SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING,

S E C R E T CD GENEVA 000067 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/15 TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) EXPANDED AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-020. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 5, 2010 Time: 12:00 P.M. - 12:40 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Ad Hoc Working Group met in expanded format (with experts) to discuss new U.S. proposals for the "third limit" on deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers that had been agreed in Moscow, and for the release of data received from the initial data exchange following treaty signature and subsequent exchanges during implementation of the treaty. The Russian side asked a few questions and agreed to respond to both proposals in the near future. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Capturing the Third Limit; What to Release to the Public and When; and What to Release versus What to Exchange. -------------- CAPTURING THE THIRD LIMIT -------------- ¶5. (S) Ambassador Ries began the meeting of the Expanded Ad Hoc Group by turning the sides' attention to an item of unfinished business from the January meetings in Moscow between U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen and Chief of the Russian General Staff General Makarov. At that meeting, the two had agreed on a third limit in the treaty on deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. All that remained, Ries stated, was to capture their agreement in writing for placement in Article IV of the treaty. Ries provided a U.S. working paper with proposed wording for the limit. Begin text. Article IV, paragraph 3: Each party shall limit deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers of SLBMs and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number does not exceed 800. End text. ¶6. (S) Admiral Kuznetsov observed that the new text contained a term for which there was no definition: "non-deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments." He asked what the U.S. delegation had in mind for the meaning of the term. Mr. Elliott responded that the definition for "deployed heavy bomber" included the concept of "equipped for nuclear armaments," and therefore the definition of non-deployed should as well. The U.S. side agreed that the definition would need to be worked out. Elliott continued that the definition certainly would include test heavy bombers, but he noted that the Russian delegation had earlier suggested that heavy bombers in long-term storage or long-term maintenance might also be included. In response to an inquiry from Kuznetsov, Elliott and Ries indicated that the meaning of the term would be discussed in the Definitions Working Group, possibly as early as the following week. -------------- WHAT TO RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC AND WHEN -------------- ¶7. (S) Turning to the subject of release of data received from the implementation of the Treaty, Ries reviewed the U.S. position which included three elements. First, everything from the initial exchange of data 45 days after treaty signature, except certain sensitive data, would be released to the public. Second, data obtained during the implementation of the treaty would be released only if the Parties agreed; the U.S. proposed adding a clarification that each Party could release its own data without seeking agreement. Third, the aggregate data that corresponded to the central limits could also be released to the public; the United States believed this should include the third limit, from Article IV, that had been agreed in Moscow. ¶8. (S) Ries provided a U.S. working paper for paragraphs in Article VIII dealing with data release, noting that the text was actually quite close to the last Russian proposal received earlier in the week. Poznikhir asked what the U.S. delegation meant by "released to the public." Ries explained that the phrase meant the data would be made available to the public. Data and information were either protected or not. If the data were released, it would be because a decision had been made that it should not be classified or protected. There would be an exception for certain sensitive information such as geographic coordinates or site diagrams, which would not be released. -------------- WHAT TO RELEASE VERSUS WHAT TO EXCHANGE -------------- ¶9. (S) Poznikhir noted that the U.S. proposal seemed to align with the Russian position that the initial release would only include the data in Section II of Part Two of the Protocol. But, he asked, was there agreement in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group on what would be in the initial exchange? Would the third limit be included? Ries agreed this was a crucial point: the sides needed to understand what would be exchanged initially to reach agreement on what would be released from that first data exchange. She stated that the sides had discussed the content of the initial exchange during the previous round of talks in both the MOU Working Group and between Heads of Delegation. The U.S. delegation understood that the sides had agreed to base the initial database information on the July 2009 START exchange of data. ¶10. (S) Mr. Trout explained one way to include the newly agreed third limit on deployed and non-deployed items into the initial data exchange. He said that paragraph 1 of Section II of the database could list the limits set forth in Article II and the third limit from Article IV could be listed in paragraph 2 of Section II of the database. Poznikhir countered that the data for all three limits could be included in paragraph 1 of the Section. Trout indicated that was also possible. ¶11. (S) Gen Venevtsev asked whether the U.S. proposal would allow either side to release data after the expiration of the treaty. Ries and Trout said it would. Poznikhir asked for clarification as to whether each side would have the right to release its own data without the agreement of the other side. Ries replied, "Yes." Poznikhir ended the discussion by saying that the U.S. proposal appeared logical, that the U.S. side seemed to have taken the Russian views into account, and that the text was generally acceptable. He confirmed the Russian delegation would consider the U.S. language and respond soon. ¶12. (S) Ries noted in closing that the MOU Working Group would be meeting later that day, with the Heads of Delegation in attendance, and she hoped they would clarify the contents of the initial exchange. Orlov and Trout both added that, while it was clear what data would be subject to initial release, it was not clear what would be initially exchanged (that is, any additional information to be exchanged that would not be subject to release). ¶13. (U) Documents provided: - UNITED STATES: -- U.S. Working Paper, Article IV, paragraph 3, dated February 5, 2010, in English and unofficial Russian; and -- U.S. Working Paper, Article VIII, paragraphs 5 through 8, dated February 5, 2010, in English and unofficial Russian. ¶14. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Amb Ries Mr. Elliott Mr. Trout Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Dr. Fraley LTC Litterini LT Lobner Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky (RO) Ms. Gesse (Interpreter) RUSSIA Gen Poznikhir Col Ilin Mr. Koshelev Mr. Luchaninov Gen Orlov Col Ryzhkov Gen Venevtsev Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter) ¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends. LARSON