Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BOGOTA143
2010-02-03 18:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:
GOC CONFLICTED OVER RISING URBAN HOMICIDES
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHBO #0143/01 0341853 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031853Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2487 INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000143
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS PTER CO KCRM ASEC SNAR
SUBJECT: GOC CONFLICTED OVER RISING URBAN HOMICIDES
REF: BOGOTA 3503; 09 BOGOTA 519; 08 BOGOTA 3077
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000143
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS PTER CO KCRM ASEC SNAR
SUBJECT: GOC CONFLICTED OVER RISING URBAN HOMICIDES
REF: BOGOTA 3503; 09 BOGOTA 519; 08 BOGOTA 3077
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Homicides in Colombia appear to be on the rise after several
years of steady decline. The GOC's leading authorities on crime
statistics reported sharply contrasting 2009 homicide rates, with
police numbers indicating a 2% downtick and the national forensic
examiner's data registering a 15% increase. This divergence marks
the largest discrepancy ever reported between the two bodies, which
frequently differ over exact numbers but have historically tended
to show the same overall trends. Despite the differences, both
sets of numbers show a rising tide of homicides in the department
of Antioquia, its capital city Medellin, and the city of Cali. The
GOC has responded with a major police surge, but local analysts
suggest the GOC's focus on insurgents will continue to blind it to
the rising crime problem. End Summary.
POLICE, FORENSICS AGENCY
AT ODDS OVER NUMBERS
--------------
2. (U) National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science
(Medicina Legal) numbers claim a 15% increase in homicides
nationwide from 2008 -- from 15,250 to 17,565 -- as well as
significant jumps in Bogota (12%),Cali (23%) and Medellin (104%).
This represents a rate of about 39 murders per 100,000 residents,
which is still a significant drop from the 2002 peak of nearly 70
per 100,000, but also a worrying increase from the 34 per 100,000
in 2008. Medicina Legal pointed out that the most violent
departments were Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander,
Narino, and Risaralda (see tables below). Medicina Legal's numbers
also indicate that homicides rose in every major Colombian city
except for Pereira (Risaralda).
3. (U) The Colombian National Police (CNP),however, reported
15,817 homicides for 2009, a 2% decrease from the 16,140 the CNP
reported for 2008. This represents a rate of roughly 35 murders
per 100,000 residents -- nearly one-half the rate in 2002.
According to the report, Bogota experienced a 1% reduction (from
1,341 in 2008 to 1,327),while both Medellin and Cali suffered
worrying increases in homicides -- 64% and 17%, respectively.
According to the data (see tables below),the departments with the
highest overall homicide rates were Arauca, Guaviare, Risaralda,
Caqueta, and Valle del Cauca, while the sharpest 2008-09 increases
took place in Sucre, Antioquia, Atlantico, Cordoba, and Bolivar.
Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva publicly touted the gains as
proof that public security was continuing to improve.
4. (U) By comparison, press reports indicate that the U.S. homicide
rate for 2009 was about 6 per 100,000, while Venezuela's was 56 (up
from 52 in 2008). Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the hemisphere's most
violent city, suffered about 130 homicides per 100,000, Caracas
about 96, and New Orleans about 95.
POLICE FACE POLITICAL PRESSURE
--------------
5. (U) The CNP and Medicina Legal estimates almost always differ --
in 2006-07 the CNP reported a drop from 17,479 to 17,198 while
Medicina Legal reported a bump up from 16,231 to 16,269 -- but the
2009 results represent the largest divergence on record. Ana
Patricia Aristizibal, Medellin's Ombudsman for Human Rights, told
the press that she believed the CNP must have made errors in its
calculations for Medellin but did not believe there had been "bad
faith," adding that she had seen a mid-December police report
claiming 2,060 homicides in Medellin (in contrast to the CNP's
official year-end statistic of 1,432). (CNP Medellin even reported
to the Embassy in December a figure of 1,676 murders for
January-November 2009 alone). The discrepancies continued into the
first weeks of 2010, with the GOC claiming Medellin had 110 murders
in the first weeks of January and Medicina Legal citing 188.
6. (C) Wilson Fernandez, Medicina Legal's statistical director,
told the press that the discrepancy could have resulted from
different counting methods and noted that Medicina Legal postmortem
investigations often ruled homicide as the cause of death in cases
the police had initially termed as "death by unknown causes."
