INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR DOL

UNCLAS BOGOTA 000237 SIPDIS USTR FOR EISSENSTAT AND HARMAN DOL FOR ZOLLNER AND QUINTANA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB EAID ETRD PGOV PHUM PREL USTR LAB CO SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR DOL CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS REF: STATE 131995; 10 BOGOTA 111 ¶1. Per reftel a, post submits the following information for the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL) Congressional Reporting Requirements related to forced and child labor. ¶2. The following is new information relevant to tasking 1: The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2005, Section 105(b) and Executive Order 13126 of 1999, keyed to the request in reftel a for new information on the use of exploitive child labor in the production of goods. We will follow up where information was "unavailable." The Colombian Sugar Cane Producers Association (ASOCANA) objected to the inclusion of sugar cane on the DOL List of Goods Produced by Child Labor in an October 2009 letter to Ambassador Brownfield. ASOCANA said its producers were committed to corporate social responsibility and have promoted the importance of child education among their employees. In 2008, the sugar sector invested almost $2 million in public and private schools and $500,000 in scholarships. ASOCANA also noted that it continues to support a program in conjunction with the International Labor Office (ILO) that promotes ILO Conventions 138 and 182 among its sugarcane suppliers. ASOCANA provided the Embassy with documentation, claiming that DOL Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) based its findings on labor practices on the part of the sugarcane sector that does not produce sugar or ethanol. In 2008, 205,000 out of the 450,000 hectares cultivated with sugarcane were dedicated to sugar and ethanol. As such, the inclusion of sugarcane on the DOL list, ASOCANA argues, represents an undeserved and poorly documented penalty on Colombian sugar and ethanol producers. ASOCANA requests that ILAB take sugarcane off its list, or contextualize its reports to reflect that child labor is not used in the production of sugar and ethanol in Colombia. ¶3. The following are answers in response to tasking 2: Trade and Development Act (TDA) of 2000, keyed to questions in reftel a. 2A) PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITIVE CHILD LABOR 1-2. In what sectors (not related to the production of goods) were children involved in exploitive labor? Posts are requested to determine if the government collected or published data on exploitive child labor during the period, and if so, whether the government would provide the data set to DOL for further analysis. There was evidence that children were involved in exploitive labor in the domestic services and child pornography industries. According to the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE),of the 11.5 million children between the ages of five and 17 in Colombia, 267,343 worked in service industries, including 28,356 in domestic services (a further breakdown was unavailable). Additionally, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) received 551 complaints of commercial sexual exploitation of children in 2009, including 53 related to child pornography. 2B) LAWS AND REGULATIONS 1-2. What new laws or regulations were enacted in regard to exploitive child labor over the past year? If applicable, were the changes improvements in the legal and regulatory framework? Was the country/territory's legal and regulatory framework adequate for addressing exploitive child labor? First, the GOC promulgated Law 1336 of 2009 to expand and strengthen Law 679 of 2001, designed to prevent and counter sexual exploitation of children, with particular reference to pornography and sex tourism. Specifically, it codified a process for dispossession of property -- hotels, pensions, residences, income - of entities and individuals involved in the sexual exploitation of minors. Second, Law 1329 of 2009 similarly modified the penal code (Law 599 of 2000). It stipulated a prison term of 14 to 25 years per instance of commercial sexual exploitation of a minor, and 10 to 14 years for advertising such services. The GOC also issued Circular 60 of 2009, which clarified the process for authorizing children to work and investigating non-compliance with child labor laws. Finally, the GOC implemented a "Regional Action Plan" for the prevention of sexual exploitation of children in the tourism sector in conjunction with neighboring countries. Colombian laws regarding child labor are comprehensive and should be adequate to address exploitive child labor. However, resources remained inadequate for effective enforcement. The Ministry for Social Protection's (MSP) 180 labor inspectors nationwide were responsible for enforcing child labor laws in the formal sector (approximately 40% of the economy) through periodic inspections. (Note: The MSP plans to hire 207 additional inspectors by the end of 2010. End Note.) 2C) INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT Section I: Hazardous Child Labor 1-2. What agency or agencies was/were responsible for the enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child labor? If multiple agencies were responsible for enforcement, were there mechanisms for exchanging information? Assess their effectiveness. The MSP had primary responsibility for enforcing child labor laws in the formal sector, which covered approximately 20% of the child labor force. Other agencies and institutions with central enforcement roles -- in both the formal and informal economies -- included the National Police (CNP) at both the national and municipal levels; the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) in a preventive capacity; the Ministry of Interior and Justice (MOIJ); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with respect to cross border trafficking; and the Ministry of Education (MOE),primarily to raise awareness of child labor issues. In accordance with Decree 859 of 1995, the MSP presided over an Inter-Institutional Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor and the Protection of Child Workers, which included the following actors: the MSP Vice Minister of Health; the MOE Director General for Investigation and Pedagogical Development; the Director of the National Planning Department (DNP); the Director General of the Colombia Family Welfare Institute (ICBF); the Director General of the Colombian Institute for Youth and Sports (ICJD); the Director General of the National Training Service (SENA); the Presidential Advisor for Social Policy; and a representative from the largest labor confederation, currently the United Workers' Confederation (CUT). While institutional coordination led to significant progress, resources remained inadequate for effective enforcement. Periodic labor inspections in the formal economy did little to dissuade noncompliance in the informal and illicit sectors. ¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a mechanism for making complaints about hazardous child labor violations? If so, how many complaints were received in the reporting period? The ICBF maintains a free hotline for complaints related to child labor. In 2009, it received 975 complaints of exploitive child labor and 551 complaints of commercial sexual exploitation of minors. ¶4. What amount of funding was provided to agencies responsible for inspections? There was no budget specifically dedicated to child labor inspections. General labor inspections included evaluations of compliance with child labor laws; however, they occurred too infrequently to constitute an effective deterrent. ¶5. How many inspectors did the government employ? Was the number of inspectors adequate? The MSP employed 180 inspectors. The number of inspectors was inadequate. ¶6. How many inspections involving child labor were carried out? MSP inspectors carried out 38,457 general labor inspections in 2009, all of which included child labor monitoring components. Still, lack of resources prevented the MSP from responding directly to numerous child labor complaints. ¶7. How many children were removed/assisted as a result of inspections? Were these children actually provided or referred for services as a result (as opposed to simply fired)? The MSP identified and assisted 22,752 victims of the worst forms of child labor with assistance from Save the Children and Partners of the Americas, among other NGOs and private actors. (Note: Per telcon with ILAB, we will clarify how the MSP arrived at this figure. End Note) The ICBF assisted 8,084 victims of child labor exploitation, and 1,806 child victims of child sexual exploitation. Additionally, it placed 3,344 children in preventative programs, and removed 901 children from exploitation by illegal armed groups. ¶8. How many child labor cases or "prosecutions" were opened? The information was unavailable. ¶9. How many child labor cases were closed or resolved? The information was unavailable. ¶10. How many violations were found or "convictions" reached? The information was unavailable. ¶11. What is the average length of time it took to resolve child labor cases? Article 99 of Law 1098 requires child labor cases to be processed within four months of opening an investigation. The MSP must also respond to child labor complaints within one day of receipt. Information on compliance with these regulations was unavailable. ¶12. In cases in which violations were found, were penalties actually applied, either through fines paid or jail sentence served? Did such sentences meet penalties established in the law? The information was unavailable. ¶13. Did the experience regarding questions 7 through 10 above reflect a commitment to combat exploitive child labor? The GOC appears committed to combating exploitive child labor. For example, it has allocated funds to hire and train an additional 207 labor inspectors in 2010. ¶14. Did government offer any training for investigators or others responsible for enforcement? If so, what (if any) impact have these trainings had? The MSP held numerous workshops and training seminars for inspectors and law enforcement personnel in conjunction with Save the Children and Partners of the Americas. The success of these training programs were partially responsible for convincing the GOC to more than double the number of MSP labor inspectors by the end of 2010. Section II: Forced Child Labor Please see responses to Section I: Hazardous Child Labor above. The same Colombian institutions that were responsible for hazardous child labor were also responsible for forced child labor. 2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT -- child trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation of children, use of children in illicit activities: ¶1. Did the country/territory have agencies or personnel dedicated to enforcement of child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? How many investigators/social workers/dedicated police officers did the government employ to conduct investigations? If there were no dedicated agencies or personnel, provide an estimate of the number of people who were responsible for such investigations. Was the number of investigators adequate? The GOC has six entities that work to combat trafficking and monitor prosecution, prevention, and victim protection: the MOIJ, which presides over the Interagency Committee for the Fight against Trafficking in Persons (ICFTP); DAS, which houses the offices that monitor migration and coordinate with INTERPOL; the Unit to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Sexual Violence and Child Victims at the Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia); the "Grupo Humanitas" inside the Judicial Police section of the CNP; the Family Welfare Institute (ICBF); and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Fourteen agencies are members of the ICFTP, which was established informally in 2003 and formally launched in 2005: MOIJ, MFA, MSP, MOE, DAS, the CNP, the Fiscalia, the Inspector General's Office (Procuraduria),the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoria),Interpol, ICBF, the Presidential Advisor for Equality of Women, The Ministry of Defense organization FONDELIBERTAD, and the Special Administrative Unit for Information and Financial Analysis (UIAF). In 2009, the ICFTP prepared public awareness campaigns, promoted information exchange among government agencies, and initiated use of a database to monitor trafficking cases. Moreover, 15 departments established inter-agency committees to combat trafficking in persons locally, and the GOC hosted a bilateral anti-trafficking conference for counterparts in Panama in August. (NOTE: Colombia has been a Tier I country since the inception of the Trafficking in Persons Report. End Note.) ¶2. How much funding was provided to agencies responsible for investigating child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? Was this amount adequate? Did investigators have sufficient office facilities, transportation, fuel, and other necessities to carry out investigations? Information on total funding was not available. ¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a hotline or other mechanism for reporting child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities violations? If so, how many complaints were received in the reporting period? The government maintained a free, national hot line to prevent trafficking and report violators. During the year the national trafficking prevention hot line received 2,097 calls, 39 (1.86 percent) directly related to trafficking. ¶4. How many investigations were opened in regard to child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? Was the number of investigations adequate? The Prosecutor General's Office opened 134 trafficking in persons cases in 2009. Information on the number pertaining to trafficked children was unavailable. ¶5. How many children were rescued as a result? A total of 10 trafficked children were recovered in 2009, including nine girls trafficked for sexual exploitation: two in Trinidad and Tobago, four in Ecuador, one in Panama, and two in Venezuela. One male victim of labor trafficking was recovered from Ecuador. ¶6. How many arrests were made or other kinds of prosecutions carried out? The information was unavailable. ¶7. How many cases were closed or resolved? The information was unavailable. ¶8. How many convictions? The Prosecutor General's Office opened 134 cases for trafficking in persons (pertaining to adults and minors) in 2009; 21 individuals were placed in preventive detention; 27 individuals were convicted and sentenced. ¶9. Did sentences imposed meet standards established in the legal framework? The law provided for prison sentences between 13 and 23 years and fines up to 1,000 times the monthly minimum wage ($252) for trafficking offenses. These penalties may be increased by up to one-half if there are aggravating circumstances, such as trafficking of children younger than 12. Additional charges of illegal detention, violation of the right to work in dignified conditions, and violation of personal freedom also may be brought against traffickers. In general, sentences imposed met these standards. ¶10. Were sentences imposed actually served? See response to 2D question 8. ¶11. What is the average length of time it takes to resolve cases of child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? This information was unavailable. ¶12. Did the government offer any training for investigators or others responsible for enforcement of child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? If so, what was the impact (if any) of these trainings? The GOC worked with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to strengthen government institutions involved in anti-trafficking efforts and assist trafficking victims. The IOM and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime trained officials on specific trafficking issues and provided sensitization training to NGO groups. ¶13. If the country/territory experienced armed conflict during the reporting period or in the recent past involving the use of child soldiers, what actions were taken to penalize those responsible? Were these actions adequate or meaningful given the situation? Guerillas and illegal armed groups used children as soldiers. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and ICBF estimated the number of children participating in illegal armed groups ranged from 10,000 to 13,000. The penalty for leaders of armed groups who use child soldiers is life imprisonment. The government, in conjunction with USAID, IOM, and UNICEF, provided services to former child soldiers and carried out public awareness campaigns to prevent the recruitment of children by armed groups. 