Opposition Committed to Elections Despite Challenges

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000177 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/12 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: Opposition Committed to Elections Despite Challenges CLASSIFIED BY: Robin D. Meyer, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Despite continuing internal rivalries, opposition political party leaders are united on the need to resist Chavez' "provocations" and remain focused on the September legislative elections, where they expect to present a unified candidate slate and to win at least 40 seats in the National Assembly. Several expect Chavez to try to derail the elections if he thinks he will lose his "rubber stamp" two thirds majority. Some Chavistas are concerned about the upcoming elections given looming inflation and electricity rationing and divisions within Chavismo. End Summary. Legislative Elections - The End of the Rubber Stamp Congress? ¶2. (C) Following a week of coup rumors and anti-government student protests sparked by the closing of RCTV, Ambassador and Polcouns met with a variety of anti- and pro-government politicians during the week of February 1 to discuss each sides' assessment of their political prospects in this election year. All characterized the September 26 legislative elections as decisive for Chavez' ability to advance his Bolivarian project. Both anti- and pro-government politicians concurred that Chavez was not eager for the legislative elections to take place. ¶3. (C) Political party leaders speculated about ways that Chavez could try to "provoke" a situation that would allow him to cancel the elections if he thought the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) would not win a two thirds majority. National Assembly Second Vice President Jose Albornoz ("Patria para Todos") (PPT),who is allied with the PSUV, told Polcouns on February 4 that the opposition had not "taken the bait" of calling for a recall referendum ("revocatorio"),as Chavez had been taunting them to do, which would have diverted the opposition's time, attention, and resources away from the legislative elections. Opposition legislator Juan Jose Molina ("Podemos") told Polcouns on February 5 that Chavez' agenda was "radicalization and violence" in order to provoke a situation in which Chavez could declare a "state of emergency" or otherwise suspend or cancel the elections. As for the political cost from cancelling the elections, Luis Carlos Solorzano (COPEI) recalled Chavez' February 7 televised walk through downtown Caracas, when he pointed to certain historic buildings and ordered the mayor to "expropriate them," and concluded that Chavez was increasingly less concerned about maintaining his democratic faC'ade; "his democratic halo is evaporating." Diego Arria, a former mayor of Caracas, political ally of former President Carlos Andres Perez and former Venezuelan Ambassador at the UN, told the Ambassador on February 1 that Chavez could also use pro-government militant groups, such as "La Piedrita," the "Tupamaro," and the "Lina Ron Brigade," to instigate violence. Elections - Opposition Cautiously Optimistic ¶4. (C) Most opposition political party leaders agreed on the need for the opposition to remain focused on the legislative elections. Julio Borges ("Primero Justicia") cautioned against "shortcuts," referring to the opposition's strategy in 2001-2002 of provoking civil disturbances and a coup, which he insisted only made the establishment of legitimate democratic institutions harder in the long run. He even expressed concern about the January 31 call for Chavez' resignation by a group of former Chavista military and government officials, which Borges feared could contribute to coup rumors and divert attention from the electoral process. ¶5. (C) However, none of the opposition leaders was able to enunciate a campaign theme or message. Solorzano blamed the opposition leadership's lack of political will or interest in defining a message, claiming that, despite the extensive work of CARACAS 00000177 002 OF 003 the "unity table" subcommittee on "program," the leadership only dedicated 15 minutes a week to the issue. However, Solorzano, Borges, and Ramos Allup ("Accion Democratica") all talked of the need for the opposition to address the social and economic problems of concern to all voters. Solorzano said the sub-committee had focused on social security, health, education, personal and legal security, and balance of powers ("reinstitutionalization"). Ramos Allup said the opposition had to focus on insecurity, water/electricity, and the cost of living. Solorzano said the themes of the still inchoate "message" would probably be peace (in contrast to Chavez' calls for war),inclusion (as opposed to Chavez' rhetoric of exclusion),and equilibrium (rather than Chavez' goal of dominance). Borges and Allup said the opposition had to refrain from allowing Chavez to divert the opposition's attention away from economic/social issues. ¶6. (C) The opposition parties appeared to take as given that they would announce a unified slate of candidates for the September elections by the April 30 deadline. Borges estimated that most