Privately, Fernandez told us the CNP faced tremendous political
pressure to keep homicide rates low, and that as a result, police
officers tried not to classify deaths as homicides unless they
absolutely had to.
7. (C) Fernandez acknowledged that differing counting methods had
caused the two agencies' numbers to diverge over the years, adding
that enhancements to Medicina Legal's statistical reporting system
had improved its ability to count homicides in rural areas, which
had caused its homicide numbers to climb gradually over the years.
Still, he argued, only political pressure could account for the
newly revealed differences. Fernandez concluded that while he did
not believe the CNP was fraudulently changing numbers for political
ends, he was certain that pressure from the top generated "creative
accounting," which in turn had led to the undercounting.
DRUGS, GANGS STILL FUEL KILLINGS
--------------
8. (C) Colonel Cancio Bolanos, head of the CNP's intelligence unit
targeting emerging criminal bands (BACRIMs),told us that most of
Colombia's murders were attributable to fights between drug gangs
over turf, and that the vast majority of victims were members of
drug gangs and/or BACRIMs. Similarly, Medellin Secretary of
Government Juan Diego Velez asserted in December that 85% of the
murders there were related to illegal narcotics or gang violence
(ref A). Gerson Arias of Bogota-based think tank Fundacion Ideas
Para La Paz (FIP) noted that violence has been particularly acute
this year as BACRIMs consolidate and move into each other's
territory. Both agencies' statistics appear to support these
claims -- most of the departments with high homicide rates also
feature heavy BACRIM presence, while Medellin is facing a second
straight year of intense internecine warfare among rival
narcotrafficking groups (refs B & C).
GOC RESPONSE CONFUSED
--------------
9. (C) The surging violence appears to have caught the GOC by
surprise -- Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva in late January
publicly dismissed local officials' claims of growing urban
insecurity, arguing that officials were "exaggerating" the problem
and asserting that murder rates in Medellin and Cali were at their
lowest in 30 years. (NOTE: Silva's claim contradicted the MOD's
own statistics, as the CNP falls under the MOD. End Note.)
However, President Uribe shortly thereafter announced a major
security push aimed at bolstering urban security, including
controversial proposals to pay students and taxi drivers to serve
as intelligence informants against criminal gangs. CNP Commander
General Oscar Naranjo fleshed out the plan's details on February 1,
which includes sending 36,000 additional police to Bogota's major
cities and stationing a "policeman on every block" in particularly
dangerous neighborhoods. The GOC last year launched a similarly
well-publicized surge of police to Medellin in a bid to lower
crime, but even the CNP's optimistic figures show a substantial
jump in homicides in the city despite the effort.
10. (C) The plan may not be enough to stem the rising tide of
homicides across the nation, leading many local analysts to
question the GOC's security priorities. Naranjo commented publicly
that the surge involves no new resources, which suggests the 36,000
officers will be stripped from already vulnerable rural areas.
Markus Schultze-Kraft of the International Crisis Group told us he
believed the GOC's "narrow" focus on defeating insurgent groups has
kept it from dealing with (or even noticing) BACRIMs and other
criminal groups, which has let crime trend upward despite
tremendous progress against guerrillas. Similarly, FIP's Arias
opined that the administration's National Consolidation Plan (PNC)
does not do enough to improve the quality of policing and other
important civilian government services in remote areas and that
BACRIMs are exploiting that failure. Arias added that the GOC
needs to address the quality of the justice system, which is so
weak in outlying areas that many criminal suspects go free due to
lack of evidence or resources to prosecute them. CNP statistics
indicate that only about 5% of Colombian homicides are ever solved.
