SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S JAN 11-13 VISIT

S E C R E T BOGOTA 000011 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/06 TAGS: PREL OVIP PGOV PHUM PTER ECON ETRD EAID SNAR MOPS CO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S JAN 11-13 VISIT TO COLOMBIA CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Your visit is an opportunity to focus U.S. and Colombian efforts to consolidate Colombia's gains as the country enters a transition year. President Uribe will seek your reassurance of our commitment to their fight against illegal drugs and illegal armed groups. His decision on whether to push for reelection remains the central chord of Colombian politics and will define the tone of congressional elections in March and the presidential elections in May. Our relations with Colombia remain solid, but will be tested by our handling of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the regional sensitivities to the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Despite improving performance on human rights throughout Plan Colombia, there are continuing abuses and potential for backsliding, especially in the Colombian Army. Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations bear a disproportionate share of violence, social exclusion and poverty. After rousing success against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2008, progress against the guerrilla organization has plateaued; there are few prospects for peace in the near term. Post has begun implementing the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) -- a follow on to Plan Colombia -- with greater focus on expanding state services in Colombia's ungoverned spaces where illegal armed groups and the illicit economy flourish. End Summary. COLOMBIA IN TRANSITION -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Embassy Bogota welcomes the visit of Deputy Secretary Steinberg and WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Christopher McMullen on January 11-13. Colombians will be looking to you, as the Department's first senior-level visitors to Colombia since the start of the Obama Administration, to give greater definition of U.S. policy toward Colombia. Colombia made a dramatic rebound from near-failed state to stable democracy over the last ten years. Murder and kidnapping rates have dropped dramatically, while rule of law has strengthened through major judicial reforms. While Colombia still experiences serious problems with illegal armed groups, the conflict has ceased to be a threat to Colombia's national security and sovereignty. ¶3. (SBU) Colombia's turnaround thus far can be attributed to improvements in overall security. Further progress depends on resolving chronic issues such as high social inequality and land tenure. Colombia has made significant inroads in confronting violence, but drug trafficking and insurgent organizations still operate in large parts of the country, especially along the borders. Colombia suffers the effects of the global economic crisis and Venezuela's trade embargo, though the impact has been lessened by sound fiscal and monetary policies that have attracted foreign investment. Growth rates were nil for 2009 but the GOC predicts 2.5% growth next year. Poverty rates have also decreased, though unemployment remains a major problem. About 60% of the economy remains mired in the informal sector. REELECTIONS AND ELECTIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) The Colombian Congress passed a law in September 2009 permitting a referendum on whether to modify the Constitution to allow President Alvaro Uribe to stand for a third term in the presidential elections on May 30, 2010. The Constitutional Court must now rule on the referendum process and its impact on the Constitution, a decision that may not come until February or March. If the Court rules in Uribe's favor, 25% of registered voters must participate in the referendum to make it valid and the majority of those voting must vote in favor of reelection for Uribe to be allowed to run. While some recent administrative rulings have complicated the efforts of Uribe's supporters, we are reasonably certain those hurdles can be overcome. Uribe seldom speaks publicly of the referendum, characterizing it as a grassroots initiative of Colombian citizens. His popularity remains around 70% after more than seven years in office. Privately, Uribe is taking steps consistent with intention to perpetuate his presidential career. Elections to replace the entire Congress (166 Representatives and 102 Senators) will be held on March 14. We expect the elections to run smoothly overall, but are concerned about pockets of violence and the influence of illicit funds during the campaign period. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) Colombia has been a staunch U.S. ally against the threats of narco-trafficking and terrorism. We continue to enjoy a robust extradition relationship, though we were disappointed at the Supreme Court's decision to deny our requests to extradite the FARC operatives charged with taking hostage or attempting to harm U.S. citizens. Colombia is our fourth largest export market in the region and a growing destination for U.S. investment. Colombia's close relations with us have caused frictions with its increasingly neo-populist neighbors such as Venezuela, which regularly calls Colombia a U.S. lackey. This was underscored by the regional tensions raised by the DCA. Despite our assertions that the DCA is strictly a bilateral issue, the GOC views the agreement as a strategic deterrent against President Hugo Chavez. The Colombians have begun to patch up relations with Ecuador but could do more with Brazil to offset the rhetoric of Chavez. The Colombians have recently engaged in "security diplomacy," providing training and assistance to neighbors (such as Mexico, Panama and Haiti) suffering from drug trafficking and organized crime. The GOC has offered to contribute to the international effort in Afghanistan via a deployment with Operation Enduring Freedom, but continues to delay actual deployments. VENEZUELA ON THE MIND -------------- ¶6. (C) Colombian officials worry that Venezuela poses a serious and growing military, economic, and covert threat. The GOC has sounded alarms in response to Venezuela's arms buildup, all but open support for the FARC, and killings and expulsions of Colombians inside Venezuela. Caracas has blocked imports from Colombia, leading to border area confrontations and unrest. Venezuela is Colombia's second largest export market, receiving large quantities of manufactured goods and food products. Bilateral trade, once thought to be of sufficient volume to prevent bilateral conflict, has declined notably since the signing of the DCA (e.g., Colombian exports declined by 75% in November 2009 compared to the same month a year earlier). Local observers are concerned that the constraints preventing conflict between the two states are dwindling. Colombia has appealed to the UNSC, OAS, and WTO for help, but seen little response. Despite these incidents, we see no evidence that either side is actively preparing for hostilities. However, as tensions along the border rise and perceptions skew, there is a small risk that a local incident could spiral out of control. Real or not, the perception of the threat posed by Venezuela has changed Colombians' worldview, causing them to seek ever greater assurances of our friendship and support. ¶7. (SBU) Colombians understand U.S. political realities associated with a vote on the FTA, but resignation has grown within the government, business, and academic communities over the lack of action on the accord signed in 2006. GOC and business community members believe that long-term inaction on the FTA will be detrimental to U.S.