DAS MARCIEL ENGAGES THAI LEADERS ON BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000381

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SMIG TH
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL ENGAGES THAI LEADERS ON BILATERAL
ISSUES, CAMBODIA, REFUGEE POLICY, REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE,
AND BURMA

REF: A. BANGKOK 344 (THAI-CAMBODIA)

B. BANGKOK 362 (DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS)

Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. EAP DAS and Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs
Scot Marciel engaged the Thai MFA PermSec and PM deputy
SecGen, as well as several prominent Thai thinkers, on key
regional and bilateral issues during his February 10 visit to
Bangkok. Issues included regional architecture, U.S.-Thai
relations, Burma, Thai-Cambodia relations, and Thai refugee
policy. DAS Marciel discussed U.S. engagement in the East
Asia Summit (EAS) as one way to enhance U.S. engagement in
Asia; PermSec Theerakul supported increased U.S. engagement
in Thailand and the region. On Burma's 2010 elections,
possibly to occur in May, both sides agreed that such an
early date left little room for free and transparent
elections based on dialogue with opposition and ethnic
groups. RTG officials noted that they had encouraged Burma
to engage with opposition groups; patience was necessary when
engaging with Burma. DAS Marciel stressed that even with the
Obama administration modified policy approach, Burma would
have to make some positive steps before the U.S. could
consider removing sanctions.


2. (C) Summary, cont: DAS Marciel raised U.S. concerns about
Thai handling of the Lao Hmong and Karen repatriations, and
warned that if Thailand again forcibly repatriated displaced
persons, it would lead to a strong reaction from the U.S.
MFA PermSec Theerakul and PM deputy Sec-Gen Panitan both
denied that the recent attempt to return displaced Karen to
Burma would have been involuntary, but noted plans were in
motion to send independent observers to the camp to interview
the refugees directly. Panitan and other interlocutors at a
group working lunch were very much focused on the state of
Thai-Cambodian relations in the wake of Hun Sen's latest
rhetorical attack against Thai PM Abhisit. End summary.

U.S.-THAI RELATIONSHIP OVERLOOKED BUT STILL PRODUCTIVE
-------------- --------------


3. (C) DAS Marciel, MFA PermSec Theerakul, and the DCM
engaged in a candid conversation about how to enhance the
U.S.-Thai bilateral relationship February 10. DAS Marciel
acknowledged that the U.S.-Thai relationship was occasionally
overlooked and that the two nations needed to remind their
publics of the strong bonds and long-standing cooperation.
He posed the possibility of the U.S. becoming involved in the
East Asia Summit (EAS) process as one way to enhance regional
engagement. PermSec Theerakul replied that Thailand would
likely support U.S. participation in the EAS but would need
to consult with the other ASEAN nations.


4. (C) PermSec Theerakul believed that increasing
opportunities for exchanges, official and informal, between
the two nations could also enhance the U.S.-Thai
relationship. He expressed PM Abhisit's interest in making
an official visit to the U.S. in 2010, and his hope that
President Obama would visit Thailand as well. FM Kasit
wanted to participate directly in the still-to-be-scheduled
Strategic Dialogue with A/S Kurt Campbell. Theerakul noted
that it seemed fewer Thai students were going to the U.S. to
study than in the past, and he hoped that we might work
together to address this in order to strengthen people-people
connectivity.


5. (C) The DCM highlighted Thailand's December seizure of
North Korean weapons at the Don Muang airport as an example
of how well the two nations work together on high profile
policy priorities. He noted that the USG would continue to
work with Thailand to ensure that they met the UNSCR 1874
obligation to dispose of the weapons. The DCM also informed
Theerakul that the upcoming unsealing of a second indictment
against Viktor Bout would result in a second extradition
request to Thailand (previously previewed to working-level
MFA and Office of the Attorney-General staff).