11. (U) Medicina Legal Homicide Statistics
--------------
2008-9
2007
2008
2009
Change
Nationwide
16269
15250
17565
15%
Bogota
1401
1466
1645
12%
Medellin
788
1066
2176
104%
Cali
1521
1473
1814
23%
Amazonas
10
14
9
-36%
Antioquia
2075
2399
4445
85%
Arauca
399
329
241
-27%
San Andres
8
6
4
-33%
Atlantico
530
484
521
8%
Bolivar
459
303
385
27%
Boyaca
199
186
144
-23%
Caldas
382
392
344
-12%
Caqueta
186
160
142
-11%
Casanare
158
86
54
-37%
Cauca
448
399
480
20%
Cesar
383
328
279
-15%
Choco
111
148
162
9%
Cordoba
197
267
363
36%
C'marca
498
372
387
4%
Guainia
3
4
7
75%
Guaviare
121
130
110
-15%
Huila
296
299
247
-17%
La Guajira
213
180
209
16%
Magdalena
425
364
384
5%
Meta
733
587
512
-13%
Narino
575
431
618
43%
Norte de Santander
805
682
634
-7%
Putumayo
103
72
131
82%
Quindio
342
298
267
-10%
Risaralda
717
753
567
-25%
Santander
545
480
470
-2%
Sucre
139
103
161
56%
Tolima
424
365
301
-18%
Valle del Cauca
3332
3114
3294
6%
Vaupes
10
1
3
200%
Vichada
42
48
18
-63%
12. (U) Colombian National Police Homicide Statistics
-------------- --------------
2008-2009
2007
2008
2009
Change
Nationwide
17198
16140
15817
-2%
Bogota
1351
1341
1327
-1%
Medellin
654
871
1432
64%
Cali
1484
1384
1615
17%
Amazonas
9
9
6
-33%
Antioquia
1984
2271
2846
25%
Arauca
222
321
244
-24%
Atlantico
514
464
512
10%
Bolivar
489
342
372
9%
Boyaca
198
164
150
-9%
Caldas
530
493
390
-21%
Caqueta
380
338
265
-22%
Casanare
223
95
75
-21%
Cauca
660
624
576
-8%
Cesar
434
292
252
-14%
Choco
113
157
141
-10%
C'marca
473
376
369
-2%
Cordoba
352
466
510
9%
Guainia
3
7
3
-57%
Guaviare
123
115
116
1%
Huila
513
412
371
-10%
La Guajira
214
227
212
-7%
Magdalena
402
354
321
-9%
Meta
599
584
438
-25%
Narino
778
723
647
-11%
Norte de Santander
765
627
528
-16%
Putumayo
380
211
186
-12%
Quindio
301
287
241
-16%
Risaralda
717
745
579
-22%
San Andres
8
4
9
125%
Santander
540
506
498
-2%
Sucre
141
105
184
75%
Tolima
456
415
439
6%
Valle del Cauca
3270
3019
2997
-1%
Vaupes
6
6
3
-50%
Vichada
50
40
10
-75%
BROWNFIELD
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS PTER CO KCRM ASEC SNAR
SUBJECT: GOC CONFLICTED OVER RISING URBAN HOMICIDES
REF: BOGOTA 3503; 09 BOGOTA 519; 08 BOGOTA 3077
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Homicides in Colombia appear to be on the rise after several
years of steady decline. The GOC's leading authorities on crime
statistics reported sharply contrasting 2009 homicide rates, with
police numbers indicating a 2% downtick and the national forensic
examiner's data registering a 15% increase. This divergence marks
the largest discrepancy ever reported between the two bodies, which
frequently differ over exact numbers but have historically tended
to show the same overall trends. Despite the differences, both
sets of numbers show a rising tide of homicides in the department
of Antioquia, its capital city Medellin, and the city of Cali. The
GOC has responded with a major police surge, but local analysts
suggest the GOC's focus on insurgents will continue to blind it to
the rising crime problem. End Summary.
POLICE, FORENSICS AGENCY
AT ODDS OVER NUMBERS
--------------
2. (U) National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science
(Medicina Legal) numbers claim a 15% increase in homicides
nationwide from 2008 -- from 15,250 to 17,565 -- as well as
significant jumps in Bogota (12%),Cali (23%) and Medellin (104%).
This represents a rate of about 39 murders per 100,000 residents,
which is still a significant drop from the 2002 peak of nearly 70
per 100,000, but also a worrying increase from the 34 per 100,000
in 2008. Medicina Legal pointed out that the most violent
departments were Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander,
Narino, and Risaralda (see tables below). Medicina Legal's numbers
also indicate that homicides rose in every major Colombian city
except for Pereira (Risaralda).
3. (U) The Colombian National Police (CNP),however, reported
15,817 homicides for 2009, a 2% decrease from the 16,140 the CNP
reported for 2008. This represents a rate of roughly 35 murders
per 100,000 residents -- nearly one-half the rate in 2002.