-Colombian relations. Your signing of the Science and Technology agreement is part of an effort to expand the bilateral economic agenda. Public sector unions (the great majority of organized labor) oppose free trade agreements and argue that the GOC needs to do more to respect worker rights and to protect unionists from violence. Thirty-nine unionists were murdered in 2009, which is a downward trend from the 49 murders in ¶2008. President Uribe publicly adheres to the commitment President Obama made in their June 29 meeting to move the FTA forward in the U.S. Congress once labor and human rights issues are adequately addressed. HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) By nearly all measures, the human rights situation in Colombia has improved over the last ten years. Serious human rights concerns remain, however, especially with regard to the Colombian military. The exposure of military "false positives" in 2008, in which unarmed civilians were murdered and presented as combat deaths, led to the dismissal of 51 members of the Colombian Army. We are concerned with the military's commitment to investigating these types of cases and its cooperation with the Prosecutor General's office. The Prosecutor General's Office is currently processing more than 1,000 cases of extrajudicial executions; prosecutions have been slow but there is progress. We are working with the Colombian military to improve soldiers' respect for human rights as they carry out security operations. Impunity for human rights violations and past crimes carried out by paramilitary and guerrilla groups is a serious concern. The GOC regularly stigmatizes NGOs as supporters of terrorist organizations, which human rights groups claim fuels death threats against them. Revelations that Colombian intelligence and law enforcement entities carried out illegal surveillance against human rights groups, unionists and political opponents have also undermined the GOC's credibility on human rights. While displacements dropped in 2009, Colombia has over three million internally displaced persons (IDPs). AFRO-COLOMBIAN AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Colombia's populations of Afro-descendants (between 11 and 20% of the population) and indigenous (between 1 and 3% of the population) suffer from discrimination, social exclusion, structural poverty, and lack of political participation. The size of both minorities is in dispute, as both disagree with the results of the 2005 census. This marginalization allows illicit drug cultivation or trafficking to move into the communities, subjecting them to a disproportionate share of violence and displacement. The GOC created the Commission for the Advancement of Afro-Colombians to help improve education, income generation, and political representation within the Afro-Colombian population. However, the Colombian Congress has not passed legislation to enact the commission's recommendations. The Embassy has implemented special programs to help Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations increase their participation in the political and economic life of the country. These will be highlighted in your signing the Framework on Ethnic and Racial Equality. CONFLICT STALLED, PEACE DELAYED -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) The GOC made dazzling progress against the FARC in 2008: three (of seven total) Secretariat members dead, 15 prized hostages freed, including three Americans, and record high desertions. Progress in 2009 was sluggish, however, with the FARC carrying out asymmetrical attacks on selective soft targets as the Colombian military tried to grind them down in a slow war of attrition. Some analysts have also pointed to lower operations tempo due to local commanders' concern of being accused of human rights abuses. The past month has been relatively intense, however, with the FARC kidnapping and assassinating the Governor of Caqueta, followed by the Colombian military killing several senior FARC commanders in two conventional bombings. The GOC is quietly probing the FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) to open a dialogue, though these efforts appear to be far from fruitful. We do not expect any serious progress on this issue until after the elections; the guerrilla groups will likely wait to see whether Uribe will repeat in office before considering a broader peace process. THE COLOMBIA STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE -------------- ¶11. (SBU) To consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia, we have developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), which meshes with Colombia's own National Consolidation Plan (PNC). Our efforts initially focus on three priority areas of on-going conflict, drug trafficking, and social marginalization. PNC/CSDI has prioritized addressing the lack of state presence that enables coca production and illegal armed groups, and seeks to establish state presence in strategic, under-governed parts of the country. The plan is centered on increasing territorial control in these areas to provide security for communities, achieve permanent coca eradication, transfer security responsibility to the police, provide a wide range of socio-economic services to address the root causes of marginalization, and improve the justice sector to mitigate illegality. A major challenge to implementation is achieving strong, effective civilian leadership of the PNC. ¶12. (SBU) The head of Social Action (Accion Social),Colombia's development agency, is the titular head of the PNC effort. Civilian agencies have been reluctant, however, to devote their budgets to the effort, often leaving the Ministry of Defense organizationally in front. Other obstacles include the need for a comprehensive GOC security strategy to transition from military to police in "consolidated" territories, more clarity on a post-eradication strategy, stronger presence of the justice sector in CSDI areas, and increased funding support for PNC ministries in the GOC budget. You will be able to witness Embassy and GOC efforts first hand during your visit to Tumaco. BROWNFIELD