GERMAN MFA HOPE IRAN SANCTIONS TARGET LEADERS NOT MASSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000081



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KNNP, IR, GM

SUBJECT: GERMAN MFA HOPE IRAN SANCTIONS TARGET LEADERS NOT

MASSES



Classified By: Pol M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 b/d





1. (C) SUMMARY. German MFA A/S equivalent for Non

Proliferation and Disarmament Gottwald told House Foreign

Affairs Committee Staff Director Richard Kessler that Germany

was ready to support sanctions on Iran, especially ones which

target the leadership and minimize impact on the general

population. Germany would prefer to see action taken within

the UNSC, but is concerned about Chinese commitment. Iran

Task Force Director Krueger said Germany was looking at

measures in sectors involving transportation (Air Iran and

shipping),banking, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and

Compressed Natural Gas (CNG),as well as exploring ways to

target the IRGC leaders. NEA Iran/Maghreb DAS equivalent

Ralph Tarraf said Germany was also exploring ways to bring

Iranian Human Rights violations before the UN offices in

Geneva. Tarraf also advocated taking Turkish initiatives on

Iran seriously while not publicly endorsing them. Experts

from Germany's leading think tank advocated for a ban on

weapons sales to Iran, covert sabotage of the Iranian nuclear

program, and focusing efforts to find a negotiated solution

more directly in the office of the Supreme Leader. End

Summary.



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IMPORTANCE OF UNSCR; CONCERN ABOUT CHINA

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2. (C) Gottwald summarized the German position on Iran

Sanctions emphasizing the importance of getting a new UNSCR

passed sooner rather than later during a January 6 meeting.

He noted it would be difficult, but important, to keep Russia

and China on board. He said no one is enthusiastic about

sanctions, but all agree that Iranian refusals to reach an

agreement must carry a price. He quoted Chancellor Merkel's

speech to Congress in November and said Germany had "zero

tolerance" for a nuclear armed Iran and was ready to support

sanctions. He expressed greater concern over the Chinese

commitment to sanctions than Russian. Putting the current

Iran discussion into a broader context Gottwald worried that

Iran could become a spoiler in the upcoming NPT RevCon.



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GOAL OF SANCTIONS: HIT LEADERS NOT PEOPLE

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3. (C) When asked by Kessler what Germany would like to see

in a UNSCR or EU measures on Iran, Gottwald and MFA Deputy

A/S equivalent for Trade and Export Control Lingemann

remained vague in their answers. Gottwald said the EU could

be counted on to take its guidance from the next UNSCR on

Iran and enact measures to enforce and strengthen the UNSCR.

In particular he expected the EU to take action to target

specific leaders with visa bans and perhaps other measures.

Gottwald said Germany would like to see measures have a

direct effect on Iranian leaders, and to minimize the effect

on the population. Gottwald called petrol sanctions a "mixed

blessing" noting that they give the government an excuse to

cut subsidies which puts the burden onto the general

population and money back in government budgets. Lingemann

said denying access to certain exploration/extraction

technology could be an effective tactic since it would more

directly impact the government's pocketbook and ability to

"buy friends" abroad. He stressed that we need measures that

do not generate a commiseration effect from other countries.

Lingemann noted that while a broad UNSCR was preferable,

there were still some technological areas (such as CNG/LNG

related technologies) in which U.S. and EU companies have a

monopoly on the market and where Russian and Chinese

companies can't compete should EU wide measures be needed.

He also said that targeted measures that impact Iran's

refining capabilities can be effective as they have an

immediate impact on the government's income.





4. (C) Iran Task Force Director Krueger, in a separate

meeting, specifically mentioned transportation (Iran Air and

shipping),banking, and LNG/CNG sectors as areas on which

Germany was looking to focus UNSC or EU action. He said

Germany was also interested in targeting the IRGC but was

still wrestling with how to best do so. He noted that the

U.S. had based its justification on the IRGC's terrorist

associations with Hezballah, but since Hezballah is not

recognized as a terrorist organization in Europe that

wouldn't work. He said his colleagues were looking at

possible action against the IRGC for violations of Human

Rights and thought that might be more workable in the

European context, but they were open to suggestions.



