MOROCCO: LABOR MONITORING AND TRADE

UNCLAS CASABLANCA 000018 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, AND DRL/ILCSR STATE PASS USTR FOR CROMERO AND SRANCESKI DOL FOR TWEDDING E.O 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB ECON ETRD PHUM PGOV MO SUBJECT: MOROCCO: LABOR MONITORING AND TRADE ENGAGEMENT REF: A. 09 STATE 131995 ¶B. CASABLANCA 0013 ¶C. 09 CASABLANCA 0074 ¶D. 09 CASABLANCA 0034 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Morocco has engaged in significant labor reform, primarily through a 2004 modernization of its labor code, an effort that received added impetus as a result of the negotiation of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement. While the current law adheres to core international labor standards and is a possible model for the region, in practice the Government of Morocco's (GOM's) implementation and enforcement of the labor code is weak. The funding, training and equipping of labor inspectors is inadequate, and other factors such as corruption, collusion between employers and local officials, and a judicial system in need of reform contribute to the problems. Labor unions are weak and plagued by lack of internal democracy and transparency, and in some cases by subordination to the interests of the ruling political parties. Morocco also continues to struggle with a considerable child labor issue; in particular there is little regulation of the widespread phenomenon of female child domestics. The GOM has responded positively to USG urging, however. Tangible progress has been made with USG funding for child labor programs and for training on the new labor code. The USG should more actively engage the GOM, within the scope of our bilateral cooperation, on enforcement of the existing labor code, strengthening of the trade federations and child labor. This cable provides an overview of the labor issues in Morocco, labor rights and recommendations for strategic engagement on labor issues (Ref A). END SUMMARY. LABOR SITUATION OVERVIEW -------------- ¶2. (SBU) According to figures provided by the GOM's statistical agency, the Haut Commissariat au Plan (HCP),in 2007 approximately 660,000 workers, or six percent of the workforce, were unionized. There are more than 25 trade unions though only five, and now possibly fewer, are considered to be the "most representative" and hence eligible to participate in the social dialogue with the Government and collective bargaining. The GOM passed a long- stalled reform to its labor code in 2003 as a result, in part, of its negotiations with the USG over the bilteral Free Trade Agreement. The new labor code ncludes provisions guaranteeing core international labor standards, including the right to organize, the right to strike and a prohibition on frced or exploitive labor. At the end of 2009, te GOM submitted two draft laws aimed at regulating and controlling labor union organizing and codifing the right to strike. The GOM argued that pasage of these laws in ther current form would permit Morocco to ratify ILO Convention 87 on the right of assembly, and to abrogate an article in the penal code that trade unions say has unfairly been used to hamper their right to strike. ¶3. (SBU) The GOM's Ministry of Employment and Professional Training's (MOEPT's) Office of Labor Inspectors is responsible for enforcing the regulations in the labor code, mediating between workers and employers to avert strikes, and organizing and overseeing the election of labor representatives. According to the MOEPT there are 421 labor inspectors stationed at 45 offices throughout the country. In the first nine months of 2009, the inspectors performed 8,938 inspections, resulting in 441 offenses and 2,303 infractions totaling 235 million dirham (USD 29 million) in fines. Trade unions and observers of Morocco's labor scene agreed that the number of inspectors is inadequate to enforce the labor code effectively. Inspectors lack resources, are susceptible to corruption, and in some cases are fearful of confronting powerful employers. In one case recounted to PolOff by the trade unions and the International Labor Organization (ILO) representative, a labor inspector in Meknes in 2007 levied a fine against a company. Subsequently the employees, at the behest of the employer, lodged a complaint in the courts that the labor inspector had fabricated the offense. As a result the labor inspector was tried and sentenced to several years in prison for his alleged abuse of power. Our interlocutors frequently cited this example to illustrate how wealthy employers, local government officials and the courts collude to prevent the inspectors from doing their job. An ILO representative commented that inspectors are reluctant to put themselves at risk and that many see their job as largely one of awareness-raising, an observation borne out by the 266,080 warnings issued by inspectors in 2009. ¶4. (SBU) Child