CHINA'S MFA, GACC, CAEA PRESS FOR GREATER NUCLEAR SECURITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000340 USDOE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY/ MCGINNIS, HERCZEG, GILLESPIE USDOE FOR NNSA/ BLACK, HUIZENGA, WHITNEY, BIENIAWSKI STATE PASS TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (DOANE) USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/YOSHIDA, CUTLER, HUANGFU USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL NSC FOR HOLGATE STATE FOR EAP/CM-BRAUNOHLER, EAP/CM STATE FOR ISN/NESS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG ECON ETTC TRGY KNNP IAEA KTIA CVIS CH SUBJECT: CHINA'S MFA, GACC, CAEA PRESS FOR GREATER NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION WITH DOE/NNSA BEIJING 00000340 001.2 OF 004 Sensitive but unclassified - please protect accordingly. SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Assistant Deputy Administrator for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation, Dave Huizenga, visited Beijing China 20-23 January. He participated in the Transportation Security Workshop with China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and China Institute of Atomic Energy(CIAE),met with Hao Chongfu, Director General, Department of Customs Control and Inspection, General Administration of China Customs (GACC),met with Wu Chuntai, Deputy Director General, Dept of External Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),and Liu Yongde, Director General Department of International Cooperation, CAEA. A common theme in each of these meetings was an acknowledgment by the Chinese host that China has a growing international role in nuclear security and that there is a strong desire to further collaborate with the U.S. in this important area. The MFA expressed strong support for going forward with the joint Center of Excellence (COE) training facility and stated China's strong support for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit. Although when pressed, they would not commit to who would represent China at the NSS. The State Council has assigned CAEA the responsibility to work with NNSA to design and construct the nuclear security training facility. This project was proposed by Deputy Secretary Poneman last fall on his trip to China. The expectation is to announce this joint activity at the April Nuclear Security Summit. To clarify the scope and expectations, the CAEA is proposing to have a meeting in late March in Washington between their Vice Chairman/Party Secretary General and the Administrator, NNSA. The GACC reported their Megaports project milestones are on track, agreed to joint collaboration efforts to support EXPO 2010, using the successful formula that was used for the Beijing Olympics, and identified shared responsibilities for developing a joint training center in China to train Chinese and regional nations on the proper planning, operations and conduct of radiation detection at shipping ports and border crossings and other ports of entry and departure. End Summary. Building on Successful Cooperation with China Customs -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In an open and candid meeting with GACC, Huizenga covered three main topic areas. Project review and status of the joint US-China Megaports demonstration project at Shanghai, reaching agreement on the timing, scope and responsibilities for joint U.S.-China collaboration on radiological detection for EXPO 2010, and negotiations on the creation of a radiation detection training facility that would create an indigenous training capability that could not only support China's needs but that of the Asian region. In exchange for U.S. support in creating this training facility, China would provide access to additional ports and border surveillance areas for the U.S. teams to visit and confirm the BEIJING 00000340 002.2 OF 004 operational effectiveness of the Chinese equipment and operations to detect illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The Megaports demonstration project is proceeding on schedule with a projected operational date of 2011. For EXPO 2010, agreement was reached on the type and quantities of equipment to be provided. NNSA will also provide training for 60 Chinese customs officials to ensure the equipment is properly operated and maintained. After Expo 2010, the equipment will deployed to principal border crossings and sea ports to enhance the detection of illicit nuclear material trafficking in and out of China. ¶3. (SBU) To create an indigenous training capability, similar to NNSA's Richland HAMMER training site, China has requested DOE/NNSA's design, construction and "train the trainers" assistance. NNSA has agreed in principle but on the condition that China provide access to different ports and border crossing that, to date have not been open to DOE/NNSA inspectors. A second stipulation is that the curriculum include dual use equipment training so China is able to detect nuclear equipment that could be used for terrorist or other illicit purposes. GACC has accepted these conditions but needs to complete interagency staffing before reaching final agreement. Huizenga also extended an invitation for DG Hao Chongfu to visit the U.S. and to meet US senior officials to further demonstrate advanced collaboration. DG Hao was receptive to this invitation and went on to discuss cooperative efforts they are undertaking with the European Union in the area of second line defense and offered to better collaborate across all programs in and with China. CAEA ASSUMES A LEADING ROLE IN THE COE TRAINING CONCEPT -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The meeting with DG Liu Yongde, CAEA Department of International Cooperation, addressed three topics. Review and agreement on the nuclear security work under the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology (PUNT),concept and shared responsibilities for the Center of Excellence (COE) proposal as conveyed in the USG non-paper (presented by Deputy Secretary Poneman during his fall visit to Beijing),and potential future joint statements or agreements that would recognize the enhanced collaboration between our two countries as well as the expanded role of CAEA. ¶5. (SBU) Huizenga and Liu Yongde reaffirmed the positive nature of U.S.