VFM CUI PROTESTS POTUS-DALAI LAMA MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000369 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2030 TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS PGOV SOCI CH TW SUBJECT: VFM CUI PROTESTS POTUS-DALAI LAMA MEETING Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 11 meeting with the Ambassador, Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai delivered a "stern representation" and expressed China's "grave concern" about the President's planned February 18 meeting with the Dalai Lama. Such a meeting "would amount to connivance with the Dalai Lama's agenda and interference in China's internal affairs." Bilateral ties were already "severely damaged" by the announcement of new Taiwan arms sales, and the Dalai Lama meeting was "equally severe." The Ambassador responded that the President would meet with the Dalai Lama in the latter's capacity as an internationally recognized religious leader and would urge the Dalai Lama to continue the dialogue process with China. The Ambassador noted that differences over Taiwan and Tibet were not new and said both countries should look ahead to important events in 2010, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Cui repeated standard talking points about Tibet and Taiwan being China's "core interests." The Ambassador and Cui agreed on the need to find the "right course" to move the relationship forward. End summary. Nice to Meet You; Let's Get Down to Business -------------- ¶2. (C) In an introductory meeting his first official day as Vice Foreign Minister in charge of North American affairs, VFM Cui skipped pleasantries and noted that PRC Ambassador to Washington Zhou Wenzhong had been informed that President Obama planned to meet with the Dalai Lama February 18. He said the Chinese side had made its points clearly in repeated representations expressing China's strong opposition to a visit by the Dalai Lama to the United States and to any meeting between U.S. leaders and the Dalai Lama under any circumstances. Despite the fact that the United States "must be very clear already" about the Chinese position, the President still planned to meet the Dalai Lama. Accordingly, Cui said, he had been instructed to make a "stern representation and express China's grave concern." ¶3. (C) Tibet was a matter that touched on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Cui continued. Reciting China's well-known characterization of the Dalai Lama as a separatist, Cui said that any U.S. leader meeting with the Dalai Lama at any time "would amount to connivance with the Dalai Lama's agenda and interference in China's internal affairs." This was even more true in the current context of bilateral relations, which had been "severely damaged" by the announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Dalai Lama meeting was "equally severe." Cui urged the United States to "honor its commitments to recognize Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, not support Tibet independence, not destabilize Tibet and not harm bilateral relations." You, Too; Let's Move the Relationship Forward -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Taiwan arms sales issue and the President's meeting with the Dalai Lama were not new and their impact on bilateral relations had been dealt with successfully in the past. He reiterated U.S. policy that Tibet was a part of China, and that the President would meet with the Dalai Lama in the latter's capacity as an internationally recognized religious and spiritual leader. He noted that the President had taken great care to be sensitive to PRC concerns regarding his meeting with the Dalai Lama, and that in his meeting would stress our desire that the Dalai Lama's representatives engage in more dialogue and promote greater peace and communication with Beijing. ¶5. (C) On Taiwan arms sales, the Ambassador reminded Cui that U.S. policy with regard to Taiwan, including arms sales, was consistent with the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. U.S.-China relations as a whole were more important, and more significant, than one or two issues. The relationship was multifaceted, deep, and of great BEIJING 00000369 002 OF 003 importance to both countries. In 2009, the relationship had reached unprecedented heights, and in 2010 we were already looking forward to a visit by Deputy Secretary Steinberg, the Nuclear Security Summit and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. "Core Interests" -------------- ¶6. (C) VFM Cui said that China had "kept the door open" to talks with the Dalai Lama's representatives, as evidenced by the January invitation to the Dalai Lama's representatives for talks with the United Front Work Department. Unfortunately, Cui said, "the talks have shown that the Dalai Lama's side is sticking to its previous rhetoric, specifically its demands for so-called genuine autonomy and greater Tibet." This was a "wrong position," Cui said, and there was "no future" for them until they "genuinely give up separatism." Until they did that, he said, there would be no basis for successful talks. If the United States was interested in the talks' success, Cui added, it should "immediately reverse its wrong decision on the President's meeting, cancel the Dalai Lama's visit to the United States and stop giving wrong signals to the Chinese people." ¶7. (C) VFM Cui noted positively the Ambassador's statements that the United States "recognizes China's sovereignty over Tibet and the one-China policy." If the United States was committed to these ideas, he said, "China will wait to see concrete results of your statements." Cui said the "important consensus" from President Obama's visit to China was the fact that the United States and China needed to put each other's concerns in better focus, particularly each other's "core interests." Tibet and Taiwan were both crucial to China's core interests, he said, and China hoped the U.S. side would come up with "credible steps" to "truly respect" China's core interests. ¶8. (C) Putting aside the paper containing the Tibet demarche, VFM Cui noted that China and the United States shared many major common interests and had the responsibility to overcome the problems and differences the relationship was currently experiencing. "But to be frank," he said, "China is not to be blamed for these problems and differences and we do not want to see such things happening. All of these issues bear on China's core interests, and so there is no room for concession or compromise on China's part." He said the Chinese public reaction to these issues was well-known, and the Chinese government had to "adhere to its principles." A Shared Desire to Find the "Right Course" -------------- ¶9. (C) VFM Cui praised the "positive momentum" from President Obama's November 2009 visit to China and said that the United States and China should do something positive to promote the benefits from our relationship. Recent events had disrupted the momentum and raised doubts about U.S. sincerity in the bilateral relationship. The United States should come up with "credible moves" to show sincerity. The United States needed to take "positive steps" to improve the relationship and should "studiously consider" this issue. ¶10. (C) VFM Cui warned that the tone and content of Western media reporting on the U.S.-China relationship painted a grim picture of relations and raised the possibility of creating a "narrative trap" or self-fulfilling prophesy that could have an even more negative impact on the relationship. He urged the Ambassador to engage the U.S. Congress and media to "keep them on the right course." ¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted that the United States and China were "two great countries with different histories, traditions and political systems." We had in common the desire for a strong economy and security in the region. In addition, we clearly needed to do a good job strengthening our understanding of each other's core interests. In that respect, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue would be important, and the United States urged BEIJING 00000369 003 OF 003 China to work with us to set a date as soon as possible. HUNTSMAN