that Tamils in the East would vote for Fonseka or not
vote at all.
POST ELECTION PREDICTIONS
--------------
8. (C) Our contact predicted that targeted violence would
follow the election, regardless of who won, but did not
foresee generalized violence in the East. She expected that
if Rajapaksa were to win, the Governor of the East would
remain in place. The Government Agent (GA) of Trincomalee
would be ousted because of his military background and rumors
that he has been in discussion with Fonseka. (NOTE: The GA
expressed his support for Rajapaksa in a December meeting
with Emboffs. END NOTE.)
BUTENIS