GERMANY: THE SHAKY ROAD TO THE 850 TROOP INCREASE

S E C R E T BERLIN 000112 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2025 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN AF GM SUBJECT: GERMANY: THE SHAKY ROAD TO THE 850 TROOP INCREASE REF: BERLIN 00105 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Georg e Glass for reasons 1.4 (C) and (D) ¶1. (S) Chancellor Merkel on January 26 announced that Germany will send 850 more troops to Afghanistan (500 for immediate deployment and 350 to be held in reserve) in addition to increasing development assistance from 220 million euros to 430 million euros, increasing police trainers from 123 to 200, and contributing 10 million euros per year to the Peace and Reintegration Fund. The first decision -- to increase the ISAF mandate by 850 rather than 1000 -- was a direct result of the January 26 mini-cabinet meeting on Afghanistan. Chancellor Merkel and Defense Minister zu Guttenberg reportedly expected to gain an increase in the ISAF mandate of 1000, but FM Westerwelle proved too difficult. WHY DOWN TO 850? ¶2. (S) Merkel always maintained that significant SPD support was necessary for a new mandate, and on January 25, the chancellor reportedly fully expected the increase of 1000 to move through a meeting of the mini-cabinet on Afghanistan, given the promise of significant SPD support for this increase. The MOD was confident enough before the mini-cabinet meeting that they had papers prepared, which were to be rolled-out on January 26 with the said increase: 500 for immediate deployment and 500 to be held in reserve. However, MOD officers responsible for Afghanistan were surprised the next morning when they were called in early to update the numbers, decreasing the reserve figure from 500 to ¶350. ¶3. (S) According to the MOD Joint Command staff responsible for Afghanistan, "one minister was always against" any troop increase, and the decision early this morning to decrease the reserve figure to 350 meant Westerwelle proved too difficult. The new reserve number of 350 represented a "political compromise." A senior MOD official found the German government to be in a "bizarre situation" where the one minister against any increase now had to go to the London Conference and present the new German package. A senior Chancellery official confirmed that the Chancellor went into the mini-cabinet meeting on January 25 expecting an increase of 1000, but the number changed last night. "It must have been Westerwelle." THE NEW MANDATE FOR 500 PLUS 350 ¶4. (S) The Chancellery and MOD remain hopeful that a new mandate could be passed on February 26. However, MOD contacts agree that this is "a dream," and that it likely will slip into March given Bundestag concerns (see reftel). Regardless of a mandate emerging in late February or March, the Chancellery appears confident that the 500 will be deployed in early summer. They will form two battalions, which will work with an additional Scandinavian battalion. The two German battalions will "go out into the area more," (i.e. outside the wire) and "partner with Afghans more," according to Chancellery and MOD contacts. However, the closest the MOD expects to come to the U.S. partnering model is a "camp in camp" approach where they operate together but are not together 24-7. ¶5. (S) The 350 in reserve will deploy to Afghanistan as needed, following notification of the Bundestag Defense Committee, which would not have a veto power. The 350 could be used as parliamentary election support this September, working with Heron UAVs, or on a possible anti-rocket shield for Kunduz. ¶6. (S) Comment: The government has tried with very little success to maintain an aura of unanimity in the coalition over this decision. Nevertheless, interlocutors constantly harp to us on the raging "competition" that is going on between Westerwelle and zu Guttenberg. Merkel's role has been less clear, though it has seemed at times as if she had zu Guttenberg taking over the troop issue in public to preempt Westerwelle's reluctance. Despite certitude of only a week ago of senior chancellery officials of a "substantial" increase in German troops, that notion was clearly whittled back in a large way by Westerwelle. Interestingly, Westerwelle's own ministry did not and does not profess to have any idea of his position on any of this. It is notable that domestic politics (including the coalition change following the September 27 elections, which the Chancellor won) resulted in the German troop increase moving from 2500 down to 850 over the past four months. The coalition will naturally point to "pressure" from the opposition SPD, but that rather tame, in our view, "opposition" seems to pale in significance to the internal coalition dynamics at work. DELAWIE