THAILAND: GT200 BOMB DETECTOR FAILURE IGNITES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000478 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: GT200 BOMB DETECTOR FAILURE IGNITES DISCUSSION ON CIVIL-MIL RELATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, PROCUREMENT BANGKOK 00000478 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva ordered a halt to RTG procurement of the GT200 explosive detection device on February 16, after tests conducted by the Ministry of Science and Technology determined the device was ineffective. The GT200 is used throughout Thailand by many agencies, most notably in the conflict-ridden Deep South. Shortly after the PM's announcement, Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander-in-Chief Anupong Paojinda and chief forensic investigator Khunying Pornthip Rojanasunant jumped to the device's defense, while human rights groups used the PM's announcement to highlight the questionable use of the device to detain alleged insurgents. PM Abhisit subsequently stated the GT200 should not be used against people and ordered a probe into the acquisition of the GT200 by various government agencies, a decision seen by many as being designed to help stamp out corruption in the procurement process. Commentators immediately picked up on the potential for conflict with those who might have vested interests in the continued procurement of the device. ¶2. (C) Comment: Abhisit's willingness to confront the military -- to which many commentators assume he is beholden -- on a procurement issue with operational implications, two areas traditionally seen as military prerogatives, serves as the latest indication of his growing confidence as Prime Minister. The military brass' reluctance to abandon use of the GT200 may be a combination of concern for and by personnel faced with countering an insurgency making extensive use of IEDs that have led to dozens of soldier deaths/injuries, as well as irritation at being challenged on oversight of procurement matters. Khunying Pornthip's defense of the GT200 is more inexplicable, the latest example of her increasingly erratic judgment in recent years. The discussion of the GT200 controversy also highlighted how financing of expanded operations in the restive South has become a cash cow for a wide range of security forces and RTG agencies; many commentators also noted a parallel controversy involving the RTA's persistence in acquiring a still inoperable blimp -- officially intended for surveillance operations, but widely viewed as unsuitable for the terrain and threat in the Deep South -- at a cost of 350 million baht (approximately $11 million). End Summary and Comment. PM CALLS OUT MILITARY ON USE OF GT200 -------------- ¶3. (SBU) PM Abhisit announced the government would not purchase any more of the British-made GT200 substance detection devices on February 16 after testing by the Ministry of Science and Technology found the equipment correctly identified explosives in just four of twenty attempts -- far worse than a random 50-50 flip of a coin would. Criticism of the GT200 came to a crescendo in Thailand in January when the British government banned export of the device after arresting an executive from the manufacturer of another bomb detection device on fraud charges. Abhisit also ordered an investigation into the purchase of the GT200 by various state agencies, following Thai press reports that some agencies had paid more than twice as much for the units as others (note: the first Thai purchases of the GT200 occurred by the Thai Air Force in 2004, when Thaksin Shinawatra was PM). ¶4. (SBU) RTA commander General Anupong and Khunying Pornthip, the director of the Institute of Forensic Science at the Ministry of Justice, led the chorus urging continued use of the GT200 in the immediate wake of Abhisit's decision. Anupong and Pornthip both insisted the GT200 was effective when used by properly trained personnel, and stated flatly that security forces -- in the Deep South in particular -- would continue to use it. Despite such unequivocal support, a bomb exploded in a market in Pattani on February 22, injuring two soldiers, immediately after troops using the GT200 had swept the area and failed to detect any explosives. That same day the Cabinet tasked the Ministry Science and Technology to go to the South and discuss discontinuing use of the GT200 with security units there, taking an additional BANGKOK 00000478 002.2 OF 003 step beyond Abhisit's suspension of further procurement. THE GT200'S TROUBLED PAST - INEFFECTIVE, UNFAIR -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Thai human rights activists and their political allies, including Democrat Party deputy leader/MP Kraisak Choonhavan, have been raising the alarm about the GT200 for months, and had engaged us in mid-2009 to see if there were any way we could share US bad experience with such equipment. Kraisak's primary concern was that innocent civilians were being detained and in some cases charged with assisting insurgent efforts solely based on GT200 readings. Thai media began questioning the effectiveness of the GT200 in Thailand's troubled southern border provinces after the device failed to detect bombs in two separate instances in October 2009, an October 6 explosion that killed one person and wounded 20 others, and an October 19 bomb that wounded 25. ¶6. (C) To most people, the GT200 appears to be a glorified dousing rod: it claims to detect explosives at long range, powered by static electricity from the user, without any more complicated sample analysis conducted. The bomb detection squad in Yala told us that they never thought it worked, but they were ordered to use it. The squad passed the GT200 to Emboff to hold; it looked and felt like a toy. In contrast, the GT200's defenders insist the device was effective when used by properly trained personnel. Failures of the device have been explained away as a byproduct of user error; operators were too tired, sick, fatigued, or otherwise impaired to operate the device properly. ¶7. (C) Srisomphop Jitphiromsri, a professor at Prince of Songkhla University-Pattani, director of Deep South Watch, and a regular Political Section contact, said that the people in the South initially had faith in the GT200. It was used extensively in the security sweeps in late 2007 and early 2008 that led to a significant reduction in insurgent-related violence, he said. According to Srisomphop, that confidence waned as judges dismissed court cases because they considered the GT200 evidence unreliable; public support for the GT200 bottomed out with the October 2009 Sungai Kolok and Muang explosions. The RTA's current defense of the GT200 had become a joke in the South, Srisomphop claimed, as everyone knew now that the tool was useless. Prince of Songkhla University-Hat Yai professor Zakee Pitakkumpol, a Thai Muslim, told us that he had been detained at a security checkpoint because a GT200 pointed at his car. ¶8. (SBU) Advocates for greater transparency and human rights in the Deep South have criticized security forces for using the GT200 to detain people in connection with the insurgency. Angkhana Neelapaijit, head of the Working Group on Justice for Peace, and Human Right Watch have both called on the government to compensate the people who have been wrongly identified as insurgents and detained because of the GT200. According to a February 17 report by Human Rights Watch, approximately 10 percent of suspected insurgents arrested since 2007 have been detained solely on the basis of a GT200 reading. HARSH LIGHT ON PROCUREMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) PM Abhisit's insistence on a probe into the purchase of the GT200 also raised suspicions of corruption in the procurement process, a problem that has plagued multiple administrations. There are currently over 800 GT200 units being used in Thailand by the military, the police, the Customs Department, and the Central Institute of Forensic Science. The first purchases occurred under former PM Thaksin and continued under the interim Surayud administration and through to the current Abhisit administrations. Thai news reports indicated that some government agencies paid 550,000 thousand baht (approx. $16,000) apiece for the machines, while others paid up to 1.6 million baht (approx. $48,000) per unit, with Khunying Porntip's lab paying the highest price; agencies involved claimed differing prices were due to different chips that are BANGKOK 00000478 003.2 OF 003 inserted into the GT200 to detect a variety of different substances. Both media and the political opposition have called for investigations into the procurement deals. ¶10. (SBU) Criticism of the GT200 coincided with increasing public calls for the RTA to justify the purchase of a surveillance blimp which the RTA claims would be an effective tool in locating insurgents in the Deep South, but which critics say cannot accomplish the stated task given the terrain in question and the technical capabilities of the airship. The Thai media has widely reported that the blimp cost 350 million baht (approximately $11 million); the vice-president of Arai International, the US-based company which sold the system to the RTA, wrote a letter to the editor of the Bangkok Post and said the contracted price was $9.7 million (approx. 320 million baht). JOHN