SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 9-13 JOINT MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000115 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 TAGS: MARR MOPS PTER KPKO PINR SY IS LE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 9-13 JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION REF: 08 BEIRUT 1390 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The February 10-12 Joint Military Commission (JMC) meetings in Washington are the second in the series of bilateral military discussions that began in October 2008 (reftel). As Lebanon emerges from 2009's six-month struggle to form the new national unity government, the JMC will reinforce the message that the U.S. is committed to supporting Lebanon's state institutions. Our support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF),with a committed total over $600 million since 2006, is a vital part of our comprehensive assistance program aimed at strengthening key state institutions, promoting economic growth, supporting education and building civil society. The JMC is an opportunity to show continued U.S. support for Lebanon's sovereignty and stability while underscoring the state's obligation to exert control over all of its territory. ¶2. (C) Recent security incidents along the southern border with Israel and in the Palestinian camps have not detracted from the effective cooperation in the Tripartite mechanism between the LAF and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) through the mediation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Furthermore, Lebanese leaders regularly call for continued U.S. assistance to the LAF, despite disagreements about Lebanon-related UN Security Council resolutions. The Lebanese delegation will likely express thanks for rapid U.S. assistance in the aftermath of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 on January 25. End Summary. NEW UNITY GOVERNMENT BASED ON CONSENSUS -------------- ¶3. (C) The new prime minister, Saad Hariri, formed a cabinet in December 2009 only after he granted the opposition -- which includes Hizballah -- key concessions following six months of negotiations. Although the contentious cabinet negotiations weakened Hariri's March 14 alliance and strengthened those allied with Syria and Iran, most Lebanese leaders appear to be seeking a period of calm after years of tumult following former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005. ¶4. (C) The LAF, deliberately neglected during the 1990-2005 Syrian occupation, plays an essential role in ensuring stability in Lebanon, primarily through its anti-terrorism efforts. The value of the LAF was clearly demonstrated during its 2007 battle with terrorists from Fatah al-Islam inside the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp, and the army has continued its vigorous anti-terrorism efforts. Nevertheless, the organization struggles in the face of its local competition: Hizballah, armed rejectionist Palestinian groups, and groups inspired by global jihadists. The LAF is also regularly called upon to provide internal security services that should fall to the ISF, particularly when sectarian tensions flare up. For these reasons and more, the overstretched and conflict-averse LAF has failed to exert exclusive control over the Hizballah-dominated south and the Bekaa Valley, as well as the Palestinian refugee camps and military bases. KEY U.S. OBJECTIVES -------------- ¶5. (C) Strengthening key Lebanese state institutions continues to be the primary U.S. objective in Lebanon. The U.S. has committed over $600 million in security assistance ($530 million in assistance to the LAF, $86 million to the ISF) to the military and police since 2006 to help the GOL gradually extend its control over all Lebanese territory, including areas dominated by Hizballah. President Obama underscored this objective during President Sleiman's mid-December visit to Washington by emphasizing the importance of controlling arms smuggling into Lebanon. The Lebanese delegation's participation in the JMC presents an opportunity to reaffirm U.S. support for the LAF and emphasize U.S. commitment to full implementation of all Lebanon-related UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), including 1559, 1680, and 1701, that call for extending the state's control over all its territory. ¶6. (C) The LAF is top-heavy, resource-poor, and subject to intense political pressures. Although the second two factors are unlikely to change in the near future, the JMC is an ideal opportunity to urge the GOL to streamline the LAF to make it a lighter, more agile force designed to address Lebanon's primary security priorities. Our assistance has been designed with these priorities in mind, but our efforts would be more effective if the LAF were to develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy document to which we could link our training and equipment assistance. Lebanese leaders, and Defense Minister Elias Murr in particular, have been open to previous offers of U.S. assistance in designing such a strategy, but the institution lacks the necessary technical skills to follow through. Thus, the JMC presents an opportunity to renew our offer to lend assistance specifically to that effort. MURR ENERGIZED -------------- ¶7. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Elias Murr, who has also been defense minister since 2005, will lead the Lebanese delegation to the JMC. Murr appears to be starting his return to the cabinet in action mode following his mid-December visit to Washington with President Sleiman. Murr visited UNIFIL headquarters in southern Lebanon on December 23, publicly affirming the GOL's commitment to UNSCR 1701, which is a linchpin in efforts to undermine non-state actors in Lebanon. Murr recently told us he plans to restructure the LAF to make it more agile and less top-heavy, and he has an ambitious plan to equip the army with the advanced weaponry so it can operate more effectively. The LAF itself has also recognized the benefit of reorienting, through programs such as civil-military cooperation training, to better accomplish its mission. Despite our robust ongoing train-and-equip assistance to the LAF, Murr will likely press the U.S. to provide additional equipment to the special operations units that he intends to be the core of a retooled LAF. Murr's attendance at the JMC will provide an opportunity to emphasize to him our hope that