-China nuclear security cooperation and discussed several different options for designing and operating the COE. Liu expressed strong Chinese willingness to collaborate on a COE, and stated that the State Council had designated CAEA as lead agency for negotiating and implementing the COE with the US. Other agencies involved include MFA, GACC, MPS, MOFCOM and MEP. Liu expressed his interest in having the USG name NNSA as its counterpart implementing organization, and that the USG inform GOC of this decision through appropriate channels. ¶6. (SBU) Both sides agreed on several key points about for the BEIJING 00000340 003 OF 004 nuclear security training Center of Excellence: - It would be necessary to jointly decide on the scope of a Center or Excellence. For example, should it be a small renovation of existing CAEA space or a larger center involving substantial new construction? Liu expressed interest in larger center involving new construction. - Liu expressed a desire for an NNSA-CAEA agreement on COE scope, list of shared responsibilities, and commitment to funding by the end of March which could be announced at the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit. He proposed to have CAEA Party General Secretary, Wang Yiren visit NNSA to finalize the agreement before the summit. He estimated a 2-3 year implementation schedule would be necessary to complete COE. - Liu suggested that the COE could be designed in a manner to not only accommodate China's domestic nuclear security training needs, but also noted that it could serve a wider audience - bilateral or multilateral nuclear security events for the Asia/Pacific region as well as bilateral and multilateral nuclear security training involving a broader international audience. Huizenga noted that the Center of Excellence could eventually serve training needs of defense complex nuclear security personnel as well. Liu acknowledged this but made no commitment as to when or if that might happen.[In follow-up conversation, Liu noted to Huizenga that CAEA could accept a U.S. Department of Defense supporting role in implementation of the training Center of Excellence as long as this was not intended to pressure them into cooperation with their defense complex. Huizenga assured him that this was not the intention.] - Huizenga noted a substantial degree of Chinese funding support would be needed. Such cost sharing might take the form of land and labor provision, for example and Liu accepted the principle of U.S.-China cost-sharing. ¶7. (SBU) Liu emphasized IAEA's leading role on the nuclear security front and expressed desire of inviting IAEA to join this initiative/cooperation. ¶8. (SBU) Liu expressed a preference for a direct NNSA-CAEA, agency-to-agency agreement to govern NNSA-CAEA nuclear security cooperation, given the Chinese government structure changes that took place in year 2008. The Chinese government reorganization also resulted in responsibility shifting. CAEA desires a new agreement/legal document between CAEA and NNSA to clearly acknowledge CAEA's role in carrying out collaboration on nuclear security and safeguards and nonproliferation. Huizenga proposed that CAEA outline key points for such an agreement based on their needs to continue the cooperation and the NNSA can work on turning it to a formal proposal. In the meantime, all the on-going cooperation under BEIJING 00000340 004 OF 004 the PUNT should not be stopped. MFA LOOKING TO UP NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION -------------- - ¶9. (SBU) Huizenga met with Wu Chuntai, the Deputy Director General for the Department of External Security Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to discuss nuclear security collaboration with China and advance preparations for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit. Huizenga discussed the enhanced collaboration that was both ongoing and additional collaboration that was being discussed with both GACC and CAEA. In opening, while acknowledging the importance of strengthening bilateral dialogue, deepening our cooperation on combating nuclear terrorism and making joint efforts to enhance nuclear security and nonproliferation, DDG Wu called for some sensitive issues such as arms sale to Taiwan, Tibetan and Xinjiang related issues to be properly addressed. Wu expressed MFA's willingness to continue cooperation based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. MFA confirmed to work along with other relevant agencies to promote our cooperation particularly supporting the idea of reaching broad agreement on these new collaborative nuclear security efforts in time for them to be announced at the upcoming NSS. He noted the Joint statement between presidents Obama and Hu cited increased cooperation in this area and was grateful for the tangible projects that were being developed. He also noted the collaboration that took place in the run-up to the Olympics, which had been very helpful in building China's capacity to prevent nuclear terrorism and to ensure nuclear security. The MFA said it agreed in principle to the U.S. proposal to establish a center of excellence on nuclear security in China and recognized CAEA's lead role. ¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by the DOE/NNSA delegation. HUNTSMAN