Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10CASABLANCA5
2010-01-13 15:56:00
SECRET
Consulate Casablanca
Cable title:  

MOHAMMED EL FIZAZI AND THE SALAFIST SHEIKHS

Tags:  PINR KISL GM MO 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCL #0005/01 0131556
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131556Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8587
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0020
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0023
S E C R E T CASABLANCA 000005 

NOFORN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR/OPS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
TAGS: PINR KISL GM MO

SUBJECT: MOHAMMED EL FIZAZI AND THE SALAFIST SHEIKHS
OF MOROCCO (C-NC9-02281)

REF: 2009 SECSTATE 120771
2009 Casablanca 90
2009 Casablanca 210

Classified By: Consul General Elisabeth Millard for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T CASABLANCA 000005 NOFORN SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR/OPS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020 TAGS: PINR KISL GM MO SUBJECT: MOHAMMED EL FIZAZI AND THE SALAFIST SHEIKHS OF MOROCCO (C-NC9-02281) REF: 2009 SECSTATE 120771 2009 Casablanca 90 2009 Casablanca 210 Classified By: Consul General Elisabeth Millard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Moroccan Salafist Sheikh Mohammed El Fizazi's letter to his daughter in Germany, published by Der Spiegel in October 2009, in our view signals a carefully couched reassessment of his support for legitimate jihad but probably not a complete renunciation of violence. Fizazi's letter provoked almost no reaction or comments by the Moroccan media and has not elicited a public response from other Salafist leaders in Morocco. We believe the Government of Morocco (GOM) has engaged in some form dialogue with the Salafist Sheikhs in prison but it does not appear to have brokered a deal or persuaded them to recant. Post will continue to monitor and report on developments concerning the situation of Morocco's Salafist prisoners. Paragraph 7 contains responses to reftel A questions. END SUMMARY. Fizazi and the Salafist Sheikhs -------------- ¶2. (C) Mohammed El Fizazi, along with Hassan Kettani, Abdelwahab Rafiki (aka Abu Hafs), Abdelkarim Chadli (aka Abu Obeida),and Miloud Haddouchi, form the intellectual leadership of Salafist ideology in Morocco. The Moroccan press commonly refers to Fizazi and these other Sheikhs as the leaders of the Salafiyya-Jihaddiyya Group. However, Salafiyya-Jihaddiyya does not in fact exist as an organization, but is more aptly a term to describe a loose grouping of radicalized Salafists ideas and the disparate Sheikhs and their followers who adhere to them. All five of these Sheikhs were tried and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 20 to 30 years for their alleged role as the ideologues for, or alleged affiliation with, participants in the Casablanca bombings of 2003. ¶3. (C) Mohammed Darif, a renowned expert on Islamic movements in Morocco, told poloff that Fizazi has never openly advocated violence in Morocco or attempted to challenge the legitimacy of King Mohammed VI and his role as Morocco's religious leader. During his trial in 2003, Fizazi condemned the Casablanca suicide bombers, "whatever their motivation," and denied that his preaching could have persuaded youth to engage in terrorism.
He also affirmed the king's role as "Commander of the Faithful" and argued that only the king has the authority to order a jihad against the enemies of Morocco such as "the POLISARIO or Spain." He denied the existence of Salaffiya-Jihaddiya, as described in the indictment, arguing that if such an organization existed, it, like the political parties, would only serve to divide the Ulema (Islamic community). Dialogue with the Sheikhs -------------- ¶4. (C) The Moroccan press has repeatedly reported on the existence of a dialogue between Salafist prisoners and the Moroccan authorities (REF B). Separate hunger strikes by the prisoners in the summer of 2007 and in December of 2009 resulted in conversations with authorities and GOM concessions that improved somewhat their prison conditions and visitation rights. Individual Salafists have also applied for and received pardons, though none since in 2005. At the end of 2009 a group of prisoners at the Okacha prison in Casablanca sent a public letter to the king proclaiming their innocence, addressing the king as the "Commander of the Faithful," and requesting a committee to study their situation. ¶5. (C) In responding to questions from the Parliament in May 2009 about pardons for Islamists prisoners, then-Minister of Interior Chakib Benmoussa denied that there was any GOM dialogue with the Salafists. He reiterated the only way for these prisoners to be considered for a royal pardon was for them to demonstrate remorse, change their thinking, and apply for a royal pardon. Fizazi and others have maintained their innocence and so far refused to request a pardon which typically includes an admission of guilt. ¶6. (C) Darif, who is familiar with the published works and speeches of Fizazi, believes the GOM, and not Salafists in Europe, was the intended audience of the letter sent by Fizazi to his daughter in Germany in hopes of indirectly winning a royal pardon. Fizazi also notably wrote a public letter, while in prison, to Abu Musab Al Zarqawi of Al Qaida in Mesopotamia asking for the release of two Moroccan embassy employees who had been kidnapped and pleading for their lives. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: We believe the GOM has engaged Fizazi and other Salafist Sheikhs in an attempt to persuade them to reconsider their radical views. However, the GOM is in a position of relative strength vis-a-vis the extremists and does not have much incentive to offer concessions to them. The GOM's security services have proven effective in disrupting potential terrorist cells in Morocco. Finally, since there is no organizational structure behind the Salafist Sheikhs, having a dialogue ultimately means negotiating with each individual Sheikh. END COMMENT. ¶8. (S/NF) Response to reftel A inquiries: ¶A. We have no information as to what may have prompted this letter. However, we find plausible the opinion of Darif that it was likely an attempt to curry favor with the Moroccan authorities. It is also noteworthy that the letter discusses a Muslim's obligation to his country of immigration in Europe but avoids touching on the legitimacy of jihad in "Muslim occupied lands." ¶B. We have no prior indications that Fizazi is moving to change his positions. ¶C. We have no information on whether the GOM had any influence on Fizazi's letter. We believe that if Fizazi had written the letter at the behest of the GOM, the letter would have been more actively promoted here in Morocco. There is also, as of yet, no indication that Fizazi has had his sentenced reduced or will be pardoned. ¶D. We have no information on the extent of German law enforcement's participation in his recantation. ¶E. We are not aware of what if any outside influences may have been brought to bear on Fizazi. Among the intellectual leaders of Salafiyya- Jihaddiya in Morocco, Fizazi stands as probably the oldest and most widely respected of the figures. Fizazi is reported to have been a one time student of Mohammed Bin Abderahman Al Meghrawi who is currently living in self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia following the closure of his Islamic schools and organization for issuing a controversial fatwa (REF C). ¶F. Fizazi is believed to retain have a following principally in Tangier where he served as an imam for more than 30 years. He remains an influential voice among Salafists in Europe and prior to his imprisonment travelled extensively as a visiting imam inside of Morocco and in Europe. He is currently serving his 30 year sentence at a prison in Tangier. ¶G. We are not aware of any response by Moroccan radicals to Fizazi's letter. BIO NOTE -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Mohammed El Fizaz (aka Abu Meriyam) was born in 1949 in Mernissa, a village in the Province of Taza. He attended the local Quranic school in the village and completed his primary and baccalaureate studies in the city of Taza. In 1968 he moved to Rabat to study at the teacher training institute where he received a teaching certificate. In 1971, at the age of 21, he moved to Tangier where he began work in public schools as a teacher of French and mathematics. He started preaching at a small mosque in Casa Barat neighborhood of Tangier in 1976. He reportedly only became radicalized later during his studies in Fes and with Mohammed bin Abdelrahman Al Meghrawi who represented the Saudi-influenced ideas of Salafism. Sometime in the late 1970s he began his studies of Sharia and Fiqh at the Faculty of Sharia Science in Fes. He eventually completed a Masters in Science of the Hadith at the end of the 1980s. It was also during the 1980s that he was appointed the imam of the Al Mohades Mosque in Tangier. ¶10. (SBU) As Fizazi popularity increased in the 1990s he formed the association Ahl Al Sunna wa Al Jamaa (People of the Sunna and the Community) for the propagation of Salafist ideas. Fizazi became more radicalized in the late 1990s and publicly attacked Abdessalam Yassine and his Islamic movement Al Adl wa Al Ihsan, Morocco's largest Islamic movement, for its Sufi influences and failure to follow the Salafist interpretation of Islam. Fizazi appeared as a guest speaker at mosques throughout Europe, notably in Hamburg, Germany, as well as in various Moroccan cities. ¶11. (SBU) In August Of 2003 Fizazi was put on trial alongside Hadouchi and others for his alleged role in inspiring the Casablanca bombings. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years in prison. During the trial Fizazi denied any involvement in the bombings but did acknowledge that some of those involved in the attackers had attended his preaching sessions, which he stressed were held publicly and with the knowledge of the state. Fizazi also acknowledged that he had a relationship with Mohammed Damir but stressed that he broke with him once he learned that he had been involved in acts of violence. (NOTE: Damir was a member of the radical Islamist group "Assirat al Moustakim" (the Straight Path) which was led by Youssef Fikri and responsible for at least six murders. Both Fikri and Damir were sentenced to death in July 2003. END NOTE) ¶12. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy Rabat.

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