Expections for Chavez' Electoral Strategy

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000197 SIPDIS NOFORN HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/12 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE PREL SUBJECT: Expections for Chavez' Electoral Strategy CLASSIFIED BY: Robin D. Meyer, Political Counselor, DOS, POL; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Based on Chavez' past practices, most observers expect him to employ the following electoral strategies in the September 26 elections for National Assembly (AN) Deputies in order to achieve his goal of retaining at least a two thirds majority: using his political machine to get out the vote, making the elections about him rather than the candidates, intimidating friends and adversaries, diverting attention away from problematic issues, and using state resources to fund the campaign and win voter support. Political leaders from both sides see the AN elections as crucial for Chavez' ability to advance his "Bolivarian" project unimpeded by legislative or judicial constraints. If Chavez assesses that he will not be able to retain his super majority in the AN, many political leaders and observers believe he might either try to derail the elections or to undercut the AN's authority. End Summary. -------------- GEAR UP THE MACHINE -------------- ¶2. (C) In past elections, Chavez has won or lost based on his ability to get out his supporters and avoid abstentionism. Pollsters have told Poloffs that disaffected Chavistas and independent voters are more likely to stay home than cast a ballot in favor of an opposition candidate, particularly given widespread concerns about the secrecy of the vote. For example, many Venezuelans are reportedly fearful that the use of fingerprint machines to confirm voter identity can be tied to their actual vote. Since approximately 2.3 million Venezuelans are employed by the public sector, these voters and their family members may feel vulnerable to job-related retaliation. ¶3. (C) The PSUV began revving up its electoral machinery in October 2009 with the announcement of a PSUV party congress and the use of "socialist patrols" - a grassroots effort that tasks each member with "delivering" a certain number of people to the polls - during the November 15 election for party congress delegates. Despite this effort, however, the abstention rate in that election was reported to be high, suggesting that Chavez may need to do more to mobilize his base. -------------- MAKE IT PERSONAL -------------- ¶4. (C) Chavez has already begun to try to recast the legislative elections as a plebiscite about him. Although his polling numbers dropped towards the end of 2009, he retains a high level of personal support. Chavez' use of rumors of enemy plots at home and abroad - ranging from coup rumors to allegations of possible U.S. and Dutch attacks against Venezuela -may be intended to suggest a threat to his personal survival. AN President Cilia Flores commented on January 5 that "the Venezuelan opposition is planning a coup attempt from the Assembly, just like what happened in Honduras six months ago." At the January 23 kick-off of the PSUV electoral campaign, Chavez told his followers that "I demand absolute loyalty to my leadership because I am not me, I am the people." ¶5. (C) Chavez will also try to use his high personal approval CARACAS 00000197 002 OF 004 ratings to win support for PSUV candidates for the National Assembly who are likely to be relatively unknown and to lack their own political base. His personal selection of the candidates and his personal appearances with them on the campaign trail will likely be used to show that these candidates represent Chavismo, rather than simply themselves. Whether this strategy can work for Chavez during this electoral season will depend largely on his own poll numbers. -------------- INTIMIDATE BOTH FRIEND AND FOE -------------- ¶6. (C) Political observers believe that Chavez will likely continue to use selective, targeted attacks to intimidate potential threats within Chavismo and the opposition. Intolerant of dissent within the PSUV or its allied parties, Chavez routinely "punishes" or threatens those who fail to toe the line. For example, Deputy Oscar Figuera (Communist Party of Venezuela) was not reelected as head of the AN's Social Development Committee allegedly because of his too-vocal protest over Chavez' draft labor law. In the case of independently popular PSUV Governor Henri Falcon, Chavez publicly warned him about getting too close to the opposition. Falcon's assistant privately told Poloff on January 28 that Falcon would not meet with Ambassador Duddy out of concern that Chavez would expel him from the PSUV if he did. ¶7. (C) Many observers also expect that Chavez will also probably continue his selective attacks against high-ranking members of opposition as well as PSUV-allied parties . In the past year, the Venezuelan government (GBRV) has issued arrest warrants or jailed leaders from "A New Time" (UNT),"Homeland for All" (PPT),"Brave People's Alliance" (ABP),and "We Can" ("Podemos"). Student activists have been detained on a number of occasions. In late December 2009, Comptroller General Clodosvaldo Russian announced a new list of 150 officials disqualified from running for public office based simply on allegations of malfeasance or criminal conduct. Russian pledged on January 18 that political disqualifications ("inhabilitaciones") would continue to be issued against unspecified officials; these administrative sanctions bar public officials from running for office for a specified period without any prior judicial process or ruling. Since, as pollsters observe, there is minimal public interest in these "disqualifications," they remain an effective and relatively cost-free tool for Chavez to use against political opponents. ¶8. (C) Chavez could also try to create a generalized sense of threat to discourage political activism. For example, Chavez has tried to paint student protesters as