GOC CONFLICTED OVER RISING URBAN HOMICIDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000143 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KJUS PTER CO KCRM ASEC SNAR SUBJECT: GOC CONFLICTED OVER RISING URBAN HOMICIDES REF: BOGOTA 3503; 09 BOGOTA 519; 08 BOGOTA 3077 CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Homicides in Colombia appear to be on the rise after several years of steady decline. The GOC's leading authorities on crime statistics reported sharply contrasting 2009 homicide rates, with police numbers indicating a 2% downtick and the national forensic examiner's data registering a 15% increase. This divergence marks the largest discrepancy ever reported between the two bodies, which frequently differ over exact numbers but have historically tended to show the same overall trends. Despite the differences, both sets of numbers show a rising tide of homicides in the department of Antioquia, its capital city Medellin, and the city of Cali. The GOC has responded with a major police surge, but local analysts suggest the GOC's focus on insurgents will continue to blind it to the rising crime problem. End Summary. POLICE, FORENSICS AGENCY AT ODDS OVER NUMBERS -------------- ¶2. (U) National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science (Medicina Legal) numbers claim a 15% increase in homicides nationwide from 2008 -- from 15,250 to 17,565 -- as well as significant jumps in Bogota (12%),Cali (23%) and Medellin (104%). This represents a rate of about 39 murders per 100,000 residents, which is still a significant drop from the 2002 peak of nearly 70 per 100,000, but also a worrying increase from the 34 per 100,000 in 2008. Medicina Legal pointed out that the most violent departments were Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Norte de Santander, Narino, and Risaralda (see tables below). Medicina Legal's numbers also indicate that homicides rose in every major Colombian city except for Pereira (Risaralda). ¶3. (U) The Colombian National Police (CNP),however, reported 15,817 homicides for 2009, a 2% decrease from the 16,140 the CNP reported for 2008. This represents a rate of roughly 35 murders per 100,000 residents -- nearly one-half the rate in 2002. According to the report, Bogota experienced a 1% reduction (from 1,341 in 2008 to 1,327),while both Medellin and Cali suffered worrying increases in homicides -- 64% and 17%, respectively. According to the data (see tables below),the departments with the highest overall homicide rates were Arauca, Guaviare, Risaralda, Caqueta, and Valle del Cauca, while the sharpest 2008-09 increases took place in Sucre, Antioquia, Atlantico, Cordoba, and Bolivar. Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva publicly touted the gains as proof that public security was continuing to improve. ¶4. (U) By comparison, press reports indicate that the U.S. homicide rate for 2009 was about 6 per 100,000, while Venezuela's was 56 (up from 52 in 2008). Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the hemisphere's most violent city, suffered about 130 homicides per 100,000, Caracas about 96, and New Orleans about 95. POLICE FACE POLITICAL PRESSURE -------------- ¶5. (U) The CNP and Medicina Legal estimates almost always differ -- in 2006-07 the CNP reported a drop from 17,479 to 17,198 while Medicina Legal reported a bump up from 16,231 to 16,269 -- but the 2009 results represent the largest divergence on record. Ana Patricia Aristizibal, Medellin's Ombudsman for Human Rights, told the press that she believed the CNP must have made errors in its calculations for Medellin but did not believe there had been "bad faith," adding that she had seen a mid-December police report claiming 2,060 homicides in Medellin (in contrast to the CNP's official year-end statistic of 1,432). (CNP Medellin even reported to the Embassy in December a figure of 1,676 murders for January-November 2009 alone). The discrepancies continued into the first weeks of 2010, with the GOC claiming Medellin had 110 murders in the first weeks of January and Medicina Legal citing 188. ¶6. (C) Wilson Fernandez, Medicina Legal's statistical director, told the press that the discrepancy could have resulted from different counting methods and noted that Medicina Legal postmortem investigations often ruled homicide as the cause of death in cases the police had initially termed as "death by unknown causes." Privately, Fernandez told us the CNP faced tremendous political pressure to keep homicide rates low, and that as a result, police officers tried not to classify deaths as homicides unless they absolutely had to. ¶7. (C) Fernandez acknowledged that differing counting methods had caused the two agencies' numbers to diverge over the years, adding that enhancements to Medicina Legal's statistical reporting system had improved its ability to count homicides in rural areas, which had caused its homicide numbers to climb gradually over the years. Still, he argued, only political pressure could account for the newly revealed differences. Fernandez concluded that while he did not believe the CNP was fraudulently changing numbers for political ends, he was certain that pressure from the top generated "creative accounting," which in turn had led to the undercounting. DRUGS, GANGS