According to the report, Bogota experienced a 1% reduction (from
1,341 in 2008 to 1,327),while both Medellin and Cali suffered
worrying increases in homicides -- 64% and 17%, respectively.
According to the data (see tables below),the departments with the
highest overall homicide rates were Arauca, Guaviare, Risaralda,
Caqueta, and Valle del Cauca, while the sharpest 2008-09 increases
took place in Sucre, Antioquia, Atlantico, Cordoba, and Bolivar.
Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva publicly touted the gains as
proof that public security was continuing to improve.
4. (U) By comparison, press reports indicate that the U.S. homicide
rate for 2009 was about 6 per 100,000, while Venezuela's was 56 (up
from 52 in 2008). Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the hemisphere's most
violent city, suffered about 130 homicides per 100,000, Caracas
about 96, and New Orleans about 95.
POLICE FACE POLITICAL PRESSURE
--------------
5. (U) The CNP and Medicina Legal estimates almost always differ --
in 2006-07 the CNP reported a drop from 17,479 to 17,198 while
Medicina Legal reported a bump up from 16,231 to 16,269 -- but the
2009 results represent the largest divergence on record. Ana
Patricia Aristizibal, Medellin's Ombudsman for Human Rights, told
the press that she believed the CNP must have made errors in its
calculations for Medellin but did not believe there had been "bad
faith," adding that she had seen a mid-December police report
claiming 2,060 homicides in Medellin (in contrast to the CNP's
official year-end statistic of 1,432). (CNP Medellin even reported
to the Embassy in December a figure of 1,676 murders for
January-November 2009 alone). The discrepancies continued into the
first weeks of 2010, with the GOC claiming Medellin had 110 murders
in the first weeks of January and Medicina Legal citing 188.
6. (C) Wilson Fernandez, Medicina Legal's statistical director,
told the press that the discrepancy could have resulted from
different counting methods and noted that Medicina Legal postmortem
investigations often ruled homicide as the cause of death in cases
the police had initially termed as "death by unknown causes."
Privately, Fernandez told us the CNP faced tremendous political
pressure to keep homicide rates low, and that as a result, police
officers tried not to classify deaths as homicides unless they
absolutely had to.
7. (C) Fernandez acknowledged that differing counting methods had
caused the two agencies' numbers to diverge over the years, adding
that enhancements to Medicina Legal's statistical reporting system
had improved its ability to count homicides in rural areas, which
had caused its homicide numbers to climb gradually over the years.
Still, he argued, only political pressure could account for the
newly revealed differences. Fernandez concluded that while he did
not believe the CNP was fraudulently changing numbers for political
ends, he was certain that pressure from the top generated "creative
accounting," which in turn had led to the undercounting.
DRUGS, GANGS STILL FUEL KILLINGS
--------------
8. (C) Colonel Cancio Bolanos, head of the CNP's intelligence unit
targeting emerging criminal bands (BACRIMs),told us that most of
Colombia's murders were attributable to fights between drug gangs
over turf, and that the vast majority of victims were members of
drug gangs and/or BACRIMs. Similarly, Medellin Secretary of
Government Juan Diego Velez asserted in December that 85% of the
murders there were related to illegal narcotics or gang violence
(ref A). Gerson Arias of Bogota-based think tank Fundacion Ideas
Para La Paz (FIP) noted that violence has been particularly acute
this year as BACRIMs consolidate and move into each other's
territory. Both agencies' statistics appear to support these
claims -- most of the departments with high homicide rates also
feature heavy BACRIM presence, while Medellin is facing a second
straight year of intense internecine warfare among rival
narcotrafficking groups (refs B & C).
GOC RESPONSE CONFUSED
--------------
9. (C) The surging violence appears to have caught the GOC by
surprise -- Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva in late January
publicly dismissed local officials' claims of growing urban
insecurity, arguing that officials were "exaggerating" the problem
and asserting that murder rates in Medellin and Cali were at their
lowest in 30 years. (NOTE: Silva's claim contradicted the MOD's
own statistics, as the CNP falls under the MOD. End Note.)
However, President Uribe shortly thereafter announced a major
security push aimed at bolstering urban security, including
controversial proposals to pay students and taxi drivers to serve
as intelligence informants against criminal gangs. CNP Commander
General Oscar Naranjo fleshed out the plan's details on February 1,
which includes sending 36,000 additional police to Bogota's major
cities and stationing a "policeman on every block" in particularly
dangerous neighborhoods. The GOC last year launched a similarly
well-publicized surge of police to Medellin in a bid to lower
crime, but even the CNP's optimistic figures show a substantial
jump in homicides in the city despite the effort.