labor remains a significant problem in Morocco despite substantial efforts by the GOM to address it and the related questions of education and poverty alleviation. Young boys worked primarily in construction, car repair, agriculture (mainly family farms) and other service sectors. Child labor for girls was most prevalent in the form of child domestics. Female child domestics or "petites bonnes" face increased risk of physical and sexual abuse from their employers. Further, they typically work very long hours for a nominal salary, do not attend school, and have high rates of illiteracy. Both the MOEPT and the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity (MOSD) have forwarded separate draft legislation to the Secretary General of the Government that would expand the labor code to protect domestic servants and substantially increase penalties for employers who use child domestic workers. (See Ref B for a comprehensive assessment of Morocco's child labor problem and the GOM's efforts to address the issue). UNIONS -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Morocco's trade unions are no longer the populist political and social force they once were under King Hassan II. However, they are still capable of mobilizing workers and challenging the Government, demonstrated most recently by a three- day national strike that forced the Government to withdraw proposed legislation to reform the traffic laws (Ref C). Many of the trade unions are now closely affiliated with political parties, hampered by a lack of internal democracy, and perceived as corrupt or acquiescent to the interests of the ruling parties. The Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) is the largest union and dominates particularly in the private sector. The UMT has been controlled by Mahjoub Benseddik, hero of the anti-colonial struggle, since 1955 and has not held an internal party congress since April 1995. The Democratic Confederation of Labor (CDT) is the next largest union and has the greatest number of government employees. Observers of the Moroccan labor scene agree that the CDT and UMT are the only two trade unions that operate with a degree of independence from the Government and political parties. ¶6. (SBU) The third-largest trade union is the General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM),affiliated with the ruling Istiqlal (Independence) party of Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi. Hamid Chabat, the head of the UGTM and Mayor of the City of Fes, also sits on the executive committee of the Istiqlal party (Ref D). The UGTM has supported the policies of the Government, often to the chagrin on its members, and only in October 2009 participated for the first time in a public sector strike. The fourth-largest trade union is the National Labor Union of Morocco (UNTM),affiliated with the Islamist-oriented Party of Justice and Development (PJD). The PJD's exclusion from Morocco's coalition governments has given it more freedom to represent the interests of its members. Finally, the Democratic Federation of Labor (FDT),affiliated with the Popular Front of Socialist Union party, was formed when the CDT split from the party in 2002. SITUATION REGARDING SPECIFIC LABOR RIGHTS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Paragraphs 8-21 provide details and a description of specific labor rights as requested in Ref A. Freedom of Association -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Moroccan constitution guarantees freedom of association, including the right to join a union. Moreover, the Labor Code allows workers to freely join and withdraw from a trade union and provides regulations for forming and registering a union. In practice, however, this right is not always respected. Trade union leaders told PolOff that attempts to organize workers, in particular in under-represented areas such as the export-oriented intensive agriculture in Agadir, frequently resulted in the dismissal and harassment of workers engaged in unionizing activities. In addition, trade unions cited other incidents of harassment, including the transfer or demotion of six employees who led the effort to form an air traffic controllers union in February of 2008. The unions also cited the high number of labor representatives elected without a union affiliation as proof of employers' exercise of undue influence to prevent effective union representation. ¶9. (SBU) From May 19 to 29, 2009, the GOM held elections for labor representatives for the first time since 2003. The election of labor representatives, required for all businesses with ten or more salaried employees every six years, is significant, since it is the duty of the labor representative to submit individual complaints about working conditions to the employer and to refer unresolved complaints to the labor inspector. Moreover, the elections designate which trade unions are the "most representative" and hence eligible to participate in collective bargaining by enterprise as well as participate in the social dialogue with the government to determine labor policy. "Most representative," for the purpose of collective bargaining by enterprise, requires a trade union to have at least 35 percent of the total number of labor representatives in an enterprise. To participate in the social dialogue, a union must have a minimum of 6 percent of the total number of labor representatives. ¶10. (SBU) The 2009 election, the first under the new labor code, included for the first time, the election of labor representatives from the agriculture and handicrafts sectors (although turnout in these areas was low). According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Employment and Professional Training (MOEPT),8,487 of the 13,578 registered businesses, or 62.5 percent, participated in the elections. Of the 615,550 registered workers, 81 percent, or 498,468, participated. The overwhelming majority of labor representative seats, 11,608 out of a total of 18,063, or 64 percent, were won by representatives without any trade union affiliation, known by the French acronym as SAS (Sans Appertenance Syndicale). Trade union leaders argued that the high number of SAS representatives was due to poorly regulated elections which allowed employers to either pressure their workers into electing an SAS representative sympathetic to the employer or to rig the election outright and name an SAS representative. The confederation of private enterprises (CGEM) and the Government countered that workers are alienated and distrustful of the highly politicized trade unions, which lack transparency and internal democracy and have failed to represent adequately the interests of workers. ¶11. (SBU) The rest of the labor representatives were elected as follows: UMT: 2,481 or 13.74 percent CDT: 1,393 or 7.71 percent UGTM: 1,045 or 5.79 percent UNTM: 683 or 3.79 percent FDT: 520 or 2.88 percent Others: 333 or 1.84 percent The remaining 333 representatives were divided among 15 other trade unions. According to Moroccan law, failure to meet a six-percent threshold means that, in theory, the UNTM and the FDT will not be allowed to participate in the social dialogue with the Government. ¶12. (SBU) Despite commitments from GOM officials at the time of the U.S.-Morocco FTA negotiations, Morocco has still not ratified ILO Convention 87 covering freedom of association and the right to organize. In November 2009, the MOEPT submitted to the trade unions two draft laws, the first of which reforms to the right to strike law (and is covered in the next section). The second draft law aims to unify legislation concerning the formation and management of trade unions. The legislation would mandate greater transparency and democracy in the unions by requiring a union to hold an internal congress every four years. In addition, it would require unions to open their books to government inspectors and account for the use of government- provided subsidies and member dues. The Minister of Employment Jamal Rhmani argued that passage of this law would permit Morocco to ratify Convention 87 and be compliant with its conditions. While the trade unions have not yet officially responded, we expect they will vociferously resist its passage. Collective Bargaining and the Right to Strike -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Unions have the right to bargain collectively, but in practice, this right is infrequently used. The GOM held numerous meetings with trade union representatives throughout 2009 under the rubric of the "social dialogue." However, talks mainly focused on wage and benefit issues related to civil servants and an increase in the minimum wage, rather than labor policy. No agreement has been reached on these issues, and civil servants, especially from the Ministries of Health, Justice, and National Education, went on strike repeatedly in late 2009. Trade unions told PolOff that employers are reluctant to engage in tripartite talks and instead negotiations are frequently held with the Government representing the interests of the enterprises. ¶14. (SBU) Workers have the right to strike but are required by law to give ten days notice, unless the issue concerns the non-payment of salaries or threatens the health or life of workers, in which case only 24 hours notice is required. Workers who wish to engage in a strike are required to submit to mediation by a labor inspector. In practice, workers frequently went on strike without notifying the Government in advance. According to the MOEPT, in the first nine months of 2009, there were 168 strikes resulting in the loss of 242,247 days of work. The MOEPT also reported that labor inspectors assisted negotiations that avoided 537 planned strikes. Observers agree, however, that this number does not accurately represent the true state