SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 9-13 JOINT MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000115

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020
TAGS: MARR MOPS PTER KPKO PINR SY IS LE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 9-13 JOINT MILITARY
COMMISSION

REF: 08 BEIRUT 1390

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The February 10-12 Joint Military Commission
(JMC) meetings in Washington are the second in the series of
bilateral military discussions that began in October 2008
(reftel). As Lebanon emerges from 2009's six-month struggle
to form the new national unity government, the JMC will
reinforce the message that the U.S. is committed to
supporting Lebanon's state institutions. Our support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces
(ISF),with a committed total over $600 million since 2006,
is a vital part of our comprehensive assistance program aimed
at strengthening key state institutions, promoting economic
growth, supporting education and building civil society. The
JMC is an opportunity to show continued U.S. support for
Lebanon's sovereignty and stability while underscoring the
state's obligation to exert control over all of its territory.


2. (C) Recent security incidents along the southern border
with Israel and in the Palestinian camps have not detracted
from the effective cooperation in the Tripartite mechanism
between the LAF and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) through
the mediation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Furthermore, Lebanese leaders regularly call for continued
U.S. assistance to the LAF, despite disagreements about
Lebanon-related UN Security Council resolutions. The
Lebanese delegation will likely express thanks for rapid U.S.
assistance in the aftermath of the crash of Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 409 on January 25. End Summary.

NEW UNITY GOVERNMENT BASED ON CONSENSUS
--------------


3. (C) The new prime minister, Saad Hariri, formed a cabinet
in December 2009 only after he granted the opposition --
which includes Hizballah -- key concessions following six
months of negotiations. Although the contentious cabinet
negotiations weakened Hariri's March 14 alliance and
strengthened those allied with Syria and Iran, most Lebanese
leaders appear to be seeking a period of calm after years of
tumult following former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's
assassination and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from
Lebanon in 2005.


4. (C) The LAF, deliberately neglected during the 1990-2005
Syrian occupation, plays an essential role in ensuring
stability in Lebanon, primarily through its anti-terrorism
efforts. The value of the LAF was clearly demonstrated
during its 2007 battle with terrorists from Fatah al-Islam
inside the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, and the army has
continued its vigorous anti-terrorism efforts. Nevertheless,
the organization struggles in the face of its local
competition: Hizballah, armed rejectionist Palestinian
groups, and groups inspired by global jihadists. The LAF is
also regularly called upon to provide internal security
services that should fall to the ISF, particularly when
sectarian tensions flare up. For these reasons and more, the
overstretched and conflict-averse LAF has failed to exert
exclusive control over the Hizballah-dominated south and the
Bekaa Valley, as well as the Palestinian refugee camps and
military bases.

KEY U.S. OBJECTIVES
--------------


5. (C) Strengthening key Lebanese state institutions
continues to be the primary U.S. objective in Lebanon. The
U.S. has committed over $600 million in security assistance
($530 million in assistance to the LAF, $86 million to the
ISF) to the military and police since 2006 to help the GOL
gradually extend its control over all Lebanese territory,
including areas dominated by Hizballah. President Obama
underscored this objective during President Sleiman's
mid-December visit to Washington by emphasizing the
importance of controlling arms smuggling into Lebanon. The
Lebanese delegation's participation in the JMC presents an
opportunity to reaffirm U.S. support for the LAF and
emphasize U.S. commitment to full implementation of all
Lebanon-related UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs),
including 1559, 1680, and 1701, that call for extending the

state's control over all its territory.


6. (C) The LAF is top-heavy, resource-poor, and subject to
intense political pressures. Although the second two factors
are unlikely to change in the near future, the JMC is an
ideal opportunity to urge the GOL to streamline the LAF to
make it a lighter, more agile force designed to address
Lebanon's primary security priorities. Our assistance has
been designed with these priorities in mind, but our efforts
would be more effective if the LAF were to develop a
comprehensive, long-term strategy document to which we could
link our training and equipment assistance. Lebanese
leaders, and Defense Minister Elias Murr in particular, have
been open to previous offers of U.S. assistance in designing
such a strategy, but the institution lacks the necessary
technical skills to follow through. Thus, the JMC presents
an opportunity to renew our offer to lend assistance
specifically to that effort.

MURR ENERGIZED
--------------


7. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Elias Murr, who has also been
defense minister since 2005, will lead the Lebanese
delegation to the JMC. Murr appears to be starting his
return to the cabinet in action mode following his
mid-December visit to Washington with President Sleiman.
Murr visited UNIFIL headquarters in southern Lebanon on
December 23, publicly affirming the GOL's commitment to UNSCR
1701, which is a linchpin in efforts to undermine non-state
actors in Lebanon. Murr recently told us he plans to
restructure the LAF to make it more agile and less top-heavy,
and he has an ambitious plan to equip the army with the
advanced weaponry so it can operate more effectively. The
LAF itself has also recognized the benefit of reorienting,
through programs such as civil-military cooperation training,
to better accomplish its mission. Despite our robust ongoing
train-and-equip assistance to the LAF, Murr will likely press
the U.S. to provide additional equipment to the special
operations units that he intends to be the core of a retooled
LAF. Murr's attendance at the JMC will provide an
opportunity to emphasize to him our hope that our assistance
will enable the GOL to exert control over all its territory
in order to maintain regional stability.