STILL FUEL KILLINGS -------------- ¶8. (C) Colonel Cancio Bolanos, head of the CNP's intelligence unit targeting emerging criminal bands (BACRIMs),told us that most of Colombia's murders were attributable to fights between drug gangs over turf, and that the vast majority of victims were members of drug gangs and/or BACRIMs. Similarly, Medellin Secretary of Government Juan Diego Velez asserted in December that 85% of the murders there were related to illegal narcotics or gang violence (ref A). Gerson Arias of Bogota-based think tank Fundacion Ideas Para La Paz (FIP) noted that violence has been particularly acute this year as BACRIMs consolidate and move into each other's territory. Both agencies' statistics appear to support these claims -- most of the departments with high homicide rates also feature heavy BACRIM presence, while Medellin is facing a second straight year of intense internecine warfare among rival narcotrafficking groups (refs B & C). GOC RESPONSE CONFUSED -------------- ¶9. (C) The surging violence appears to have caught the GOC by surprise -- Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva in late January publicly dismissed local officials' claims of growing urban insecurity, arguing that officials were "exaggerating" the problem and asserting that murder rates in Medellin and Cali were at their lowest in 30 years. (NOTE: Silva's claim contradicted the MOD's own statistics, as the CNP falls under the MOD. End Note.) However, President Uribe shortly thereafter announced a major security push aimed at bolstering urban security, including controversial proposals to pay students and taxi drivers to serve as intelligence informants against criminal gangs. CNP Commander General Oscar Naranjo fleshed out the plan's details on February 1, which includes sending 36,000 additional police to Bogota's major cities and stationing a "policeman on every block" in particularly dangerous neighborhoods. The GOC last year launched a similarly well-publicized surge of police to Medellin in a bid to lower crime, but even the CNP's optimistic figures show a substantial jump in homicides in the city despite the effort. ¶10. (C) The plan may not be enough to stem the rising tide of homicides across the nation, leading many local analysts to question the GOC's security priorities. Naranjo commented publicly that the surge involves no new resources, which suggests the 36,000 officers will be stripped from already vulnerable rural areas. Markus Schultze-Kraft of the International Crisis Group told us he believed the GOC's "narrow" focus on defeating insurgent groups has kept it from dealing with (or even noticing) BACRIMs and other criminal groups, which has let crime trend upward despite tremendous progress against guerrillas. Similarly, FIP's Arias opined that the administration's National Consolidation Plan (PNC) does not do enough to improve the quality of policing and other important civilian government services in remote areas and that BACRIMs are exploiting that failure. Arias added that the GOC needs to address the quality of the justice system, which is so weak in outlying areas that many criminal suspects go free due to lack of evidence or resources to prosecute them. CNP statistics indicate that only about 5% of Colombian homicides are ever solved. ¶11. (U) Medicina Legal Homicide Statistics -------------- 2008-9 2007 2008 2009 Change Nationwide 16269 15250 17565 15% Bogota 1401 1466 1645 12% Medellin 788 1066 2176 104% Cali 1521 1473 1814 23% Amazonas 10 14 9 -36% Antioquia 2075 2399 4445 85% Arauca 399 329 241 -27% San Andres 8 6 4 -33% Atlantico 530 484 521 8% Bolivar 459 303 385 27% Boyaca 199 186 144 -23% Caldas 382 392 344 -12% Caqueta 186 160 142 -11% Casanare 158 86 54 -37% Cauca 448 399 480 20% Cesar 383 328 279 -15% Choco 111 148 162 9% Cordoba 197 267 363 36% C'marca 498 372 387 4% Guainia 3 4 7 75% Guaviare 121 130 110 -15% Huila 296 299 247 -17% La Guajira 213 180 209 16% Magdalena 425 364 384 5% Meta 733 587 512 -13% Narino 575 431 618 43% Norte de Santander 805 682 634 -7% Putumayo 103 72 131 82% Quindio 342 298 267 -10% Risaralda 717 753 567 -25% Santander 545 480 470 -2% Sucre 139 103 161 56% Tolima 424 365 301 -18% Valle del Cauca 3332 3114 3294 6% Vaupes 10 1 3 200% Vichada 42 48 18 -63% ¶12. (U) Colombian National Police Homicide Statistics -------------- -------------- 2008-2009 2007 2008 2009 Change Nationwide 17198 16140 15817 -2% Bogota 1351 1341 1327 -1% Medellin 654 871 1432 64% Cali 1484 1384 1615 17% Amazonas 9 9 6 -33% Antioquia 1984 2271 2846 25% Arauca 222 321 244 -24% Atlantico 514 464 512 10% Bolivar 489 342 372 9% Boyaca 198 164 150 -9% Caldas 530 493 390 -21% Caqueta 380 338 265 -22% Casanare 223 95 75 -21% Cauca 660 624 576 -8% Cesar 434 292 252 -14% Choco 113 157 141 -10% C'marca 473 376 369 -2% Cordoba 352 466 510 9% Guainia 3 7 3 -57% Guaviare 123 115 116 1% Huila 513 412 371 -10% La Guajira 214 227 212 -7% Magdalena 402 354 321 -9% Meta 599 584 438 -25% Narino 778 723 647 -11% Norte de Santander 765 627 528 -16% Putumayo 380 211 186 -12% Quindio 301 287 241 -16% Risaralda 717 745 579 -22% San Andres 8 4 9 125% Santander 540 506 498 -2% Sucre 141 105 184 75% Tolima 456 415 439 6% Valle del Cauca 3270 3019 2997 -1% Vaupes 6 6 3 -50% Vichada 50 40 10 -75% BROWNFIELD