Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BELGRADE23
2010-02-05 14:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SERBIA: AMBASSADOR'S FIRST MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR SR KV 
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VZCZCXRO7579
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0023/01 0361408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051407Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0709
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000023 

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/05
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SR KV
SUBJECT: SERBIA: AMBASSADOR'S FIRST MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER
SUTANOVAC

REF: 08 BELGRADE 1231

CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000023 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/05 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SR KV SUBJECT: SERBIA: AMBASSADOR'S FIRST MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SUTANOVAC REF: 08 BELGRADE 1231 CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a February 2 conversation with the Ambassador, Defense Minister Sutanovac welcomed the opportunity for increased bilateral engagement and identified his top goals for 2010 as professionalization of the military, sending troops to peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and Cyprus, and increasing public support for NATO. He spoke of his support for eventual Serbian membership in NATO but was non-committal when pressed to increase activities within the Partnership for Peace framework. Sutanovac emphasized the importance of relaxing the Kumanovo Agreement in recognition of Serbia's status as a partner rather than an adversary of NATO, explaining that a request for revisions was being forwarded through military channels as he could not directly approach the North Atlantic Council for political reasons. The Minister discussed the importance of defense reform, including professionalization of the military and cost-cutting, and described plans to create a regional peacekeeping training facility at Serbia's new South Base. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador paid an introductory courtesy call on Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac on February 2. Sutanovac was accompanied by MOD State Secretary Dusan Spasojevic, MOD Chief of Staff BGEN Milan Bjelica, and MAJ Dalibor Ogrizovic. The Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM, Acting DATT, and Polcouns. Bilateral Cooperation -------------- ¶3. (C) Sutanovac welcomed the Ambassador to Serbia, noting that the lengthy period without a U.S. ambassador or DATT had hampered efforts to strengthen the bilateral partnership. He expressed appreciation for the good meetings he'd had in Washington in December and explained that his h
igh-profile engagement with the United States had led to renewed attacks at home by anti-NATO activists pushing for a referendum on membership. He told the Ambassador that his primary goals for 2010 were the professionalization of the military, sending troops to peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and Cyprus, and increasing public support for NATO. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador highlighted the importance of security and defense cooperation to the overall bilateral relationship and said she was particularly pleased with the results of the Ohio National Guard's work through the State Partnership Program (SPP). She urged Sutanovac to take the relationship to the next level through additional exercises and training opportunities, particularly those which draw on the expertise of neighboring countries such as the Hungarian offer. The Ambassador said that she would work to support enhanced cooperation and regular consultations such as Joint Staff Talks and Bilateral Defense Consultations, mentioning the planned February 11-12 visit of SACEUR and EUCOM CDR ADM James Stavridis. Sutanovac said he was looking forward to hosting ADM Stavridis at Serbian Armed Forces Day celebrations on February 12. He mentioned that he hoped to return to the U.S. in April or May for meetings with Congress and a speech at West Point on defense reforms. BELGRADE 00000023 002 OF 004 Relations with NATO; Kumanovo Agreement -------------- ¶5. (C) Sutanovac informed the Ambassador that late 2009 polling data showed that 27% of the Serbian public favored NATO membership. He described the number as relatively high given that 2009 saw both a visit by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev to Belgrade and the tenth anniversary of the NATO intervention. The Minister said his goal was to increase public support for eventual membership in order to create a better environment for joint activities with NATO, even though "we won't join in the next one or two years." He added that he had to work for eventual NATO membership for the good of the country because he was convinced that "Serbia would move faster inside of NATO rather than out." In response to the Ambassador's question about the impact of recent Russian government comments discouraging Serbia from considering NATO membership, Sutanovac complained that pro-Russian news outlets could easily obtain anti-NATO quotes from high-level sources in Moscow, but NATO members were reluctant to make the counter argument. He added that he had not been invited to Wehrkunde this year, which he said further undermined the perception of Serbia's partnership with NATO allies. ¶6. (SBU) Asked about plans to increase participation in PfP and the status of Serbia's NATO Mission, Sutanovac explained that both issues were linked to the implementation of the Security Agreement, which was now the MFA's responsibility. ¶7. (SBU) Turning to the Military-Technical Agreement (aka the Kumanovo Agreement) with NATO, Sutanovac said he had raised Serbia's desire for modifications during a December 24 meeting with ADM Fitzgerald in Naples. The Ground Security Zone (GSZ) and Air Security Zone (ASZ) do not cause operational difficulties for Serbia but are a problem symbolically; it is difficult for him to explain to the public why he has to seek COMKFOR permission to fly to a destination within the GSZ to visit his troops. If Serbia is truly a partner with NATO, and if the security situation in Kosovo is improving to the point where KFOR can now draw down its forces, the GSZ is