10. (C) The plan may not be enough to stem the rising tide of
homicides across the nation, leading many local analysts to
question the GOC's security priorities. Naranjo commented publicly
that the surge involves no new resources, which suggests the 36,000
officers will be stripped from already vulnerable rural areas.
Markus Schultze-Kraft of the International Crisis Group told us he
believed the GOC's "narrow" focus on defeating insurgent groups has
kept it from dealing with (or even noticing) BACRIMs and other
criminal groups, which has let crime trend upward despite
tremendous progress against guerrillas. Similarly, FIP's Arias
opined that the administration's National Consolidation Plan (PNC)
does not do enough to improve the quality of policing and other
important civilian government services in remote areas and that
BACRIMs are exploiting that failure. Arias added that the GOC
needs to address the quality of the justice system, which is so
weak in outlying areas that many criminal suspects go free due to
lack of evidence or resources to prosecute them. CNP statistics
indicate that only about 5% of Colombian homicides are ever solved.
11. (U) Medicina Legal Homicide Statistics
--------------
2008-9
2007
2008
2009
Change
Nationwide
16269
15250
17565
15%
Bogota
1401
1466
1645
12%
Medellin
788
1066
2176
104%
Cali
1521
1473
1814
23%
Amazonas
10
14
9
-36%
Antioquia
2075
2399
4445
85%
Arauca
399
329
241
-27%
San Andres
8
6
4
-33%
Atlantico
530
484
521
8%
Bolivar
459
303
385
27%
Boyaca
199
186
144
-23%
Caldas
382
392
344
-12%
Caqueta
186
160
142
-11%
Casanare
158
86
54
-37%
Cauca
448
399
480
20%
Cesar
383
328
279
-15%
Choco
111
148
162
9%
Cordoba
197
267
363
36%
C'marca
498
372
387
4%
Guainia
3
4
7
75%
Guaviare
121
130
110
-15%
Huila
296
299
247
-17%
La Guajira
213
180
209
16%
Magdalena
425
364
384
5%
Meta
733
587
512
-13%
Narino
575
431
618
43%
Norte de Santander
805
682
634
-7%
Putumayo
103
72
131
82%
Quindio
342
298
267
-10%
Risaralda
717
753
567
-25%
Santander
545
480
470
-2%
Sucre
139
103
161
56%
Tolima
424
365
301
-18%
Valle del Cauca
3332
3114
3294
6%
Vaupes
10
1
3
200%
Vichada
42
48
18
-63%
12. (U) Colombian National Police Homicide Statistics
-------------- --------------
2008-2009
2007
2008
2009
Change
Nationwide
17198
16140
15817
-2%
Bogota
1351
1341
1327
-1%
Medellin
654
871
1432
64%
Cali
1484
1384
1615
17%
Amazonas
9
9
6
-33%
Antioquia
1984
2271
2846
25%
Arauca
222
321
244
-24%
Atlantico
514
464
512
10%
Bolivar
489
342
372
9%
Boyaca
198
164
150
-9%
Caldas
530
493
390
-21%
Caqueta
380
338
265
-22%
Casanare
223
95
75
-21%
Cauca
660
624
576
-8%
Cesar
434
292
252
-14%
Choco
113
157
141
-10%
C'marca
473
376
369
-2%
Cordoba
352
466
510
9%
Guainia
3
7
3
-57%
Guaviare
123
115
116
1%
Huila
513
412
371
-10%
La Guajira
214
227
212
-7%
Magdalena
402
354
321
-9%
Meta
599
584
438
-25%
Narino
778
723
647
-11%
Norte de Santander
765
627
528
-16%
Putumayo
380
211
186
-12%
Quindio
301
287
241
-16%
Risaralda
717
745
579
-22%
San Andres
8
4
9
125%
Santander
540
506
498
-2%
Sucre
141
105
184
75%
Tolima
456
415
439
6%
Valle del Cauca
3270
3019
2997
-1%
Vaupes
6
6
3
-50%
Vichada
50
40
10
-75%
BROWNFIELD