our assistance will enable the GOL to exert control over all its territory in order to maintain regional stability. ¶8. (C) Murr, who sometimes exaggerates his level of influence over the institutional LAF, will nevertheless arrive at the JMC with the full backing of President Michel Sleiman, PM Saad Hariri, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who all have requested continued U.S. military assistance to the LAF. While in Washington, Sleiman publicly emphasized the need for continued U.S. assistance to Lebanon, complained of Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, and called on the U.S. to ensure that any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians address Lebanese concerns on Palestinian refugees. Sleiman's advisors tell us that the message he heard in Washington on the danger that arms smuggling to Hizballah poses to Lebanon continues to resonate with him. PM Hariri has outlined for recent visiting USG officials his desire for a "Marshall Plan" for the LAF, under which the U.S. would give more advanced equipment so that the LAF could be a credible force compared to Hizballah. Syrian-allied Speaker Berri welcomes continued U.S. assistance, but remains a vocal opponent of international resolutions that target Hizballah's arms, which he believes should be addressed through the National Dialogue process. Berri continues to lobby for U.S. pressure on Israel to restart peace negotiations with Syria. RECENT SECURITY INCIDENTS -------------- ¶9. (C) As the new government began its work, recent security incidents highlighted the inability of Lebanese security forces to operate in certain areas. A bomb exploded at the Hamas headquarters in the Hizballah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut on December 26, and Hizballah initially prevented the security forces from reaching the scene. While the LAF took on the investigation once Hizballah gave it access, the incident highlighted the army's inability to work freely in areas under Hizballah control. Fighting on January 2 between gunmen from Fatah and Jund al-Sham in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp similarly displayed the Lebanese security forces' inability to access the camps and the resulting potential for radicalization and violence to develop and spread beyond their boundaries and destabilize the country. ¶10. (C) More recently, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) Michael Williams reported to the Ambassador a January 23 act of aggression against a UNIFIL foot patrol in the southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil involving an angry crowd and denial of the UNIFIL patrol's freedom of movement, a violation of UNSCR 1701. Williams called the incident "clearly worrying" because of its quick escalation and its occurrence during a routine patrol. Similarly, tensions rose between the GOL and the GOI after the IDF detained and questioned a Lebanese shepherd on January 31 when he allegedly crossed the Blue Line into Israeli-occupied territory. Williams remains concerned that such small incidents, if not rapidly contained, have the potential to destabilize the border region. ¶11. (C) The Lebanese delegation will likely decry Israeli occupation of both Shebaa Farms and the Lebanese portion of the village of Ghajar. Recent aggressive GOI statements that the IDF will target all of Lebanon instead of only Hizballah in any future conflict have also raised concerns in Beirut. The delegation may also point to ongoing Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory as evidence that Israel is not serious about respecting UNSCR 1701, which halted the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah. UNIFIL has proposed a plan for IDF withdrawal from Ghajar, but neither the GOL nor the GOI has yet signed on to the proposal. THE TRIPARTITE MECHANISM -------------- ¶12. (C) Despite escalating political rhetoric from both the GOL and the GOI, on a technical level the Tripartite mechanism continues to work well, by all accounts. The Tripartite, the only official mode of communication between the LAF and the IDF via UNIFIL's mediation, has been a key factor in mitigating the impact of security incidents along the Blue Line and establishing a level of trust between the parties, UNSCOL Williams believes. The head of the Lebanese Tripartite team is Brigadier General Abdulruhman Shehaitly, who is also scheduled to participate in the JMC. SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL -------------- ¶13. (C) Lebanon was unanimously elected to a rotating two-year UN Security Council (UNSC) seat, beginning in January 2010. President Sleiman fought personally for the seat, which he views as an opportunity to bolster his and Lebanon's international prestige and sovereignty credentials. While Lebanon's vote will generally follow Arab League consensus, some issues, especially those related to Iran, Middle East peace, or Lebanon itself, could cause significant political friction in Beirut. Multiple sources also indicate that Syria has launched a committed, although thus far unsuccessful, campaign to coopt Lebanon's vote on the UNSC for its own ends. While we understand Lebanon's delicate domestic environment, we want to stress that membership on the Council is an opportunity for the Lebanese to demonstrate responsible leadership. ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASH -------------- ¶14. (C) The Lebanese delegation will likely express thanks for U.S. assistance, including assistance from the U.S. military, in the aftermath of the January 25 crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 409 off the coast of Beirut just minutes after takeoff. The tragic event magnified the limitations of the GOL to address emergency situations and highlighted the GOL's weakness in conducting search and rescue operations. At the request of PM Hariri, the U.S. government mobilized its resources to provide the USS Ramage, a contingent NAVCENT dive team, and technical expertise from the National Transportation and Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration to assist in the ongoing investigation. A second U.S. Navy ship, the USNS Grapple, is currently en route to Beirut and will remain until a commercial salvage ship arrives on or about February 11. Our immediate and ongoing support to GOL requests for assistance allowed us to provide real-time training to the LAF and exhibited goodwill in a time of national crisis. SISON