Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BISHKEK84
2010-02-02 10:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

KYRGYZSTAN SEEKS SIGNS FROM THE U.S. OF LONG-TERM

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MARR KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000084 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN SEEKS SIGNS FROM THE U.S. OF LONG-TERM
COMMITMENT TO THE RELATIONSHIP

REF: BISHKEK 51

Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000084

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN SEEKS SIGNS FROM THE U.S. OF LONG-TERM
COMMITMENT TO THE RELATIONSHIP

REF: BISHKEK 51

Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Action request para. 8.


2. (C) Summary: The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is
actively reviewing the state of its relationships with the
U.S., Russia, and China, seeking a balance which would best
serve its interests. A key concern of our interlocutors is
what role the U.S. intends to play in Kyrgyzstan in the
medium and long-term. Signals, intentional or otherwise,
which we give over the coming weeks may significantly affect
Kyrgyz attitudes, and could affect our ability to use the
Manas Transit Center and other valuable Kyrgyz transit
routes. End Summary.

Trial Period
--------------


3. (C) Numerous meetings with Foreign Minister Kadyrbek
Sarbayev, Director of the Central Agency for Development (and
son of the President of Kyrgyzstan) Maxim Bakiyev, and other
officials of the Kyrgyz Republic over the past weeks have
left us with the strong impression that we are in a "trial
period" in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz took an important step
away from their closest international partner, Russia, and
toward us in agreeing to host the Transit Center last year.
They are running the balance on that decision right now.


4. (C) We are confident that that balance is now positive.
Efforts to speed up the payment process for the second
quarter of Manas Transit Center operations, the beginning of
preliminary construction on the airport ramp project, the
progress in disbursement and deliveries under our
counternarcotics and counterterrorism programs, the upcoming
visit by DOD to review the progress of the air traffic
control upgrade program, efforts by the Transit Center to
contract with Kyrgyz providers of goods, numerous
humanitarian projects by the Transit Center, and a good deal
of effective public diplomacy work have kept this ledger in
the black.

Long vs. Short Term Interest?
--------------


5. (C) However, the Kyrgyz remain very queasy about our
long-term intentions. Although we have been able to assuage
early concerns that the U.S. policy in Afghanistan meant we
would be out of that country by 2011, our interlocutors
remain concerned that, over the next few years, our need for
the Transit Center will evaporate and we will disappear. We
believe that the Russians, burned last year, are pressing a
new set of talking points intent on convincing the Kyrgyz
that the U.S. will turn out to be an unreliable partner and
will soon leave. Russia is pressing its desire to have a new

base in southern Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyz opposition to that
idea seems to be waning.

Potential Regional Jealousies
--------------


6. (C) The U.S. discussions with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
on access to other transportation facilities, and especially
air transport facilities, also play into Kyrgyz concerns. It
will be crucial as we move forward on any of these options to
ensure that the Kyrgyz do not get the impression that we are
attempting to somehow "replace" the capabilities we have in
Manas.

Minimizing Risk of Renegotiation
--------------

BISHKEK 00000084 002 OF 002




7. (C) Our concern is that while a long time frame and an
assumption that the U.S. will be in Manas for many years
makes the Kyrgyz easier to work with and more acquiescent to
our needs, the growing belief that the U.S. is in the last
year(s) of its tenure at Manas might well lead the Kyrgyz to
become more demanding. At its most problematic, it could
lead to a decision on their part that they should reopen the
Manas negotiations with an eye toward maximizing short-term
benefits while we remain highly dependent on the Transit
Center for our operations in Afghanistan. At this point, we
do not expect that to happen. We do believe that it is
crucial that the USG take steps to minimize such a
possibility.


8. (C) Action Request: In that regard, we request that the
Department consider the following issues:

-- We believe that it would be best to request renewal of
the Transit Center Agreement as soon as possible. The longer
we wait, the more time the Kyrgyz have to speculate about our
intentions.

-- In requesting renewal of the Transit Center Agreement, we
recommend using language suggesting that the USG would like
to begin discussions of our long-term relationship and
possible long-term access to facilities at Manas. This issue
should also be broached at the Annual Bilateral
Consultations.

-- Keeping-up contacts with Kyrgyzstan. Where high level
contacts are made with Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, parallel
contacts with Kyrgyzstan would make sense. A Cabinet level
visit to the Transit Center would pay huge dividends. A high
level meeting for the Kyrgyz Annual Bilateral Consultations
delegation, to be headed by Maxim Bakiyev and FM Sarbayev,
would also make a real difference.

-- If we move forward with new air transit capabilities in
another Central Asian country, it would help for us to
provide the Kyrgyz Government with a heads-up, emphasizing
that the capabilities we have at Manas are not being
replaced.

-- Maintaining assistance levels. The Kyrgyz will be very
sensitive to any changes in our level of support and
engagement.
GFOELLER

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