Expections for Chavez' Electoral Strategy

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/12
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SUBJECT: Expections for Chavez' Electoral Strategy

CLASSIFIED BY: Robin D. Meyer, Political Counselor, DOS, POL; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: Based on Chavez' past practices, most observers
expect him to employ the following electoral strategies in the
September 26 elections for National Assembly (AN) Deputies in order
to achieve his goal of retaining at least a two thirds majority:
using his political machine to get out the vote, making the
elections about him rather than the candidates, intimidating
friends and adversaries, diverting attention away from problematic
issues, and using state resources to fund the campaign and win
voter support. Political leaders from both sides see the AN
elections as crucial for Chavez' ability to advance his
"Bolivarian" project unimpeded by legislative or judicial
constraints. If Chavez assesses that he will not be able to
retain his super majority in the AN, many political leaders and
observers believe he might either try to derail the elections or to
undercut the AN's authority. End Summary.



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GEAR UP THE MACHINE

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2. (C) In past elections, Chavez has won or lost based on his
ability to get out his supporters and avoid abstentionism.
Pollsters have told Poloffs that disaffected Chavistas and
independent voters are more likely to stay home than cast a ballot
in favor of an opposition candidate, particularly given widespread
concerns about the secrecy of the vote. For example, many
Venezuelans are reportedly fearful that the use of fingerprint
machines to confirm voter identity can be tied to their actual
vote. Since approximately 2.3 million Venezuelans are employed by
the public sector, these voters and their family members may feel
vulnerable to job-related retaliation.




3. (C) The PSUV began revving up its electoral machinery in
October 2009 with the announcement of a PSUV party congress and the
use of "socialist patrols" - a grassroots effort that tasks each
member with "delivering" a certain number of people to the polls -
during the November 15 election for party congress delegates.
Despite this effort, however, the abstention rate in that election
was reported to be high, suggesting that Chavez may need to do more
to mobilize his base.



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MAKE IT PERSONAL

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4. (C) Chavez has already begun to try to recast the legislative
elections as a plebiscite about him. Although his polling numbers
dropped towards the end of 2009, he retains a high level of
personal support. Chavez' use of rumors of enemy plots at home and
abroad - ranging from coup rumors to allegations of possible U.S.
and Dutch attacks against Venezuela -may be intended to suggest a
threat to his personal survival. AN President Cilia Flores
commented on January 5 that "the Venezuelan opposition is planning
a coup attempt from the Assembly, just like what happened in
Honduras six months ago." At the January 23 kick-off of the PSUV
electoral campaign, Chavez told his followers that "I demand
absolute loyalty to my leadership because I am not me, I am the
people."




5. (C) Chavez will also try to use his high personal approval

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ratings to win support for PSUV candidates for the National
Assembly who are likely to be relatively unknown and to lack their
own political base. His personal selection of the candidates and
his personal appearances with them on the campaign trail will
likely be used to show that these candidates represent Chavismo,
rather than simply themselves. Whether this strategy can work for
Chavez during this electoral season will depend largely on his own
poll numbers.



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INTIMIDATE BOTH FRIEND AND FOE

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6. (C) Political observers believe that Chavez will likely
continue to use selective, targeted attacks to intimidate potential
threats within Chavismo and the opposition. Intolerant of dissent
within the PSUV or its allied parties, Chavez routinely "punishes"
or threatens those who fail to toe the line. For example, Deputy
Oscar Figuera (Communist Party of Venezuela) was not reelected as
head of the AN's Social Development Committee allegedly because of
his too-vocal protest over Chavez' draft labor law. In the case of
independently popular PSUV Governor Henri Falcon, Chavez publicly
warned him about getting too close to the opposition. Falcon's
assistant privately told Poloff on January 28 that Falcon would not
meet with Ambassador Duddy out of concern that Chavez would expel
him from the PSUV if he did.




7. (C) Many observers also expect that Chavez will also probably
continue his selective attacks against high-ranking members of
opposition as well as PSUV-allied parties . In the past year, the
Venezuelan government (GBRV) has issued arrest warrants or jailed
leaders from "A New Time" (UNT),"Homeland for All" (PPT),"Brave
People's Alliance" (ABP),and "We Can" ("Podemos"). Student
activists have been detained on a number of occasions. In late
December 2009, Comptroller General Clodosvaldo Russian announced a
new list of 150 officials disqualified from running for public
office based simply on allegations of malfeasance or criminal
conduct. Russian pledged on January 18 that political
disqualifications ("inhabilitaciones") would continue to be issued
against unspecified officials; these administrative sanctions bar
public officials from running for office for a specified period
without any prior judicial process or ruling. Since, as pollsters
observe, there is minimal public interest in these
"disqualifications," they remain an effective and relatively
cost-free tool for Chavez to use against political opponents.




