EU PASSES BURMA REPORT IN ANTICIPATION OF SPECIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000049 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR EAP/ML:LSCHEIBE AND EUR/ERA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV BM EU SUBJECT: EU PASSES BURMA REPORT IN ANTICIPATION OF SPECIAL ENVOY'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON REF: 09 BRUSSELS 1615 Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Mary Curtin for reas ons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) According to European Council Desk Officer for South East Asia Leo Schulte Nordholt, EU Special Envoy for Burma/Myanmar Piero Fassino will seek advice from us and the UN on how to negotiate preconditions for his upcoming visit to Burma during his January 26-29 consultations in New York and Washington. Nordholt said that Fassino will elicit advice on whom he should meet and on how best to request access from the Burmese regime. "It is important that the West presents a unified front to the Burmese regime to avoid any attempts by (the regime) to exploit our differences," Nordholt explained. ¶2. (C) In order for both sides to be best prepared for Fassino's meeting with EAP Assistant Secretary Campbell, Nordholt said, he passed over a copy of the EU's internal report on the then Council President Carl Bildt's December 17, 2009 meeting with Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win in Copenhagen. Fassino also attended the meeting and for the first time, orll continued its armed struggle, waQ not representative of the Karen, who were 'mstly peaceful people.' The government contin5ed negotiations. The international communiy could help by encouraging the cease-fire grQups to 'work with each other and co-exist peaQefully'. FM Nyan Win issued a warning to unspeQified foreign governments ('we need not to na-e them') who allegedly helped the armed grops. Without this external support the confliQts would have been resolved long ago. - FM NyQn Win underlined that an EU delegation would be welcome. However, there should be no preconditions for such a visit since discussions on preconditions would risk to bog down the preparations. Burma/Myanmar would nevertheless try to accommodate the EU's demands. - (According to FM Nyan Win) Burma/Myanmar reacted positively to the US'sQnitiative and invited Senator Webb and later Ass. SoS Campbell. No preconditions had been set for these visits but Burma/Myanmar had expressed that it would try to fulfill any demands regarding access and cQditions. However, FM Nyan Win also suggested that Burma/Myanmar had had little choice but to engage, since the proposal came from a very strong country. The US had been able to get a full picture of the situation first-hand, and had understood that it was impossible to change everything at once. Instead, evolution was needed. Since the US was a much stronger country, the initiative for a possible continuation of the dialogue should primarily come from their side. - FM Nyan Win said that preparations for the elections were '97% done'. When they would be completed, the elections would be held. FM Nyan Win was aware of the call from some for external observers. But there was no neeQor an observation ('we don't need to be watched'). The election would be handled in a 'right and proper way' and as a result the government of the country would be handed over to the successful parties. FM Bildt reiterated that it was in Burma/Myanmar's own interest that the elections were accepted by the international community. - FM Nyan Win recalled that Than Shwe had authorized the minister in charge of relations with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) to discuss with her on 9 December regarding the requests of BRUSSELS 00000049 002 OF 002 her letter to Than Shwe from 11 November. Following a request in her letter, she had also been allowed to meet with the elderly leaders of her party, including U Aung Shwe, as well as the Central Electoral Committee of the NLD. He criticized ASSK for having published the letter before Than Shwe had even received it. This was an indication that her efforts were not sincere, but part of a 'political ploy'. FM Nyan Win alleged that Than Shwe previously had offered to lift restrictions on ASSK, if she agreed to stop her support for sanctions and for disinvestment. But she had not yet decided so." End excerpts from report. KENNARD. .