of labor relations and is likely a tally of the "official strikes" referred to labor inspectors. Finally, the courts have the power to reinstate workers who are unfairly dismissed. The MOEPT reported that in the first nine months of 2009, 5,713 workers were reinstated. ¶15. (SBU) Trade unions complained that the GOM continues to use Penal Code Article 288 to prosecute workers who participate in a strike. Article 288 prescribes a sentence of one month to two years' imprisonment for any individual using force, threat or fraudulent activities to cause a coordinated stoppage of work in order to force a change in wages or that jeopardizes the free exercise of work. Unions alleged that the GOM frequently used this law to prosecute workers, citing the example of strikes in January 2009 at the SOPROFEL packaging plant in Biourga, Agadir, where a number of workers were injured by strikebreakers and then prosecuted and sentenced under Article 288. ¶16. (SBU) Minister of Employment and Professional Training has tabled a draft law on the right to strike. The new legislation would require that 35 percent of workers, through the labor representatives, agree to a strike, and give ten days notice. The bill would require mediation before a labor commission, rather than by the labor inspectors, and would include prohibitions on strikebreaking and sit-ins. Minister Rhmani announced that the passage of this law would allow the GOM to abrogate Article 288 and bring the Government in compliance with its ILO obligations. Elimination of Forced Labor and Child Labor -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Despite substantial steps to address the issue, Morocco continues to have a significant problem with the use of child labor in multiple sectors. Young girls trafficked from the countryside to work as domestic servants or "petites bonnes" are especially vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse and forced labor. The GOM has proposed a law that would extend the labor code to include domestic workers and increase penalties for those who employ minors. A comprehensive assessment of the problem of child labor and the GOM's efforts to address the issue is available in mission reporting on child labor for TVPR and TDA (Ref B). Elimination of Employment Discrimination -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Women are the primary victims of wage, employment and workplace discrimination. Morocco's most prominent non-governmental organizations for women's rights reported that women are the frequent victims of sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Sexual harassment is a crime under the penal code, but only when committed by a superior, and is classified as an abuse of authority. The law was not adequately enforced by the Government. Women were generally reluctant to sue their employers for fear of losing their jobs, anticipated difficulties in proving their case and conservative social mores that would harm their reputation. Acceptable Condition of Work -------------- ¶19. (SBU) The national minimum wage for non- agricultural work is 1,873 Dirham per month (USD 230) based on a 44-hour work week. Agricultural workers earn 55.12 dirham per day or 1,203 dirham a month (USD 137) based on a 48-hour work week. The minimum wage does not provide an adequate standard of living for a worker and his family. Trade unions reported that many employers do not respect the minimum wage, do not pay overtime as required by the law and do not accurately report workers' earnings to the national social security system. The MOEPT, through its labor inspectors, reported that among the offenses failure to pay the minimum wage was the number one issue, accounting for 34 percent of all fines. Failure to pay a worker's social security obligations accounted for another 20 percent. ¶20. (SBU) The law specifies a number of health and safety standards for workers, but in practice these are rarely enforced. There are less than a dozen labor inspectors who specialize in health and safety issues, and their numbers are inadequate to enforce the standards properly as set by the law. The MOEPT, in discussions with PolOff, has requested funding for the training of health and safety inspectors, which representatives admitted were too few in number. Strategic Recommendations -------------- ¶21. (SBU) The Mission recommends a sustained and focused engagement with GOM on priority labor issues, specifically targeting areas where the GOM is able to make tangible improvements, such as in fighting child labor, training and resources for the labor inspectors, and more robust enforcement of the existing labor code. Washington agencies, including the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR),should continue to emphasize the importance of enforcing current labor regulations in their bilateral discussions with the GOM. The consultation and assistance provisions on