Argentina: Standoff between the President and the Central

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000013 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/11 TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL PGOV AR SUBJECT: Argentina: Standoff between the President and the Central Bank CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Kelly, Charge; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) set off a major institutional crisis in Argentina with her January 8 dismissal of Central Bank (BCRA) Governor Martin Redrado. The GoA has since been fighting frantically with the opposition-controlled Congress, the courts, and media to control the narrative. The economic and political consequences of this standoff are still evolving as events unfold at a rapid pace, but seem likely to be considerable. The markets have not yet panicked, but analysts believe that the conflict between CFK and Redrado will soon take an economic toll in addition to the political costs. In the interim, the showdown has sparked yet another political crisis borne of the Kirchners' autocratic instincts and the institutional shortcomings of the Argentine political system. End Summary. The Story So Far -------------- ¶2. (C) President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) on January 6 demanded the resignation of the Governor of the Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) Martin Redrado for his failure to transfer US$6.569 billion in foreign currency reserves to the Treasury subject to her direct control in accordance with her government's announcement last month to unveil a "Bicentennial Fund." Redrado declined to leave office, and CFK took measures to force his departure, issuing a presidential decree on January 8 co-signed by all 14 cabinet ministers. Kirchner supporters have denounced Redrado, while political opposition leaders have called for him to hold fast and not resign. Late on January 8, a federal district court judge issued injunctions effectively blocking both Redrado's dismissal and the transfer of BCRA assets pending further judicial review. The GoA is appealing the injunctions, and the issue may go to the Supreme Court. Should Redrado go, the most frequently mentioned replacement for him is former BCRA Governor Mario Blejer (whom Minister of Economy Boudou had announced as Redrado's successor), who formerly held the position. The well-regarded Blejer has publicly declined the offer under the current circumstances. GoA Fires in All Directions -------------- ¶3. (C) The GoA has responded to the crisis by pushing several themes in the press, including the idea that the BCRA's recalcitrance reflects the inherent anti-democratic premise of a central bank. This point of emphasis seems to have increased the reluctance Blejer, with years of experience in the IMF and the central banks of Israel, the UK, and Argentina, to head the BCRA. Blejer reportedly stated that he is "extremely respectful" of BCRA independence and autonomy as regulated by the BCRA Charter and that "the BCRA already has a Governor, and that prohibits him from considering the offer." Sebastian Vargas, a senior Barclays analyst, believes that Blejer will not become Governor of a Central Bank that does not focus on controlling inflation (currently, according to most objective analysis, in the 17-20% range). Another key element of the GoA narrative (as voiced by former President Nestor Kirchner over the weekend) is that the BCRA crisis is the work of a conspiracy by the media (led by Clarin),political opportunists (led by VP Cobos),and the "neoliberal" business class against the Kirchners' supposedly more progressive national project. Finally, the GoA is manufacturing stories of support for their actions, including a baseless assertion published in house organ El Argentino that Ambassador Martinez supports the Kirchners' new Bicentennial Fund. Redrado: An Unlikely Rebel -------------- ¶4. (C) As BCRA Governor since 2004, Redrado has, until now, been a staunch supporter of the Kirchners and their unorthodox economic policies, including Nestor Kirchner's use in 2005 of $8 billion in BCRA reserves to pay off the GoA's IMF loans and CFK's nationalization in 2008 of US$20 billion in private pension funds. However, Redrado has been increasingly marginalized in economic policy making. The estrangement dates back to CFK's announcement in September 2008, without consulting Redrado, that the GoA was going to pay off all of its Paris Club debt with BCRA reserves (nothing ever came of the announcement since it was immediately followed by the global financial crisis). What may be behind his reluctance to transfer BCRA reserves to the Treasury is both pique at his increasingly marginalized status and fear over the legal consequences once his tenure expires in September 2010 and, especially, after a new government takes power at the end of next year. It is not clear, however, if he would ultimately have stood in the way of transfer of the BCRA reserves had he been fully consulted. CFK announced the transfer and Fund creation on December 14, immediately before the Argentine summer holidays. Redrado and his staff had serious reservations that the transfer would leave the Funds vulnerable to seizure by holdouts of the outstanding $20 billion in defaulted debt from the 2001-2002 crisis. Economic Consequences -------------- ¶5. (C) The economic consequences are still very unclear and the markets have shown restraint, with few signs of panic. Reports indicate that the BCRA has been intervening more robustly to defend the peso, and this has maintained peso stability. What is now clearly in question is the independence of the BCRA. Any possible replacement, Vargas speculated, would be entirely dependent on the Kirchners and would tailor policies to their political imperatives, to the ultimate detriment of the Argentine economy. If the crisis persists and the market reacts by upping the price on GoA bonds, it could imperil GoA plans for a debt swap at the end of the month with the remaining holdouts of defaulted Argentine bonds that could give Argentina access to international credit markets after a 7-year absence, an opportunity that the Kirchners may regret missing. Although Boudou indicated that Blejer was the leading candidate to take Redrado's place and is apparently still consulting with him, it is doubtful that anyone with enough stature to effectively defend the BCRA's autonomy would be willing to take the reins under the current circumstances. Boudou's Position -------------- ¶6. (C) On January 8, Boudou called the Ambassador