Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10CARACAS229
2010-02-25 17:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:
TRIPWIRES FOR AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURE IN THE EVENT
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHCV #0229/01 0561742 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 251742Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0516 INFO RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 0022 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000229
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25
TAGS: ASEC CVIS AMGT AEMR
SUBJECT: TRIPWIRES FOR AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURE IN THE EVENT
OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLY
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 G
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000229
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25
TAGS: ASEC CVIS AMGT AEMR
SUBJECT: TRIPWIRES FOR AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURE IN THE EVENT
OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLY
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 G
1.(C) Summary: Caracas Emergency Action Committee (EAC) convened
on February 11, 2010, to review the current situation of
electricity and water shortages as well as the GBRV imposed
rationing. Core EAC members were in attendance. We assess that
catastrophic failure of electricity and water supply systems
endangering post operations and public safety is less than fifty
percent. This message describes tripwires for authorized and
ordered departures to deal with a worst case scenario. End
Summary.
2.(C) Venezuela is approaching a severe electricity shortage due in
part to a drought which has reduced water levels at its main
hydroelectric facility at the Guri Dam on the Caroni River in
eastern Venezuela which produces 70% of the nation's electrical
power. If seasonal rains are delayed beyond the end of May 2010,
the level of water could fall below the turbine intake point
causing a collapse in generation capacity. Existing thermal
generating capacity would cover, at most, 40% of demand leading to
blackouts and draconian rationing. Fresh water levels at
reservoirs in the Caracas metropolitan area have also been affected
by drought, but the main threat is that massive electrical failure
would degrade the pumping system that carries water from the main
reservoir about 100 miles away to Caracas' higher elevation.
3.(C) In the worst case scenario of a total cut off in electrical
power or water, the Chancery has diesel storage tanks that would
fuel our emergency electrical generators (with conservation
measures) for two weeks. Current water storage capacity would
(with conservation measures) last about one week. The post is
already experiencing municipal water rationing. The Chancery
depends on our emergency storage tanks to make up for lost supply.
We must take delivery of water by tank trucks at least every two
weeks to top off emergency storage tanks. The Ambassador and DCM
residences have diesel and water storage that would last for about
a week. The Marine Security Guard residence does not have an
electrical generator, but a swimming pool could provide non potable
water in an emergency. All other American direct hire staff live
in apartment buildings. All of these buildings have below ground
water storage cisterns, which could supply water for one or two
days in the event of a total disruption of the water supply, but
none/none have emergency generators to supply the electric power to
pump the water in the event of prolonged power blackouts.
4.(C) Rather than a total blackout over a period of weeks or
longer, it is more likely that we would experience severe
electrical rationing in Caracas for up to 16 hours a day. In this
scenario hospitals, schools and supermarkets could also be
challenged to maintain operations. The operation of the Chancery
in anywhere normal status would require continued access to diesel
fuel and water delivered by tank truck. Fuel operation including
delivery services were nationalized by the GBRV in September 2008.
In a situation of massive shortages we anticipate that we would not
receive priority assistance in securing supply of either diesel or
water from the Venezuelan government. The worst case scenario
could result in civil disturbances and looting that would lead to a
further deterioration of living conditions in Caracas.
5.(C) The government of Venezuela is imposing electricity rationing
and is trying to acquire more thermal capacity to mitigate the
severe loss of electrical generating capacity at the Guri Dam in
the event rains within the next three months do not begin to halt
the drop in water level behind the dam. The Embassy has developed
a series of tripwires to plan for authorized and ordered departure
in the event that the collapse of electricity and water supply
endangered the safety of our employees.
6.(C) Tripwires for Authorized Departure:
A. Water supply behind the Guri Dam drops to the
equivalent of three weeks of generating capacity.
B. Severe electricity rationing in the Caracas
area results in occasional civil disturbances.
C. Emergency medical facilities used by Embassy
families become inoperable.
D. Diesel or water tank trucks that supply the
Embassy become unreliable.
E. Twenty-five percent of direct hire employees
lose electricity power for 48 hours causing food spoilage and
irregular water supply.
7.(SBU) Tripwires for Ordered Departure
To be determined.
8.(C) If commercial airline seats to the U.S. were not available on
a timely basis in the event that we crossed our authorized
departure tripwires, our response would be to request an American
carrier who currently services Venezuela to put on an additional
flight.
9.(C) In the still unlikely event authorized departure of embassy
personnel became necessary it is likely that some private American
citizens in Venezuela would also seek to leave, at least
temporarily. If regular commercial air flights were insufficient
to meet demand we would look to additional flights by U.S. carriers
as the best alternative.