labor and environment of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement provide a vehicle both for highlighting problems with compliance, and for helping with solutions. It might be possible to augment our technical assistance, provided under the FTA, through MEPI or other funding, to emphasize the importance of the labor and environmental chapters. The USG should, for example, stress to the GOM the need to assure adequate enforcement of minimum core labor standards in the export-oriented value-added agriculture sector, where Moroccan and U.S. labor groups have recently noted deficiencies. Past and current DOL programs have been well received and produced measurable results. In particular, the Department of Labor's program "Strengthening Industrial Relations" to achieve higher levels of compliance with the new labor code through the training of labor inspectors and union representatives, implemented by the ILO, was a positive first step to increase enforcement. The Mission supports the ILO follow-on proposal to continue the training program -- in our view, a much-needed next step. Any follow-on proposal should have clearly defined indicators to measure the progress of the GOM's enforcement of the labor code. ¶22. (SBU) Labor Engagement: The GOM's efforts to pass legislation requiring the trade unions to become more transparent and democratic are likely to meet with stiff resistance. The problem of union independence is intricately tied to weaknesses of capacity in the political parties, which remain largely powerless to initiate and implement reform independent of the Palace. The AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center reported that its training and cooperation with Moroccan trade unions is limited to work with CDT. According to the Solidarity Center representative, the UMT was eager to receive funding but declined training and cooperation programs, arguing that the UMT had its own internal trainers. The representative opined that the real reason for their refusal to enter into a partnership was the UMT's reluctance to lift the veil on its internal workings. Ultimately, stronger unions are the key to bringing pressure to bear on the GOM to adequately enforce existing labor legislation. U.S. engagement with the trade unions needs to be open to all the unions and would be best achieved through a program such as "Strengthening Industrial Relations." ¶23. (SBU) Child Labor: This is an area that has seen real progress but still remains a significant problem. U.S. support for more programming is very much needed. If the GOM is successful in passing new legislation to restrict and penalize the use of female child domestics, the U.S. should look for ways to support the initiative with program funding. Ongoing Labor Programs -------------- ¶24. (U) The U.S. Department of Labor's program "Combating Child Labor through Education (Dima Adros)" is scheduled to last from 2007 until 2010 at a cost of USD 3 million. The program aims to prevent exploitive child labor in rural areas through school retention. The program has been highly successful and a model for capacity building of local NGOs and an effective means of preventing child labor. Labor Contacts -------------- ¶25. (U) Post Labor Reporting Officer is Matthew Lehrfeld, e-mail: LehrfeldMW@state.gov, telephone: +212522264550 ext.4151, fax number: +212522208096. The Senior Foreign Commercial Service Officer is Jane Kitson, e-mail: Jane.Kitson@mail.doc.gov, telephone: +212522264550 ext.4129, fax: +212522220259, the Economic Counselor is Michael DeTar, e-mail: DeTarMR@state.gov, telephone: +212537668132, fax: +212537765661. ¶26. (U) The principal interlocutor for labor issues at the MOEPT is Abdelaziz Addoum, Director of Labor, e-mail: azizaddoum@yahoo.fr, telephone: +212537281861, fax: +212537281858. ¶27. (U) The MOEPT provides office space and hosts a local officer from International Labor Organization's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) to oversee and coordinate programs to reduce child, forced and exploitive labor. Ms. Malak Ben Chekroun is the National Program Administrator for ILO-IPEC, e-mail: benchekroum@ilo.org, telephone: +212537291881, fax: +212537290864. ¶28. (U) The AFL-CIO Solidarity Center maintains an office in Rabat and is active in providing training to unions, principally the CDT. The regional officer based in Algiers is Loraine Clewer, e-mail: LClewer@solidaritycenter-dz.org, telephone: +213770650395, fax: +212537681437. There is a local program officer, Driss Choukri, e-mail: dchoukri@solidaritycenter-dz.org, telephone: +212537681436, fax: +212537681437. ¶29. (U) UNICEF is active in promoting studies and programs aimed at child protection, in particular child labor. Ms. Malika Elatifi, Specialist in Child Protection, e-mail: maltifi@unicef.org, telephone: 212537759741, fax: 212537759760. ¶30. (U) Embassy Rabat cleared this message. MILLARD