worried about rumors that bond holdouts in the U.S. would seek and obtain a U.S. federal court order to attach BCRA reserves on the grounds that the BCRA's transfer of reserves to the GOA proved that BCRA reserves were GOA assets. Boudou assured the Ambassador that he intended to proceed with the planned debt swap for the remaining $20 billion of defaulted Argentine bonds later this month. Press reports over the weekend that Boudou incurred the displeasure of CFK for erroneously advising that Redrado could be removed without any problem were denied by the GoA. Political Considerations: Another Crisis is Brewing -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Once again, the Kirchners' insular decision-making process has transformed an economic policy dispute into a major political crisis. CFK announced her December 14 decree creating the Bicentennial Fund with BCRA reserves without consulting the BCRA or Congress. Likewise, she announced her January 8 decree removing Redrado without first getting the advice of Congress as required by the BCRA Charter. Several of the protagonists, including Nestor Kirchner, have nicknamed this crisis "126" as a possible sequel to the four-month conflict with the agricultural sector in 2008 over Decree 125, which increased export duties on agricultural exports. That conflict culminated in the dramatic tie-breaking vote in the Senate cast by Vice President Cobos against the GOA's proposal, which made a hero of Cobos and marked the beginning of the Kirchners' long slide toward unpopularity. ¶8. (C) This crisis could cut much more deeply, as the Executive Branch seeks to usurp congressional authority over BCRA leadership and reserves. Ever since the Kirchners lost their majorities in both chambers of Congress in the June 28 mid-term elections, it has been widely speculated that CFK would seek to marginalize the legislative branch by resorting to "decrees of necessity and urgency" (DNU). Judge Maria Sarmiento disrupted this calculus by suspending CFK's December 14 and January DNUs, noting that DNUs were for "exceptional" circumstances, and that the president had failed to demonstrate in these cases the necessity or the urgency for bypassing Congress. The GOA has appealed these court decisions, but the Kirchners also attacked the judge and made some moves that the Association of Magistrates has called unacceptable pressure and intimidation tactics against a sitting judge. ¶9. (C) Ominously for the government, the opposition has seemed unusually nimble in its response to CFK's questionable decrees regarding the Central Bank. Different opposition parties filed legal challenges within days of the first decree in December, and Radical Party leaders Senators Sanz and Morales arrived at court the day after the second decree to seek an injunction. These legal challenges are what allowed the courts to put the brakes on the GOA's power grab. ¶10. (C) The Kirchners and their associates are responding with the same fury and paranoia that turned off the Argentine public during the farm crisis of 2008. In attacking their opponents on this issue, they have employed familiar rhetorical devices, including assertions of a conspiracy led by their nemesis, estranged Vice President Cobos, in cahoots with the powerful Clarin media group and its CEO, Hector Magnetto. CFK has publicly called on Cobos to learn his place as vice president, and sarcastically noted that "those who raffled the reserves and bankrupted the country in the recent past are today the Central Bank's greatest defenders." The Central Bank, she said, is not the "unipersonal" fiefdom of Redrado but rather governed by a "collegial body." A Crisis that Could Have Easily Been Avoided -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) A banker with ties to the GoA told CDA January 11 that "this whole thing could have been avoided if the Kirchners had done a few simple things." The most obvious is their failure to bring the Bicentennial Fund to a vote in the regularly scheduled BCRA board meeting. The Kirchners control a majority of the board and would probably have won if the item were on the agenda. Alternatively, they could have gone to Redrado, who has been notably malleable and compliant with Kirchner initiatives during his tenure, and persuaded him to play along with this one as well. (It's worth noting that Redrado never refused to comply with the December 14 decree -- he merely incurred the Kirchners' wrath by seeking legal counsel on the implications for the remaining BCRA reserves and his own potential legal liability.) Daniel Marx, who runs the AGM consulting company, told Econoff that he spoke to Redrado shortly after the GoA announced his departure. During their conversation, Redrado told Marx that he was stunned by the President's demand for his resignation; he was given no forewarning that he would be required to step down. Redrado indicated that he would have been willing to discuss his reservations on the Bicentennial Fund with the Casa Rosada but was never given the opportunity. ¶12. (C) Moreover, CFK acted precipitously when she could have worked to build support for the initiative. In the case of the 2005 IMF payoff with BCRA funds, Nestor Kirchner was supported by a majority in the congress and had strong public support (which may explain, at least in part, Redrado's less accommodating position in the current situation). CFK now faces a Congress controlled by the opposition and little popular support, making it even more incumbent on her to build support for the Bicentennial Fund. The ostensible purpose of the Bicentennial Fund was to meet debt payments coming due in 2010. However, since Congress had already approved sufficient funds for this purpose in the 2010 budget, the widespread suspicion is that the Kirchners were seeking to siphon BCRA reserves in order to free up the budgeted funds for social spending to guarantee the discipline of governors, mayors, labor and social leaders and marshal their support for a Kirchner 2011 run at the presidency. ¶13. (C) While it's not clear yet how it will play out, the crisis demonstrates once again the lack of respect for institutional limits in Argentine political culture. Pundits have noted that, mere days after the GoA lambasted AS Valenzuela for repeating concerns expressed to him by representatives of U.S. companies regarding Argentina's weak rule of law, the Kirchners proceeded to prove the truth of the comments by flouting congressional prerogatives as well as legally mandated safeguards intended to keep governments from raiding BCRA coffers at will. MARTINEZ