LINKAGE BETWEEN DDR AND ELECTIONS COULD SPELL TROUBLE FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000041 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C USUN FOR DMUERS PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD NAIROBI FOR AKARAS AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL INR FOR JPEKKINEN DRL FOR SCRAMPTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT SUBJECT: LINKAGE BETWEEN DDR AND ELECTIONS COULD SPELL TROUBLE FOR THE CAR REF: A. A- 10 BANGUI 29 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. B- 09 BANGUI 157 ¶C. C- 09 BANGUI 237 AND COOK - MAZEL EMAIL 02/04/10 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The 2010 Central African elections and the country's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs are becoming increasingly linked, which could result in serious difficulties for the country in the coming months. The opposition continues seek every opportunity to delay the elections past the June 11 date required by the constitution, and it appears their efforts will likely push the elections past the projected April 18 first round date(Ref A). The DDR program is the victim of competing political interests, and suffered a serious setback on February 9 when teams enacting an information campaign were turned back to Bangui by truculent militia men in the country's troubled north. The opposition, by insisting on the completion of DDR process as a prerequisite for the elections seeks to push Bozize into a constitutional crisis resulting in a power sharing agreement that will placate major donors. The president, though he remains the clear favorite to win the elections, knows that a successful DDR process that results in the enfranchisement of voters in opposition areas may threaten his prospects. Therefore, a devilish catch 22 is developing: hold the elections without the DDR and risk an election that is not representative, or delay the elections and risk an unpredictable constitutional crisis - neither of which is in the interest of the CAR or the USG. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- The Democratic Opposition: Fighting Over Every Issue -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) After President Bozize's heavily publicized attempt to broker a solution between the opposition and the president of the Independent Electoral Commission at the end of January (Ref A),the Collective of Forces for Change - made up of the opposition umbrella organization National Union of Concerned Citizens (UFVN),several members of the non-aligned parties and one politico-military group, won some serious concessions from the President of the IEC and his supporters in the majority. Negotiations under the auspices of the National Mediator to resolve the stalemate resulted in: -- The replacement of the UFVN's members in the IEC: the UFVN and the Army for the Restitution of Democracy (APRD) militia will send new delegates to the IEC Committee (NOTE: The former members, who didn't want to lose their IEC salaries and other perks, refused to obey the parties' demands that they quit the commission. They have since been expelled from their parties. END NOTE.). -- An independent audit of the IEC finances to date, with special attention paid to the IEC President's expenditures. It is yet to be decided who will complete the audit. The opposition demands an audit by an accredited firm while the government insists on using the government's own audit team. -- The appointment of unspecified civil society representatives, who were not previously granted membership in the IEC. -- The local IEC committees unilaterally established - possibly illegally - by the President of the IEC, were annulled. -- Establishment of the Permanent Political Dialogue Framework, recommended by the December 2008 national dialogue but until now opposed by President Bozize. (Comment: This may be an attempt by the opposition to create a framework which would serve as the basis for a transitional government if the elections are not BANGUI 00000041 002 OF 003 held. ¶3. (SBU) UFVN members are hoping to send very high ranking party officials to take their place on the IEC in an effort to have extra influence on the electoral process. However, the negotiators did not reach any agreement on the UFVN's request for cancellation of decrees which appointed new mayors throughout the country (NOTE: Municipal elections were to be held this year, but the president abruptly appointed new mayors in January 2010 and canceled the proposed elections. END NOTE.). In addition, no mention was made of the opposition's ``non negotiable'' demand that the President Binguimale of the IEC resign. The opposition strongly suspects that he has squandered a considerable amount of IEC resources on travel and other things. Opposition representatives said on condition of anonymity that Binguimale's position would be discussed at a later date. ¶4. (SBU) With the first round of the elections scheduled for April 18, each delay paralyzes preparations and kills valuable weeks that are needed to set up the regional IECs, establish voting offices, print ballots, train election workers, etc. The audit is expected to take one to two weeks, at which point, if the auditors discover impropriety, a new debate will rage about the fate of the IEC president. -------------- DDR: Each Side Playing a Dangerous Game -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The DDR process has been much maligned for a lack of direction and because it does not address the root problems of the Central African Republic (Ref B): -- It addresses the fate of 8,000 militia members while ignoring nearly 300,000 internally displaced people and refugees. -- It ignores the challenges of reintegrating people into an economy that barely exists. -- It makes no provision for who will provide law and order once the local militias are demobilized. The Central African Army, with 5,000 soldiers, is incapable of securing the national territory. Still, the UNDP has made significant progress over the last year and stands ready, from a technical standpoint, to start the first two steps of the process. ¶6. (SBU) Unfortunately, both the militias and the government continue to stall the procedure. The largest group the process aims to demobilize is the APRD. Holding sway over two of the most populous prefectures of the CAR - the Ouham and Ouham Pende make up 20 percent of the CAR's population - many observers mistakenly view the APRD's demobilization as the one least fraught with difficulties. The most recent dispute is over the money provided by the government to pay for three months worth of food. The President wants the money to go through the local (CARG-appointed) governors in an effort to enforce their authority. The APRD wants the money distributed uniquely by their representatives. After a week, both sides remain intransigent, and the DDR sensitization team returned to Bangui just four days into a month-long mission. This is symptomatic of BANGUI 00000041 003 OF 003 the deep seeded lack of trust between the two sides that culminates in repeated delays in implementation. -------------- -------------- The Collision between the DDR and the Elections -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Some informed observers worry that the President, knowing that the APRD wants their people to control the funding, is insisting on the local governors' authority because he does not want the DDR to happen at all before the elections. Though he is the odds on favorite to win a second term, the President is thought to be advised by people who would rather see an unrepresentative election than one in which the Ouham and Ouham Pende might turn the vote against him. Some in the opposition, particularly the political head of the APRD, Jean Jacques Demafouth, feel that the militias are a trump card for them going forward. By having an armed force behind them, they may be able to demand further concessions from Bozize in a possible second round of elections or in a government of national unity. ¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: Post suspects that the opposition is playing a game it will have difficulty winning. Though there are examples of Central Africans taking to the streets, the last seven years of Bozize's rule have seen Bangui calmer and safer than at any point since the 1980s, and violence in the populous western half of the country has decreased substantially. Most observers agree that while people recognize Bozize's short comings, the opposition lacks cohesion, message, and charisma. Bozize's ``peace dividend'' is therefore likely to keep people from rallying to the opposition's cause if elections delays push the country into a constitutional crisis. Even France, who as recently as a year ago had taken a hard line with the regime, has significantly softened its stand - a leaked cable from the French Embassy in CAR called Bozize's rule an ``idyllic grain of hope''. This will likely embolden Bozize, who already feels strengthened by the attainment of HIPC debt relief and increased support from international actors like the IMF and China (Ref C),in his dealings with the opposition. END COMMENT. COOK