radicals trying to "turn cities into chaos." Pollster Joe Saade (protect) noted that targeted, individual killings, such as the killing of student protesters in Merida, was a way of stoking fear, although with a potentially high political cost. -------------- DISTRACT AND CONQUER -------------- ¶9. (C) According to opposition political party leaders, Chavez may also try to divert the opposition's focus on the elections and CARACAS 00000197 003 OF 004 on the social and economic issues of concern to most voters. In mid-January, for example, Chavez repeatedly challenged the opposition to collect signatures to hold a recall referendum ("revocatorio"). AN President Cilia Flores, a close Chavez ally, said January 27 that "opposition, it is your moment. If it is true, as you say, that Chavez is in his worst moment and has lost the support of the majority, well, convoke a recall referendum and so, one by one, we will see who has the majority." Similarly, in mid-December, Chavez floated the idea of convoking a constituent assembly to redraft the Constitution - an initiative he did not pursue but that kept the opposition in discussions for weeks. Opposition party leaders Julio Borges ("Primero Justicia") and Henri Ramos Allup ("Accion Democratica") suggested that Chavez' decision to close RCTV was intended in part to distract attention away from the controversial currency devaluation and electrical rationing plan to "political" issues purportedly of less interest to poorer voters. Datanalisis pollster Luis Vicente Leon (protect) suggested that Chavez could use the threat of an armed conflict with Colombia to stoke Venezuelan nationalism, hoping for a "rally around the flag" effect. -------------- -------------- USING STATE RESOURCES FOR PSUV CAMPAIGNING -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Notwithstanding statutes that supposedly limit or ban the use of state funds in election campaigns, Chavez has repeatedly made use of state money for partisan campaigning with minimal consequences. Government agencies have been visibly involved in distributing PSUV campaign materials - even displaying party propaganda on the front steps of government offices in downtown Caracas. The National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Public Ministry are legally required to prohibit and punish such abuses. However, Chavez controls the CNE, which has wide discretion in establishing the electoral timetable and election-related regulations. While Vicente Diaz, the sole independent CNE rector, remains in charge of the CNE committee that regulates campaign financing, CNE administrator Aime Nogat told Poloffs January 19 that Diaz's role will probably be nominal at best since the CNE leadership selected in December 2009 has reduced what little space had existed for "respectful dialogue" and what little authority Diaz had. As a result, Diaz will be even less able challenge PSUV campaign abuses. ¶11. (C) As he has in the past, Chavez is expected to dedicate substantial resources to the social missions, particularly those in health and education, that benefit his political base. The January 8 currency devaluation was seen by many as principally a way to fill government coffers in order to support this pre-election spending spree. -------------- AND IF FACED WITH A LOSS? -------------- ¶12. (C) Without exception, political observers have predicted that Chavez will not tolerate losing his super majority control in the AN. While elections expert Eugenio Martinez told Poloffs on January 13 that Chavez accepted electoral defeat before in the December 2007 referendum, and is capable of doing so again, he could create a work-around in the event he lost his two thirds majority. During the three-month lame duck session after the CARACAS 00000197 004 OF 004 elections, Martinez speculated that Chavez could seek legislation that would give him indefinite decree powers ("ley habilitante") or that would drastically decrease the legal powers of the legislative branch. ¶13. (C) However, others doubt Chavez would allow elections to be held if he assessed the PSUV would lose its two thirds majority. Some legal experts said that Chavez could try to cancel or suspend the elections by having the Supreme Court rule the new electoral law (LOPE) unconstitutional and require that the AN pass new legislation; the constitution does not permit elections to be held until at least six months after new electoral legislation is passed. However, cancelling elections would have high political costs, especially since national elections have apparently only been suspended twice in Venezuelan history. Moreover, Chavez has used elections to give domestic and international legitimacy to his "Bolivarian project." Some observers suggest that, if faced with a truly desperate situation, Chavez could declare a state of emergency that would allow him to dissolve the government, although most consider it unlikely unless there were unprecedented, violent social unrest and/or mass infrastructure failure. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Venezuela has not held "normal" AN elections since 2000 (due to the opposition's boycott of the 2005 election),making the September elections unpredictable. Most observers still estimate that Chavez will easily retain his two thirds majority, although a significant number of opposition deputies will make the National Assembly much less compliant than it is now. Chavez' electoral strategy and campaigning skill will be tested if electricity rationing, water shortages, and inflation become crises this spring and summer. Chavez' habit of publicly blaming officials within his own government for these and other problems, often during his televised Sunday "Alo Presidente" show, has deprived officials of credibility and cast doubt on whether anyone in the GBRV other than Chavez can be trusted by the public to resolve these problems. His challenge, therefore, will be to make the election about him, while also instilling public confidence in the PSUV candidates. DUDDY