PRC/INDIA: CONTACTS SEE POSITIVE OUTLOOK FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000233 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2035 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER MARR CH PK AF IN XD SUBJECT: PRC/INDIA: CONTACTS SEE POSITIVE OUTLOOK FOR RELATIONS IN 2010 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson for reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: China and India will seek to leverage the positive atmosphere surrounding the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2010 to project an image of a healthy, stable bilateral relationship, according to PRC academics and Indian diplomatic contacts. There is consensus that territorial disputes along the China-India border face little chance of resolution in 2010, but will remain manageable through diplomatic channels. An expert at an MFA-affiliated think tank described U.S. influence on Sino-Indian relations as minimal, while a contact at Beijing University suggested that the U.S.-India strategic partnership has undermined China's national security and soured relations between the two Asian giants. Our contacts believe there is little enthusiasm for China-India coordination on Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. 60th Anniversary Boost -------------- ¶2. (C) Embassy contacts at PRC government-affiliated think tanks and the Indian Embassy separately explained that China and India planned to use the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2010 to showcase the health and stability of the bilateral relationship. Indian Embassy PolOff Satish Kumar January 21 highlighted plans for: Indian President Pratibha Patil to visit Beijing at the invitation of President Hu Jintao during summer 2010; stepped up cultural exchanges; deepened cooperation on climate change post-Copenhagen; coordination in Doha round negotiations; joint involvement in the BRIC Summit and G-20 activities; and a mutually agreed goal to increase bilateral trade from roughly USD 40 billion in 2009 to USD 60 billion in 2010. Accentuating the Positive amid Intractable Problems -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) MFA-affiliated China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) South Asia scholar Rong Ying told PolOff January 12 that China and India would use the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations to deflect attention from the unresolved border disputes and toward the positive development of relations, but discounted the likelihood that the bilateral relationship would produce any new concrete outcomes. The development of China-India relations had leveled in recent years, according to Rong, because many of the previous bilateral irritants had already been resolved, leaving only intractable problems like the border disputes for both parties to manage. Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) South Asia scholar Wang Shida provided a blunter assessment January 19, commenting that until India stopped thinking of itself as South Asia's "big brother," China-India relations would not mature. India's unwillingness to acknowledge China's legitimate interest in stability in South Asia stunted the growth of China-India relations, according to Wang. Border Dispute Manageable -------------- ¶4. (C) PRC academic and Indian Embassy contacts uniformly predicted that Sino-Indian border disputes faced little chance of resolution in 2010, but would remain manageable through diplomatic channels. While concurring in the low likelihood of conflict, Beijing University Professor Han Hua warned January 5 that the potential for conflict could not be completely ruled out. Two factors if not properly managed could prompt a repeat of the border war in 1962: a spike in nationalism in either country, and/or escalatory actions by either military taken independently of the civilian command authority. Han suggested that PRC authorities were capable of controlling surges of nationalism, as demonstrated by the PRC government's ability to manage anti-Japanese sentiment in ¶2005. Likewise, Hu Jintao had firm control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The question was whether the same could be said in either case for India, Han said. Role of U.S. in PRC-India Relations -------------- ¶5. (C) CIIS' Rong downplayed the influence of the United States on Sino-Indian relations, which were "propelled by their own internal logic." Leaders in Beijing and New Delhi BEIJING 00000233 002 OF 002 were committed to maintaining a stable bilateral relationship. For China, leaders since Deng Xiaoping understood that domestic economic development was a top priority, and that stable China-India relations were a prerequisite for domestic development, according to Rong. ¶6. (C) Beijing University's Han separately assessed that the United States had a large influence on China-India relations. According to Han, Sino-Indian relations had reached a high point during Premier Wen Jiabao's April 2005 visit to New Delhi, when the two countries had announced six broad principles for reaching a boundary settlement. The bilateral relationship had steadily deteriorated since, due to the expansion of U.S.-India relations. Institutionalized efforts by the United States and India to develop a strategic partnership, and thus increased military interoperability, expanded information-sharing, and the conclusion of a civil nuclear deal, had greatly undermined China's national security. Han explained that her research as the Director of Beijing University's Center for Arms Control and Disarmament had led her to conclude that unless stringent safeguards in implementation of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal were put in place and closely monitored, the civil nuclear deal could provide India with the capability to produce up to 50 nuclear warheads. Han declined to provide further elaboration. Potential for Cooperation -------------- ¶7. (C) Beijing University's Han identified two potential areas for U.S.-PRC-Indian cooperation: joint efforts to protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and counterterrorism cooperation in South and Central Asia. Han asserted that the Indian Navy "strongly opposed" trilateral cooperation in the Indian Ocean. On counterterrorism cooperation, Han expressed confidence that the U.S., India and China could identify common enemies that would prompt increased information-sharing. ¶8. (C) On regional cooperation, Han dismissed the possibility of China-India coordination on Afghanistan and suggested that the United States urge India to reduce its assistance footprint in Afghanistan because Indian involvement in Afghanistan undermined Pakistan's sense of security. Indian EmbOff Kumar likewise downplayed the likelihood of China-India cooperation on Afghanistan. He claimed there was no substantial China-India discussion on Afghanistan outside of annual China-India-Russia Foreign Ministers meetings and other international fora involving China and India where Afghanistan was raised. For India, exchanging views with China on Afghanistan amounted to China merely parroting Pakistan's "paranoia" about Indian involvement in Afghanistan, according to Kumar. HUNTSMAN