8. (C) Chavez could also try to create a generalized sense of
threat to discourage political activism. For example, Chavez has
tried to paint student protesters as radicals trying to "turn
cities into chaos." Pollster Joe Saade (protect) noted that
targeted, individual killings, such as the killing of student
protesters in Merida, was a way of stoking fear, although with a
potentially high political cost.



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DISTRACT AND CONQUER

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9. (C) According to opposition political party leaders, Chavez
may also try to divert the opposition's focus on the elections and

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on the social and economic issues of concern to most voters. In
mid-January, for example, Chavez repeatedly challenged the
opposition to collect signatures to hold a recall referendum
("revocatorio"). AN President Cilia Flores, a close Chavez ally,
said January 27 that "opposition, it is your moment. If it is
true, as you say, that Chavez is in his worst moment and has lost
the support of the majority, well, convoke a recall referendum and
so, one by one, we will see who has the majority." Similarly, in
mid-December, Chavez floated the idea of convoking a constituent
assembly to redraft the Constitution - an initiative he did not
pursue but that kept the opposition in discussions for weeks.
Opposition party leaders Julio Borges ("Primero Justicia") and
Henri Ramos Allup ("Accion Democratica") suggested that Chavez'
decision to close RCTV was intended in part to distract attention
away from the controversial currency devaluation and electrical
rationing plan to "political" issues purportedly of less interest
to poorer voters. Datanalisis pollster Luis Vicente Leon (protect)
suggested that Chavez could use the threat of an armed conflict
with Colombia to stoke Venezuelan nationalism, hoping for a "rally
around the flag" effect.



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USING STATE RESOURCES FOR PSUV CAMPAIGNING

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10. (C) Notwithstanding statutes that supposedly limit or ban the
use of state funds in election campaigns, Chavez has repeatedly
made use of state money for partisan campaigning with minimal
consequences. Government agencies have been visibly involved in
distributing PSUV campaign materials - even displaying party
propaganda on the front steps of government offices in downtown
Caracas. The National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Public
Ministry are legally required to prohibit and punish such abuses.
However, Chavez controls the CNE, which has wide discretion in
establishing the electoral timetable and election-related
regulations. While Vicente Diaz, the sole independent CNE rector,
remains in charge of the CNE committee that regulates campaign
financing, CNE administrator Aime Nogat told Poloffs January 19
that Diaz's role will probably be nominal at best since the CNE
leadership selected in December 2009 has reduced what little space
had existed for "respectful dialogue" and what little authority
Diaz had. As a result, Diaz will be even less able challenge PSUV
campaign abuses.




11. (C) As he has in the past, Chavez is expected to dedicate
substantial resources to the social missions, particularly those in
health and education, that benefit his political base. The January
8 currency devaluation was seen by many as principally a way to
fill government coffers in order to support this pre-election
spending spree.



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AND IF FACED WITH A LOSS?

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12. (C) Without exception, political observers have predicted
that Chavez will not tolerate losing his super majority control in
the AN. While elections expert Eugenio Martinez told Poloffs on
January 13 that Chavez accepted electoral defeat before in the
December 2007 referendum, and is capable of doing so again, he
could create a work-around in the event he lost his two thirds
majority. During the three-month lame duck session after the

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elections, Martinez speculated that Chavez could seek legislation
that would give him indefinite decree powers ("ley habilitante") or
that would drastically decrease the legal powers of the legislative
branch.




13. (C) However, others doubt Chavez would allow elections to be
held if he assessed the PSUV would lose its two thirds majority.
Some legal experts said that Chavez could try to cancel or suspend
the elections by having the Supreme Court rule the new electoral
law (LOPE) unconstitutional and require that the AN pass new
legislation; the constitution does not permit elections to be held
until at least six months after new electoral legislation is
passed. However, cancelling elections would have high political
costs, especially since national elections have apparently only
been suspended twice in Venezuelan history. Moreover, Chavez has
used elections to give domestic and international legitimacy to his
"Bolivarian project." Some observers suggest that, if faced with a
truly desperate situation, Chavez could declare a state of
emergency that would allow him to dissolve the government, although
most consider it unlikely unless there were unprecedented, violent
social unrest and/or mass infrastructure failure.



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COMMENT

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14. (C) Venezuela has not held "normal" AN elections since 2000
(due to the opposition's boycott of the 2005 election),making the
September elections unpredictable. Most observers still estimate
that Chavez will easily retain his two thirds majority, although a
significant number of opposition deputies will make the National
Assembly much less compliant than it is now. Chavez' electoral
strategy and campaigning skill will be tested if electricity
rationing, water shortages, and inflation become crises this spring
and summer. Chavez' habit of publicly blaming officials within his
own government for these and other problems, often during his
televised Sunday "Alo Presidente" show, has deprived officials of
credibility and cast doubt on whether anyone in the GBRV other than
Chavez can be trusted by the public to resolve these problems. His
challenge, therefore, will be to make the election about him, while
also instilling public confidence in the PSUV candidates.
DUDDY