DEPUTY GREAT LAKES ENVOY JIM YELLIN'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000073 C O R R E C T E D COPY: ADDED SPACES TO SEPERATE PARAGRAPHS SIPDIS STATE PASS AF/C AND EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV CG BU RW BE SUBJECT: DEPUTY GREAT LAKES ENVOY JIM YELLIN'S MEETING WITH BELGIAN MFA BRUSSELS 00000073 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: A/DCM Richard M. Eason for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). Introduction and Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) James Yellin, Deputy to the U.S. Special Advisor for Africa,s Great Lakes region, met with Belgian MFA Africa Division officials on December 18 after returning from his travel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, and Rwanda with Roeland van de Geer, the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region. The meeting was hosted by Africa Director General Renier Nijskens. Also present were Foreign Minister Vanackere,s Africa Advisor Karl D,haene, Congo Desk Officer Hugues Chantry, Jean-Michel Dumont from van de Geer's office, and Poloff. ¶2. (C) Yellin said the U.S. places importance on collaborating with the EU and Belgium on peace processes in Africa. With regard to Burundi, he said that international observers should be present before, during and after the elections in 2010. The Belgian MFA officials agreed and said they would examine the possibility of increasing the number and length of stay of Belgian election observers. ¶3. (C) Dumont remarked that the FDLR had reorganized effectively in the wake of the military operations against them and had the initiative in eastern Congo. He said that CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda seemed to be consolidating his power over military units and the populace in Masisi to protect himself in the event the Congolese government t@nder his International CrimmaryQ` July 26, second round of presidential elections if needed; July 28, Senate elected by Communal Councils; September, lections for the Communal Councils and Hill CQuncils. End note) ¶6. (C) Nijskens commented that Youssef Mahmoud, the head of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB),was concerned about security during the elections and had asked UN planners to come up with options for dealing with possible emergencies. Congo -------------- ¶7. (C) Dumont from the office of the EU Special Representative described the situation in North and South Kivu as tense. He said the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) had reorganized into an efficient organization in the wake of the military operations against them and had the initiative in the Kivus. Although they had lost important cassiterite mines, he noted, they continued to exploit gold, timber, and charcoal. He suggested that MONUC target military operations against FDLR military leaders in the DRC. ¶8. (C) Dumont said the integration of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and other armed groups into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) had not taken place as foreseen by the GoDRC-CNDP agreement of March 23, 2009.. BRUSSELS 00000073 002.3 OF 002 (Note: The March 23 agreement specifies that the CNDP will transform itself into a political party and integrate its fighters into the Congolese army and police. The GoDRC, for its part, is required to establish a National Follow-Up Commission and grant prominent government positions to CNDP officials. Although the commission exists, its meetings have been largely unproductive, and no CNDP officials have been given national-level jobs in the GoDRC. End Note.) ¶9. (C) Dumont said the supposedly integrated army units appear to be loyal to Bosco Ntaganda, not to the GoDRC. Bosco seems to be pursing a two-pronged strategy of trying to maintain good relations with both Kinshasa and Kigali, while increasing his own control over local forces. According to Dumont, Bosco has been delivering speeches in Masisi in North Kivu asking the people of the province to rise up and join him should he be arrested as required by the ICC warrant. Dumont said that Bosco has access to funds from local &taxation8 of approximately 250 thousand dollars per month. Bosco's influence has risen in the east, Dumont said, while Congolese central government authority, especially in Masisi, has waned. ¶10. (C) Nijskens said that some governments, which he did not specify, were uneasy with the perceived U.S. goal of arresting Bosco soon and thought that it would be better to wait. Dumont said he was told by GoDRC contacts that Bosco would be arrested when the timing was convenient for the GoDRC, and that Kinshasa might use his arrest as a justification for withdrawing its opposition to an extension of the mandate of MONUC. Dumont said that the government of Rwanda was against Bosco's arrest at this time. ¶11. (C) Nijskens noted that Congolese president Kabila had promised to hold local elections in February 2011 and parliamentary and presidential elections on September 4, ¶2011. However, Nijskens continued, Congolese planning for the elections is slow, and the government will be unable to put in place the administrative and logistical mechanisms needed to keep to this schedule. Dumont, by contrast, believed that it would be possible to put in place the necessary mechanisms but that the government would use administrative and logistical problems as an excuse to delay elections. Rwanda -------------- ¶12. (C) The Belgian MFA officials said that Kagame is concerned about the morale and loyalty of senior francophone Tutsi army officers. To reduce the uneasiness of the Tutsi francophone elite, Nijskens observed, Kagame had reestablished diplomatic relations with France the same day that Rwanda had joined the British Commonwealth. ¶13. (U) This message has been cleared by Yellin. GUTMAN