of the candidates would be chosen through a "consensus" process organized by the opposition "unity table," but that about 30 would have to be selected through primary elections. They acknowledged the potential for division and "personalism" when the decisions were actually made in March and April. Already, opposition figures have begun announcing their candidacies even before the "unity table" selection process has been completed. ¶7. (C) While hurt by the new electoral law and redistricting, the opposition leaders all calculated the opposition could win at least 40 seats. Solorzano and Borges were the most optimistic, with Solorzano predicting an opposition win of 50 seats and Borges even seeing the possibility of winning a blocking one third. Even Chavez ally Jose Albornoz claimed the opposition would win about 40 seats, which, he lamented, while less than a blocking one third, would still create "problems" in the National Assembly. According to Solorzano, even if the opposition wins less than a blocking one third, Chavez will face a different game if the National Assembly has a significant opposition presence. ¶8. (C) In contrast to this focus on elections, former Caracas mayor and former UN Ambassador Arria advocated building a legal case against Chavez, whom he characterized as a "walking rap sheet." Arrias referred to the January 31 announcement of the former Chavista military officers (see para 5 above) as a positive step that contributed to the de-legitimization of Chavez in the international community. Elections - Chavismo Divided and Worried ¶9. (C) Government ally Albornoz claimed that Chavez was concerned about the elections given the looming inflation and electrical crisis. He said many PSUV Deputies who did not expect to be selected as candidates wanted to talk to him about joining the PPT. Albornoz claimed that even Lara Governor Henri Falcon had approached him about possibly joining the PPT. (Note: Falcon is a popular PSUV governor with crossover appeal to many in the opposition. Chavez has publicly challenged him to join the opposition. Falcon recently defied Chavez' call for a crackdown on student protesters by calling for dialogue rather than repression. End Note.) (Comment: While disgruntled, most Chavista Deputies lack the stature or the political base that would enable them to prosper outside of Chavez' patronage. End Comment.) Albornoz said the PPT was considering forming an electoral alliance with several small leftist parties, including the Communist Party (PCV),which is unhappy with Chavez' decisions to not support their draft workers law and to replace the PCV Chair of the National Assembly's Social Development Committee. CARACAS 00000177 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) While PSUV Deputies Saul Ortega, Calixto Ortega, Francisco Torrealba, and Hiroshima Bravo asserted to Polcouns that the PSUV would win between 127- 140 of the 165 seats in the National Assembly, they expressed concern about the government's communication efforts, alleging that widespread public doubts about Chavez' programs were due to the GBRV's own ineffective communication. In contrast to Albornoz, Saul Ortega stressed the PSUV's internal party discipline, which would ensure that, whatever the process for candidate selection, all PSUV members would support the candidates selected. (Note: Saul Ortega himself had recently been replaced as the National Assembly's First Vice President. End Note.) (Note and Comment: Despite the assertions by Saul and Calixto Ortega, Chavez may in fact be concerned about party discipline. In his February 7 "Alo Presidente" talk show, Chavez called on the National Assembly leadership to consider approving a law that would punish Deputies elected on the PSUV ticket from changing parties after their election. End Note.) Appealing to the "Ni-Ni" Voters ¶11. (C) Both the PPT and the opposition parties expressed interest in the growing percentage of voters identifying themselves as "ni-nis," neither with the government nor with the opposition. Albornoz considered the "ni ni" voters as potential supporters of a non-Chavez leftist alliance, while Solorzano stressed the need for "new opposition faces" to appeal to the "ni nis." However, Ramos Allup concluded that the "ni-nis" really do not exist as an independent voting bloc since polls show that, on the issues, there are no separate "ni-ni" positions: overwhelming majorities support private property, reject the Cuban model, reject Chavez' reelection after 2012, etc. Comment ¶12. (C) Chavez could face a difficult spring if projected electrical and water crises materialize. The opposition is counting on this discontent to help them in the September elections. Chavez' recent actions, especially his summary expropriations, show his increasing willingness to dispense with the illusion of needing to consult with the legislature or judiciary before taking major decisions. Despite the preference of some in the opposition to hope for "shortcuts," opposition political parties appear committed to the democratic and electoral process, despite its difficulties. They believe that, even without a blocking one third, it will be a different game for Chavez after September. DUDDY