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EXPLORING WHAT TO DO ON HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT

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5. (C) NEA Iran/Magreb DAS equivalent Ralph Tarraf noted

that Germany was looking at whether and how to bring the

Iranian Human Rights violations before the UN offices in

Geneva. He said it was important to make clear to the Iranian

government that we are concerned about their human rights

violations and that the concern is not purely a "Western"

phenomena but rather a global one. He said February 15 is a

key date as that is when the Iran country review process will

take place in Geneva. He added that Germany is discussing

listing the IRGC both under the non-proliferation regime and

now also for its human rights violations. He noted that it

was important to keep the two separate sanctions tracks

separate and not to confuse the proliferation and human

rights issues.



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CAN ENGAGEMENT WORK? IS THERE A ROLE FOR TURKEY?

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6. (C) On the issue of whether continued engagement with the

Iranian government undermines the opposition, Gottwald

stressed that it is important that engagement not be

construed to "favor" Ahmadinejad, but rather we should

continue, as we have, on a purely "logical" basis. He said

he was concerned that the current Iranian government may be

incapable of coming to any conclusions, but that doesn't mean

we should let up on our pressure. Tarraf said we face the

"worst situation possible" with a weak regime that is not yet

close to regime change. He suggested we focus on new forms

of access to the regime which would allow for discrete talks

to continue at a high-level. Gottwald added that he thought

it was important to look for other mechanisms such as the TRR

proposal which can serve as disincentives to continue down

the nuclearization path.



7. (C) Tarraf said he saw increased Saudi/Iranian rivalry in

the Gulf region and suggested the West avoid putting all its

"eggs in one basket" behind the Saudis. He suggested looking

for other allies in the region who can be constructive such

as Turkey. He admitted that Turkey had abstained in the IAEA

and expressed reluctance on sanctions, but these positions

also afforded them greater leverage with the Iranians. He

suggested we consider taking Turkish initiatives seriously

without publicly endorsing them. He agreed that to date

Turkish promises - on Syria/Israel and Iran- have not yielded

any results, but he advocated giving Turkey a quiet nod of

approval to see if they can deliver.



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ARMS BAN, SABOTAGE, FOCUS ON SUPREME LEADER

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8. (C) The Director of Germany's Institute for Security and

International Affairs (SWP),Volker Perthes, and their Iran

expert Walter Posch argued that the only effective sanctions

which could positively impact the regime's security

calculations on the nuclear dossier would be a ban on sales

of conventional arms. Only such a move could shift the

security calculation for the regime from the longer term goal

of achieving nuclear capability to the shorter term goal of

maintaining a conventional capability. He warned that

ineffective sanctions could be worse than no sanctions,

especially if they send more money to the IRGC's pockets

(through increasing necessity of procurement on the black

market which is dominated by the IRGC.) In the interim

Perthes recommended that a policy of covert sabotage

(unexplained explosions, accidents, computer hacking etc)

would be more effective than a military strike whose effects

in the region could be devastating.



9. (C) Posch offered some insights into the inner workings

of the regime and postured that the TRR deal had failed

because the Supreme Leader (SL) hadn't committed himself to

the deal 100 percent. He said any deal would have to have

the full blessing of the SL and said that once negotiations

in the SL's office (or with his closest confidants) began,

success would be guaranteed since the SL - by definition-

never fails. He noted that the SL has his representatives at

every level of government, but some have greater access to

him than others. The three with greatest access, according

to Posch, at the moment are his son Mojtaba, Ayatollah

Golpaygani and Hejazi.





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10. (U) This cable has been cleared by StaffDel Kessler.

MURPHY