10.(SBU) Post has updated its Emergency Action Plan and has
recently held training sessions exercises to familiarize key
players with the plan. We will hold future exercises to better
prepare for likely scenarios.
DUDDY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25
TAGS: ASEC CVIS AMGT AEMR
SUBJECT: TRIPWIRES FOR AUTHORIZED AND ORDERED DEPARTURE IN THE EVENT
OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLY
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 G
1.(C) Summary: Caracas Emergency Action Committee (EAC) convened
on February 11, 2010, to review the current situation of
electricity and water shortages as well as the GBRV imposed
rationing. Core EAC members were in attendance. We assess that
catastrophic failure of electricity and water supply systems
endangering post operations and public safety is less than fifty
percent. This message describes tripwires for authorized and
ordered departures to deal with a worst case scenario. End
Summary.
2.(C) Venezuela is approaching a severe electricity shortage due in
part to a drought which has reduced water levels at its main
hydroelectric facility at the Guri Dam on the Caroni River in
eastern Venezuela which produces 70% of the nation's electrical
power. If seasonal rains are delayed beyond the end of May 2010,
the level of water could fall below the turbine intake point
causing a collapse in generation capacity. Existing thermal
generating capacity would cover, at most, 40% of demand leading to
blackouts and draconian rationing. Fresh water levels at
reservoirs in the Caracas metropolitan area have also been affected
by drought, but the main threat is that massive electrical failure
would degrade the pumping system that carries water from the main
reservoir about 100 miles away to Caracas' higher elevation.
3.(C) In the worst case scenario of a total cut off in electrical
power or water, the Chancery has diesel storage tanks that would
fuel our emergency electrical generators (with conservation
measures) for two weeks. Current water storage capacity would
(with conservation measures) last about one week. The post is
already experiencing municipal water rationing. The Chancery
depends on our emergency storage tanks to make up for lost supply.
We must take delivery of water by tank trucks at least every two
weeks to top off emergency storage tanks. The Ambassador and DCM
residences have diesel and water storage that would last for about
a week. The Marine Security Guard residence does not have an
electrical generator, but a swimming pool could provide non potable
water in an emergency. All other American direct hire staff live
in apartment buildings. All of these buildings have below ground
water storage cisterns, which could supply water for one or two
days in the event of a total disruption of the water supply, but
none/none have emergency generators to supply the electric power to
pump the water in the event of prolonged power blackouts.
4.(C) Rather than a total blackout over a period of weeks or
longer, it is more likely that we would experience severe
electrical rationing in Caracas for up to 16 hours a day. In this
scenario hospitals, schools and supermarkets could also be
challenged to maintain operations. The operation of the Chancery
in anywhere normal status would require continued access to diesel
fuel and water delivered by tank truck. Fuel operation including
delivery services were nationalized by the GBRV in September 2008.
In a situation of massive shortages we anticipate that we would not
receive priority assistance in securing supply of either diesel or
water from the Venezuelan government. The worst case scenario
could result in civil disturbances and looting that would lead to a
further deterioration of living conditions in Caracas.
5.(C) The government of Venezuela is imposing electricity rationing
and is trying to acquire more thermal capacity to mitigate the
severe loss of electrical generating capacity at the Guri Dam in
the event rains within the next three months do not begin to halt
the drop in water level behind the dam. The Embassy has developed
a series of tripwires to plan for authorized and ordered departure
in the event that the collapse of electricity and water supply
endangered the safety of our employees.
6.(C) Tripwires for Authorized Departure:
A. Water supply behind the Guri Dam drops to the
equivalent of three weeks of generating capacity.
B. Severe electricity rationing in the Caracas
area results in occasional civil disturbances.
C. Emergency medical facilities used by Embassy
families become inoperable.
D. Diesel or water tank trucks that supply the
Embassy become unreliable.
E. Twenty-five percent of direct hire employees
lose electricity power for 48 hours causing food spoilage and
irregular water supply.
7.(SBU) Tripwires for Ordered Departure
To be determined.
8.(C) If commercial airline seats to the U.S. were not available on
a timely basis in the event that we crossed our authorized
departure tripwires, our response would be to request an American
carrier who currently services Venezuela to put on an additional
flight.
9.(C) In the still unlikely event authorized departure of embassy
personnel became necessary it is likely that some private American
citizens in Venezuela would also seek to leave, at least
temporarily. If regular commercial air flights were insufficient
to meet demand we would look to additional flights by U.S. carriers
as the best alternative.
10.(SBU) Post has updated its Emergency Action Plan and has
recently held training sessions exercises to familiarize key
players with the plan. We will hold future exercises to better
prepare for likely scenarios.
DUDDY