no longer needed, Sutanovac emphasized. ¶8. (C) Sutanovac stressed that he did not want to repeat the experience of late 2008 when former CHOD Zdravko Ponos spoke prematurely to the media about Serbia's desire to revise the MTA, "derailing" the idea temporarily (reftel). The Minister said that the current CHOD Miloje Miletic had prepared a letter to ADM Fitzgerald which would be forwarded to ADM Stavridis and then on to NATO SYG Rasmussen in the next "5 to 10 days." The letter would lay out the Serbian request for revisions to the MTA. Sutanovac said his hope was that SYG Rasmussen would visit Serbia in the near future and announce that it was time to relax the MTA. (There are no current plans for a Rasmussen visit, Sutanovac said; he planned to visit Brussels soon for meetings with both the EU and NATO, however.) Sutanovac explained that he could not write directly to the North Atlantic Council with the request for fear that it would leak and set off another domestic political firestorm. The Ambassador welcomed the news that Serbia had laid out its request in writing. ¶9. (C) Asked when the CHOD would reestablish regular communications with COMKFOR, Sutanovac said only that Miletic had met with COMKFOR in Naples on December 24 and there were no problems with communication. He indicated that former CHOD Ponos had unilaterally decided to cut off communications with COMKFOR in response to the decision to have NATO train the Kosovo Security BELGRADE 00000023 003 OF 004 Forces. Sutanovac added that SYG Rasmussen's recent statement in favor of Peter Fieth's plan for northern Kosovo had made the situation "tougher" for Serbia now. Defense Reform - South Base -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Underscoring his commitment to defense reform, Sutanovac identified professionalization of the military as the main task in that area and said he was committed to achieving it in 2010. He described full professionalization as a tough but achievable goal which 80% of the public supported. Sutanovac lamented the fact that after President Tadic's tenure as defense minister, there had been a lull in reforms from 2005 to 2007. Sutanovac pointed to high public approval ratings of the army as proof that his reform efforts were paying off. Among government institutions the army was now seen by the public as the most popular and least corrupt, which was a complete reversal of the situation just a few years ago. Much work remained to cut the fat from MOD's extensive operations, which included everything hospitals to schools to hotels, Sutanovac said; 80% of the budget now went to personnel costs. In December he had dismissed 450 people from loss-making commercial enterprises belonging to the military. He was also working to right-size the officer corps and had recently cut the number of colonels from 1600 to 800, which had led to a surge in press criticism. Sutanovac also highlighted his efforts to increase arms sales, mentioning discussions with Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt. ¶11. (SBU) Sutanovac told the Ambassador that Serbia's new South Base was the first facility built to NATO standards. Planning had begun before he became minister, he said; if it had been his decision he might have spent the money differently rather than constructing facilities to house 1000 people. MOD now wanted to develop the base as a regional peacekeeping training facility in order to use it fully and avoid the appearance of militarization of southern Serbia, given the sensitivities of the ethnic Albanian minority living there. The base commander has been reaching out to local communities to inform them of the opportunities the base presents. The facility is currently 35 hectares; MOD is purchasing an additional 65 hectares to create a sufficiently large training range. They hoped to bring in foreign trainers to give the facility a true multi-national character, Sutanovac said. Peacekeeping Operations -------------- ¶12. (C) Sutanovac informed the Ambassador that Serbia had recently contributed a medical team to a Norwegian-lead peacekeeping mission in Chad. The mission was the first deployment requiring parliamentary approval under the 2006 Constitution; it required heavy lifting with Parliament as Norway is not a member of the EU and has recognized Kosovo. Serbia is now working to send troops to Lebanon in cooperation with Spain and Italy. Sutanovac added that he also hoped to send troops to a mission in Cyprus this year, as requested by Hungary; it would be a "good, easy mission" that would help increase the interoperability of Serbian troops. Sutanovac commented that the Cyprus mission was also a good fit because Hungary and Serbia were both SPP partners with the Ohio National Guard, and because Slovakia (a non-recognizer and thus palatable to the MFA) also participated. Serbia was seeking the support of the Turkish government before making a final decision. BELGRADE 00000023 004 OF 004 Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Sutanovac was true to form, making no effort to disguise his political ambitions and painting a vivid picture of the political sacrifices he claims to make in the name of defense reform and partnership with the West. He was also quite frank about his feeling that his Western partners did not adequately reciprocate his efforts, rattling off a list of complaints including not being invited to Wehrkunde (while FM Jeremic and Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Ratkovic were) , a lack of rhetorical support from EU partners, the U.S. decision to send a transport plane rather than a fighter to the 2009 air show, insufficient international support for the Military Hospital, and even the fact that the Vice President did not have time to address the officer corps during his May 2009 visit to Belgrade. More substantively, Sutanovac revealed a simplistic approach to defense reform, equating it solely with professionalization and cost-cutting, and a lack of enthusiasm to take on more challenging international missions and joint activities. For all his shortcomings, however, Sutanovac is an influential figure in the Serbian government who is moving the Serbian military slowly in the right direction and can be counted on to continue to advocate for partnership with NATO as long as the political cost-benefit analysis remains in his favor. End Comment. WARLICK

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