EU SUPPORT FOR G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST WMD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000066 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020 TAGS: EMIN ENRG ETTC AORC EUN MNNC PARM TBIO KGIC KNNP, KRAD, XA, XC, XF, G-8 SUBJECT: EU SUPPORT FOR G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST WMD Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Christopher R. Davis for re ason 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During her January 11 meeting with EU officials, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, sought EU support for extending and expanding the mandate of the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and ensuring that the Partnership be adequately resourced into the future. Senior officials from the European Union Council Secretariat and the European Commission agreed that the G-8 Global Partnership's mandate should be extended and that it should take on work in new functional and geographic areas. The European Commission's Richard Wright was confident that EU would continue to provide significant financial support, specifying that EU support to the Global Partnership was locked in through 2013, when the next multi-year funding program would be agreed. END SUMMARY ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Jenkins was joined in Brussels by Canada's Troy Lulashnyk, who will chair the Global Partnership Working Group while Canada leads the G-8 in 2010. Lulashnyk noted that the G-8 Global Partnership had been largely successful, withtension of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Details on how long to extend it and how much funding the U.S. would devote to it would be taken soon. ¶5. (SBU) The EU's Annalisa Giannella, the High Rep's Personal Representative on Non-Proliferation, said that while some chemical weapons and plutonium disposition programs were funded by the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy budget and overseen by the EU Council Secretariat, most work was being carried out through European Commission programs. The EU was the major donor to the IAEA's nuclear security fund. As for future non-proliferation priorities, she cited the Balkans, North Africa, Central Asia, Caucasus, and South East Asia as key areas. Biological security was a priority. She said the EU would like to engage further on scientist redirection and export controls. As for geographic scope, Gianella agreed that it was time to expand the Global Partnership's geographic scope beyond Russia and the Ukraine. Shared Priorities ¶6. (SBU) The European Commission's Richard Wright affirmed that the EU shared U.S. and Canadian priorities. He cited nuclear safety; biological safety; and export controls as areas that deserve an enhanced focus. He touched on the EU's BRUSSELS 00000066 002 OF 003 plan to establish regional CBRN Centers of Excellence in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa over the next three to five years. He suggested that these Centers could be used to support the Global Partnership. Jenkins and Lulashnyk both agreed that the Centers of Excellence might be able to play a needed capacity-building role. EU Budget Cycle ¶7. (SBU) Wright was supportive of extending and expanding the G-8 Global Partnership mandate. The existing multi-year budget had seen 700 million Euros spent to support activities linked to the G-8 Global Partnership, with an additional 200 million Euros to be spent by 2013. He acknowledged that High Representative Catherine Ashton's approach to the issue was not yet known, but opined that U.S. and Canadian priorities seemed to fit well with the EC approach and its funding mechanisms. He noted, however, that it would be difficult to harmonize the Commission's budget cycle with the G-8 Global Partnership's mandate. He was reluctant to predict how much the EU would be able to spend after 2013 and doubted that there could be any change in what was programmed through ¶2013. ¶8. (SBU) Lulashnyk underlined that Canada was focused on the same regions. Jenkins noted that the U.S. has non-proliferation programs in over 100 countries. Numerous projects were needed to make a difference given the size of the challenge. Giannella interjected that there was no need to convince the EU of the importance of this effort. The question would be how much money the EU would be able to devote to the issue, which relied upon a political decision on EU priorities. Wright added that EU external action programs were pre-coordinated with all 27 EU member states in management committees. Given the scarcity of resources, it was critical to plan in synergy, she said, but putting money in trust funds and creating new structures often only complicated matters. We should enhance coordination and cooperation, as was done on CWC, without centralizing all cooperation. ¶9. (SBU) Lulashnyk agreed that flexibility was important but noted that for small countries, it was often easier to contribute money to a central pool. He noted that the IAEA nuclear security fund allowed them to contribute to action in situations when bilateral action was impossible for them. He acknowledged that multilateral funds often failed to be responsive and effective, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl Containment project. Russia's Role ¶10. (SBU) Turning to Russia, Richard Wright asked how Russia could move from being the G-8 Global Partnership's major beneficiary to playing a role as a contributor. Russia could do more on scientist engagement, addressing trans-regional threats such as smuggling without duplicating the work now being done by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. On the issue of scientist engagement, Wright expressed interest in the future of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC),raising the possibility of shifting its focus in some way, while still keeping a non-proliferation element to its work, which is a requirement for EU funding; all parties agreed to continue discussing this issue. Lulashnyk agreed that Russia had been the major beneficiary of programs on chemical weapons, submarines and nuclear security and now had a new list of priorities, such as dealing with waste and fuel for their navy. Before the crisis, Russia had expressed interest in playing a role as a donor and has put between 7-8 Billion dollars in to the G-8 Global Partnership. Jenkins added that Russia had continued to express the desire to move from recipient to partner. Summit Goals and Prospects ¶11. (C) Lulashnyk said that Canada's Summit goals for the G-8 Global Partnership were likely to center on extending the Partnership, expanding the Partnership's activities into new regions and functions and securing future funding. There BRUSSELS 00000066 003 OF 003 had been expressions of support for extension from London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and Tokyo, he said. Giannella commented that Russia seemed to be "reluctant" about geographic expansion. Lulashnyk explained the perception of Russian opposition might stem from Moscow's feeling that it had been assured funding from France and Italy that had not materialized. In Canada-Russia bilateral meetings, however, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had not opposed expansion of the partnership, as long as Russia continued to benefit from the partnership's future activity. Jenkins said that the U.S. had gotten a similar message from Russia: expansion was acceptable as long as existing commitments were met, including the chemical issue. ¶12. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs. KENNARD .