ADMIRAL WILLARD'S VISIT TO THAILAND: POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000414 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF TH SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLARD'S VISIT TO THAILAND: POLITICAL PROGRESS EXPECTED Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. During U.S. Pacific Command Commander Admiral Robert Willard's February 2-7 visit to Thailand in conjunction with the multilateral Cobra Gold exercise, Thai officials and political commentators expressed optimism that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva would be able to effectively address domestic political conflict, and would do well in elections that must be held by the end of 2011. Panitan Wattanayagorn, Deputy Secretary General for Security Issues for Prime Minister Abhisit, said that the RTG would like to lessen the internal security role of the Thai Army and increase the relative influence of the Air Force and Navy, but border concerns and domestic political challenges made it necessary for now to maintain a strong role for the Army. End summary. ¶2. (C) During the February 2-7 visit, Admiral Willard and the Ambassador met with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, and Royal Thai Armed Chief of Defense Forces General Songkitti Jaggabatra. In addition, Admiral Willard and the Ambassador engaged Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander General Anupong Paojinda and RTA Deputy Commander General Prayuth Chan-ocha, Deputy Secretary General for Prime Minister Abhisit and Acting RTG Spokesperson Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, CP Group Executive Vice President and former high-ranking Thai diplomat Dr. Sarasin Viraphol, and Assistant Group Editor of the Nation Multimedia Group Kavi Chongkittavorn. SECURITY PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE PROTESTS -------------- Q.@cQ fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra would fade over the year. During a February 5 meeting with Admiral Willard and the Ambassador at Government House, PM Abhisit said it was a busy time for his government, with internal distractions that included economic, social, and political difficulties. That said, the RTG was working hard to overcome these challenges so that Thailand could become an anchor of stability in Southeast Asia. ¶4. (C) Separately February 5, Admiral Willard raised with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan the planned February 26 reading of the verdict in the court case of Thaksin's 76 billion baht ($2.2 billion) in frozen assets, and asked for Prawit's views on predictions that red-shirt protests could turn violent. Prawit said that the RTG was committed to maintaining security and stability, but would use force only as a last resort. In the meantime, the Abhisit government was endeavoring to increase the Thai public's understanding of the case, particularly with the "silent majority" that wanted the nation to move beyond the yellow and red protests. ¶5. (C) Dr. Panitan told Admiral Willard during a February 5 coffee hosted by the Ambassador that the court case came as the Thai public was moving from political non-participation to a much more active role. This made governing more challenging, but the RTG was focused for now on defusing political problems in Bangkok associated with the upcoming verdict. PM Abhisit would focus on outreach to rural areas later this year, Panitan predicted, and Abhisit's efforts were expected to be helped by an improving economy. ¶6. (C) Kavi Chongkittavorn, Assistant Group Editor of the Nation Multimedia Group, added during the coffee that the RtQV|C1Qty challenge would be successfully handled by the Abhisit administration, after which the government would turn its focus to improving the BANGKOK 00000414 002 OF 002 situation in the South. PREDICTION THAT ABHISIT WILL STAY LONGER -------------- ¶7. (C) Kavi told Admiral Willard that he believed PM Abhisit had been very impressive in office. Abhisit was a new breed of Thai politician: intelligent; liked to multi-task; and enjoyed tackling difficult challenges. While most Thai journalists did not look kindly on Abhisit, due to the Prime Minister maintaining higher standards of personal conduct than past Thai leaders (including vis-a-vis journalists themselves),Kavi insisted that the Thai leader was right for Thailand, as he provided for stability that other politicians were incapable of maintaining. Stability was important as Thailand moved towards transitions, such as royal succession, therefore Kavi expected Abhisit to remain in office for the foreseeable future. Kavi predicted Abhisit's Democrat Party would do well in the next election -- to be held by the end of 2011 -- and would be able to form the next government. ¶8. (C) Kavi told Admiral Willard that the Thai Army firmly supported Abhisit, both because he was better suited to maintain stability than other politicians, and because the Prime Minister gave clear orders and was willing to accept responsibility for the consequences for the orders. That said, Kavi admitted that in order for Abhisit to solidify his standing, he would need to learn how to better reach out to rural Thais, particularly those from the Northeast who were the primary supporters of Thaksin and the red-shirt movement. FUTURE ROLE OF THE THAI MILITARY -------------- ¶9. (C) Panitan told Admiral Willard that the RTG eventually would like to move the Royal Thai Army (RTA) away from a domestic security role, but that the limited crowd and riot control capabilities of the Royal Thai Police (RTP) made achieving this goal difficult and long-term. Panitan reviewed for Admiral Willard the internal Thai government deliberations during the April 2009 redshirt riots in Pattaya and Bangkok, and stressed that it had become very clear to the Thai government that the RTP was incapable of maintaining domestic security. As such, PM Abhisit was forced to turn to the RTA to counter the red-shirt protesters and to preserve security in Bangkok. According to Panitan, the Army had told Abhisit that they were willing to leave the barracks for this purpose, but that the PM would need to make clear that this had been a government decision. Abhisit readily agreed to take responsibility for this action. ¶10. (C) In response to Admiral Willard's question about the relative influence and power among the Thai armed services, Panitan said it would be ideal to enhance the role of the Thai Air Force and Navy. However, border concerns and domestic security priorities made it imperative for the time being that the Thai Army remained foremost among the armed services. ¶11. (C) That said, Panitan said the Abhisit administration Q ~ations Command (ISOC). (Note: ISOC has become the lead mechanism for implementation of the Internal Security Act, which has been the primary avenue for efforts to maintain security in the South, Bangkok, and other areas. End note.) Providing ISOC with more civilians would hopefully lead to a lesser military role in maintaining internal security. Panitan also remarked that modernizing RTAF equipment was difficult due to budget constraints. Admiral Willard suggested to Panitan that considering budget constraints, a strategic approach to procurements would be helpful. Full participation in the Defense Resource Management Study was one avenue to assist such an approach. ¶12. (U) Admiral Willard cleared this cable. JOHN