8. (C) Murr, who sometimes exaggerates his level of influence
over the institutional LAF, will nevertheless arrive at the
JMC with the full backing of President Michel Sleiman, PM
Saad Hariri, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who all
have requested continued U.S. military assistance to the LAF.
While in Washington, Sleiman publicly emphasized the need
for continued U.S. assistance to Lebanon, complained of
Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, and called on the
U.S. to ensure that any peace agreement between Israel and
the Palestinians address Lebanese concerns on Palestinian
refugees. Sleiman's advisors tell us that the message he
heard in Washington on the danger that arms smuggling to
Hizballah poses to Lebanon continues to resonate with him.
PM Hariri has outlined for recent visiting USG officials his
desire for a "Marshall Plan" for the LAF, under which the
U.S. would give more advanced equipment so that the LAF could
be a credible force compared to Hizballah. Syrian-allied
Speaker Berri welcomes continued U.S. assistance, but remains
a vocal opponent of international resolutions that target
Hizballah's arms, which he believes should be addressed
through the National Dialogue process. Berri continues to
lobby for U.S. pressure on Israel to restart peace
negotiations with Syria.

RECENT SECURITY INCIDENTS
--------------


9. (C) As the new government began its work, recent security
incidents highlighted the inability of Lebanese security
forces to operate in certain areas. A bomb exploded at the
Hamas headquarters in the Hizballah-controlled southern
suburbs of Beirut on December 26, and Hizballah initially
prevented the security forces from reaching the scene. While
the LAF took on the investigation once Hizballah gave it
access, the incident highlighted the army's inability to work
freely in areas under Hizballah control. Fighting on January
2 between gunmen from Fatah and Jund al-Sham in the Ain
al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp similarly displayed the

Lebanese security forces' inability to access the camps and
the resulting potential for radicalization and violence to
develop and spread beyond their boundaries and destabilize
the country.


10. (C) More recently, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon
(UNSCOL) Michael Williams reported to the Ambassador a
January 23 act of aggression against a UNIFIL foot patrol in
the southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil involving an angry
crowd and denial of the UNIFIL patrol's freedom of movement,
a violation of UNSCR 1701. Williams called the incident
"clearly worrying" because of its quick escalation and its
occurrence during a routine patrol. Similarly, tensions rose
between the GOL and the GOI after the IDF detained and
questioned a Lebanese shepherd on January 31 when he
allegedly crossed the Blue Line into Israeli-occupied
territory. Williams remains concerned that such small
incidents, if not rapidly contained, have the potential to
destabilize the border region.


11. (C) The Lebanese delegation will likely decry Israeli
occupation of both Shebaa Farms and the Lebanese portion of
the village of Ghajar. Recent aggressive GOI statements that
the IDF will target all of Lebanon instead of only Hizballah
in any future conflict have also raised concerns in Beirut.
The delegation may also point to ongoing Israeli overflights
of Lebanese territory as evidence that Israel is not serious
about respecting UNSCR 1701, which halted the 2006 war
between Israel and Hizballah. UNIFIL has proposed a plan for
IDF withdrawal from Ghajar, but neither the GOL nor the GOI
has yet signed on to the proposal.

THE TRIPARTITE MECHANISM
--------------


12. (C) Despite escalating political rhetoric from both the
GOL and the GOI, on a technical level the Tripartite
mechanism continues to work well, by all accounts. The
Tripartite, the only official mode of communication between
the LAF and the IDF via UNIFIL's mediation, has been a key
factor in mitigating the impact of security incidents along
the Blue Line and establishing a level of trust between the
parties, UNSCOL Williams believes. The head of the Lebanese
Tripartite team is Brigadier General Abdulruhman Shehaitly,
who is also scheduled to participate in the JMC.

SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL
--------------


13. (C) Lebanon was unanimously elected to a rotating
two-year UN Security Council (UNSC) seat, beginning in
January 2010. President Sleiman fought personally for the
seat, which he views as an opportunity to bolster his and
Lebanon's international prestige and sovereignty credentials.
While Lebanon's vote will generally follow Arab League
consensus, some issues, especially those related to Iran,
Middle East peace, or Lebanon itself, could cause significant
political friction in Beirut. Multiple sources also indicate
that Syria has launched a committed, although thus far
unsuccessful, campaign to coopt Lebanon's vote on the UNSC
for its own ends. While we understand Lebanon's delicate
domestic environment, we want to stress that membership on
the Council is an opportunity for the Lebanese to demonstrate
responsible leadership.

ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASH
--------------


14. (C) The Lebanese delegation will likely express thanks
for U.S. assistance, including assistance from the U.S.
military, in the aftermath of the January 25 crash of
Ethiopian Airlines flight 409 off the coast of Beirut just
minutes after takeoff. The tragic event magnified the
limitations of the GOL to address emergency situations and
highlighted the GOL's weakness in conducting search and
rescue operations. At the request of PM Hariri, the U.S.
government mobilized its resources to provide the USS Ramage,
a contingent NAVCENT dive team, and technical expertise from
the National Transportation and Safety Board and the Federal
Aviation Administration to assist in the ongoing
investigation. A second U.S. Navy ship, the USNS Grapple, is
currently en route to Beirut and will remain until a
commercial salvage ship arrives on or about February 11. Our

immediate and ongoing support to GOL requests for assistance
allowed us to provide real-time training to the LAF and
exhibited goodwill in a time of national crisis.

SISON