Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10CHIANGMAI3
2010-01-11 09:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:  

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE PIPELINE CONTINUES TO RUN THROUGH

Tags:  PREF PREL PHUM SMIG CH KN KS TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4567
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0003/01 0110906
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 110906Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1238
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0093
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0035
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0062
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0071
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1330
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000003 

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, DRL AND PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/5/2020
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM SMIG CH KN KS TH
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE PIPELINE CONTINUES TO RUN THROUGH
NORTHERN THAILAND

REF: A. 08 CHIANG MAI 185 (THAILAND-NORTH KOREA REFUGEE)

B. 09 RANGOON 10 (FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES)

CHIANG MAI 00000003 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------------------

Summary and Comment

--------------------------



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000003

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, DRL AND PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/5/2020
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM SMIG CH KN KS TH
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE PIPELINE CONTINUES TO RUN THROUGH
NORTHERN THAILAND

REF: A. 08 CHIANG MAI 185 (THAILAND-NORTH KOREA REFUGEE)

B. 09 RANGOON 10 (FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES)

CHIANG MAI 00000003 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------

Summary and Comment

--------------




1. (C) During a late 2009 trip to Thailand's northern province
of Chiang Rai, contacts told us that: North Korean asylum
seekers continue to enter the province at a rate of 350-400 per
year, mostly in the March-May and October-November timeframes;
field-level cooperation to intercept would-be arrivals with
Burmese and Lao counterparts is good; and that smuggling
techniques have improved . We also visited the Mae Sai IDC,
where conditions appeared good, and spoke with a South Korean
Missionary, who provided new details about migratory patterns.




2. (C) Comment: As long as Thailand facilitates DPRK
resettlement to third countries, asylum seekers will continue to
make their way here in search of a better life. Nonetheless,
local authorities lack resources to handle the growing caseload,
and appear reluctant to do more than absolutely necessary to
assist North Koreans in search of better opportunities in South
Korea and the U.S. End Summary and Comment.



--------------

Numbers, Routes

--------------




3. (C) According to police officials in Chiang Rai, would-be
North Korean refugees continue to enter northern Thailand
through the province at an average rate of 350-400 per year - a
trend they say has stayed consistent since 2005. Without
revealing precise figures, immigration officials told us local
authorities had arrested more North Korean asylum seekers in
2009 than 2008. They continue to arrive via China and Laos as
reported Reftel, our contacts reaffirmed, with most arriving in
the months of March-May and October-November. Separately,
despite earlier assertions by various contacts that North

Koreans were favoring other routes of entry into Thailand, such
as through Nong Khai Province, contacts in that northeastern
province told us that the Marine Police there arrested a total
of 47 North Korean asylum seekers between January 2008 and March

2009. (Note: In 2007, Chiang Rai provincial authorities rounded
up a total of 924 North Korean asylum seekers.)




4. (C) A South Korean missionary who used to regularly provide
succor to North Korean asylum seekers in Chiang Rai confirmed
the local authorities' suspicion that South Korean brokers are
involved. The North Koreans pay upwards of $3,000 to be
smuggled, he said. If they have family in the U.S. or ROK who
can pay the broker, they only spend a short time in China before
heading to Thailand, he asserted. Those less fortunate work a
long time in China in order to repay the debt, he observed. The
fact that some North Korean arrestees speak fluent Chinese leads
police and immigration officials with whom we spoke to believe
that a number spend years in China. Some marry and have Chinese
families, though when they arrive in Thailand, they bring their
DPRK, not Chinese relatives, the officials stated.




5. (C) The Missionary, Reverend Oh, went on to say that most
enter Thailand through the ports of Chiang Khong and Chiang
Saen, which are separated from Laos by the Mekong River. Police
and immigration contacts corroborated this statement, noting
that most North Korean refugees surrender to Thai authorities as
soon as possible after entering Thailand,, and often go so far
as to create situations that would cause them to be arrested.
Some opt to travel directly to Bangkok and get arrested there in
the hope of spending less time in immigration detention before

CHIANG MAI 00000003 002.2 OF 003


resettling, they stated. Rev. Oh acknowledged that he used to
proactively assist asylum seekers with this journey, adding that
he now only assists if refugees take the initiative to seek him
out.



--------------

Cuffed, Then What?

--------------




6. (C) Once North Korean asylum seekers are arrested, they are
taken to the nearest police station for interrogation and
pre-trial detention of up to 48 hours, according to police and
immigration contacts. When they are taken to court on
immigration charges, they do not contest the charges, and choose
to spend a few days in custody at the court house in lieu of
paying a fine. Officials told us fines are roughly equivalent
to $30, and those who can/will not pay typically spend a day or
two in custody. They are then transferred to the Mae Sai IDC.
Once they have a big enough group that is ready to travel to
Bangkok, immigration officials make arrangements for their
transfer. They do not send refugees one by one because it is
not cost effective, our contacts asserted.




7. (C) Police officials described working-level cooperation
with their Lao and Burmese counterparts as good, noting however
that coordination at the central government level is lacking.
They cited a case in early 2009 in which they cooperated with
Burmese authorities to receive a group of 19 North Korean
defectors (Ref B),and process their subsequent resettlement
applications. Local authorities told us they would prefer not
to see humanitarian NGOs set up shop in the province, fearing
that their presence will create a "pull factor."



--------------

Legal Process Inadequate

--------------




8. (C) Police and immigration contacts pointed to several legal
and logistical difficulties they face in trying to process North
Koreans. They claim they do not have a budget to cover the cost
of feeding and sheltering the refugees once they are arrested,
nor do they have Korean-speaking staff. The ROK Embassy assists
them with interpretation when requested, but can often not
respond immediately, they lamented. Due to the need to process
many asylum seekers without an officer from the ROK Embassy
present, most refugees sign legal documents without
comprehending them. Additionally, they observed that South
Korean brokers are taking advantage of Thai laws that allow
Koreans to enter Thailand and stay for 90 days without obtaining
a visa.



--------------

Not All IDCs are Unsanitary

--------------




9. (C) While at the Mae Sai Immigration Office, we requested
and received permission to view the IDC where North Koreans were
held. The Center consists of two chambers separated by gates at
a distance of a few yards from each other. One room is for male
detainees, and the other for female. Detainees in different
chambers can talk to each other easily through the fences and
can see each other, but are not permitted to have physical
contact. Inmates in both chambers were conversing, looking
after family members, and hanging out laundry.

CHIANG MAI 00000003 003.2 OF 003






10. (C) We observed bathroom facilities in both chambers, as
well as neatly-stacked and recently washed food service trays.
Ventilation was more than adequate, and the walls of both
chambers appeared to have been recently painted. Immigration
officials told us that there were a total of 24 North Korean
inmates at the time -- four male and 20 female. This number
nearly doubled in early November due to the arrest of an
additional 19 North Koreans, but was reduced to zero two days
later, when officials transferred the entire contingent of 43
North Korean detainees to Bangkok.
MORROW