2E) GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR: ¶1. Did the government have a policy or plan that specifically addresses exploitive child labor? Please describe. The GOC ratified ILO Convention 182 (Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor) in ¶1999. Subsequently, the GOC promulgated the Code of Childhood and Adolescence in 2006 (Law 1098). In 2008, the MSP issued Resolution 677 further delineating those activities considered to be the worst forms of child labor. The GOC also has a National Strategy for Preventing and Eliminating the Worst forms of Child Labor and Protecting Child Workers (2008-2015),and a National Action Plan for Preventing and Eliminating Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents (2006-2011). ¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate exploitive child labor specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty reduction, development, educational or other social policies, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, etc? Please describe. Strategies and policies addressing exploitive child labor formed part of the National Development Plan (2006-2010) and Millennium Development Goals. ¶3. Did the government provide funding to the plans described above? Please describe the amount and whether it was sufficient to carry out the planned activities. The MSP budget for child labor administrative responsibilities was approximately USD$600,000. The ICBF received about USD$6 billion, which was disbursed for the following program categories: $3.4 billion for removing children from the armed conflict; $2 billion for assisting children in circumstances of sexual exploitation; and $600,000 for attending to children dangerous and prohibited employment. ¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child labor plans? Please describe. In the past decade, the GOC has provided institutional, informational, and other non-monetary support to a variety of international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments aimed at eliminating the worst forms of child labor in Colombia, including four USG programs (three by DOL and one by USAID) totaling USD$10 million. The GOC has readily adopted best practices stemming from these projects and integrated them into its own national strategy and programming (reftel b). ¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and effectiveness of the government's policies or plans during the reporting period in regard to exploitive child labor. The ICBF also identified and assisted 2,137 children working in illegal mining operations in 2009. Estimates of the total number of children who worked in illegal (artisanal) mining operations varied from 10,000 to 200,000. ¶6. Did the government participate in any commissions or task forces regarding exploitive child labor? Was the commission active and/or effective? See response to 2D question 1. No additional details were available. ¶7. Did the government sign a bilateral, regional or international agreement to combat trafficking? On April 27, the ICBF signed a cooperation agreement with the ILO to reinforce its efforts to prevent and eliminate exploitive child labor. Additionally, the Department of Cordoba and municipalities of Armenia, Cartagena, Cucuta, and Dosquebrades signed a voluntary accord on January 21 aimed at combating commercial sexual exploitation of children. 2F) SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE OR PREVENT CHILD LABOR: ¶1. Did the government implement any programs specifically to address the worst forms of child labor? Please describe. (Please note that DOL will not consider anti-poverty, education or other general child welfare programs to be addressing exploitive child labor unless they have a child labor component.) See responses to 2C Section I above. No additional details were available. ¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate child labor specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty reduction, development, educational or other social programs, such as conditional cash transfer programs or eligibility for school meals, etc? Please describe. See response to 2E question 2. No additional details were available. ¶3. Did the government provide funding to the programs described above? Please describe amount and whether it was sufficient to carry out the planned activities. N/A ¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child labor programs? Please describe. See response to 2E question 4. ¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and effectiveness of the government's activities during the reporting period in relation to the programs described above. If the programs involved government provision of social services to children at risk of or involved in exploitive child labor, please describe and assess the effectiveness of these services. Colombian laws and strategies regarding exploitive child labor are comprehensive and should be adequate to address exploitive child labor. However, resources were inadequate for effective enforcement. ¶6. If the government signed one or more bilateral, regional or international agreement/s to combat trafficking, what steps did it take to implement such agreement/s? Did the agreement/s result in tangible improvements? If so, please describe. See response to 2E question 7. 2G) CONTINUAL PROGRESS: ¶1. Considering the information provided to the questions above, please provide an assessment of whether, overall, the government made progress in regard to combating exploitive child labor during the reporting period. In making this assessment, please indicate whether there has been an increase or decrease from previous years in inspections/investigations, prosecutions, and convictions; funding for child labor elimination policies and programs; and any other relevant indicators of government commitment. Despite resource challenges, evidence suggests that the GOC continues to invest significantly in preventing and eliminating exploitive child labor. In 2009, the MSP took action in 155 municipalities in 20 departments, identifying and assisting 22,572 children in danger of the worst forms of child labor. It also passed new legislation to expand and strengthen existing laws, including increasing penalties for cases of child exploitation. Moreover, the GOC has committed to doubling the number of official labor inspectors by the end of 2010, which should substantially improve enforcement. It also implemented a regional action plan in cooperation with neighboring countries, and readily cooperated with international organizations such as Save the Children, Partners of the Americas, and the ILO. BROWNFIELD