BURMA ELECTIONS, IF IN MAY, LEAVE LITTLE HOPE FOR LEGITIMACY
-------------- --------------


BANGKOK 00000381 002 OF 004



6. (C) DAS Marciel shared that he had received word from
senior Cambodian officials that Burma's elections would most
likely be held in May. He expressed alarm that such an early
date left little hope for a credible and free process, adding
that an election in Burma that was neither free nor fair
could put ASEAN in a difficult position. PermSec Theerakul
said the Thai Embassy in Rangoon had reported the same about
the May date and that he believed that the junta was serious
in its intentions to hold an election. He shared the worry,
however, that the "groundwork is not there" for a free and
fair election. The PermSec further noted that Thailand - as
the Chair of ASEAN in 2009 - had pushed the GOB to open
dialogue with the opposition in order to move towards
becoming a more democratic society. That said, expectations
should not be high for change in Burma, considering the
nation had been a closed society for over fifty years.


7. (C) DAS Marciel emphasized that the USG had modified its
approach to Burma under the Obama administration, but that
Burma still needed to take steps in the right direction. The
USG would like to see that some steps are made - no matter
how small - towards democracy. With such progress, the USG
could consider reducing sanctions in response.
Unfortunately, Burma had made no attempts yet to reach out to
the opposition parties or ethnic groups, DAS Marciel said.
In a separate group lunch, PM deputy SecGen and Acting
Government Spokesman Panitan shared DAS Marciel's concerns
about May elections prior to progress on dialogue. While PM
Abhisit had been hoping to travel to Burma for over a year,
he had made meeting Aung Sang Suu Kyi a precondition.
Elections in May would not allow time for sufficient
progress, Panitan commented, and probably push any Abhisit
trip to the second half of the year.

CONCERNS OVER FORCED REPATRIATIONS: HMONG AND KAREN
-------------- --------------


8. (C) DAS Marciel shared his concerns in both meetings
about the February 5 attempt to involuntarily repatriate
displaced Karen back to Burma (note: 3 families/12
individuals were returned before further operations were
suspended after U.S. officials intervened. End note). In
particular, many were concerned about the potential loss of
life due to landmines in the Karen villages in Burma. DAS
Marciel noted previous USG advocacy by the Ambassador and
others (including Admiral Willard) and strongly urged PermSec
Theerakul and Panitan to move forward carefully on this
issue, as both the U.S. Administration and Congress was
following closely and would react strongly to involuntary
Karen returns in the wake of the December Hmong repatriation.
Even though the reports so far on the treatment of the
returned Hmong in Laos had been encouraging in some regards,
the lack of transparency in the return had sparked concern in
Washington, Marciel reported.


9. (C) Panitan expressed concern about the damage refugee
policy issues could cause to the U.S.-Thai relationship, but
stressed that Thailand was acting on principles. On the
Hmong, the RTG had been obligated to work with Laos on the
return of the Hmong but would follow up on adherence to their
promises of fair treatment and international access back in
Laos; the Thai military would make a visit in the second half
of February to a resettlement site to check on the situation.
DAS Marciel confirmed that Lao officials had informed him of
those plans during his recent discussions in Vientiane.


10. (C) Regarding the Karen, PermSec Theerakul insisted that
the recent efforts to repatriate Karen were voluntary. He
believed it was the RTG's responsibility to support their
wishes to return, and to provide security to them if they
alternately wished to stay. The MFA did not want local
military officers making decisions on returns because of the
potential consequences to the Karen as well as to Thailand.
Panitan reconfirmed that the return had been put on hold and
that the RTG would be inviting observers to talk to the
displaced Karen.


11. (C) Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk, in the same lunch
meeting as Panitan, took issue with the RTG views, predicting
that the Royal Thai Army (RTA) would continue to seek to send

BANGKOK 00000381 003 OF 004


the Karen back. Sunai expressed concern that Thai civilian
officials seemed to be accepting military accusations that
NGOs and even UNHCR representatives were lobbying the
displaced Karen against return. Both Sunai and Democrat
Party MP Kraisak Choonhavan, a long-time Burma activist, told
Panitan that he and PM Abhisit needed to expand their sources
of information on the issue.

THAI-CAMBODIA RELATIONS: TORTURED HISTORY
--------------


12. (SBU) In the wake of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's
harsh statements against PM Abhisit (ref A),Thai-Cambodia
relations were discussed extensively in the meetings.
PermSec Theerakul expressed concern that Hun Sen's recent
statements regarding Abhisit would make it difficult to move
toward a resolution of outstanding border issues between the
two nations.


13. (C) Panitan suggested Hun Sen's increasing malevolence
towards the RTG might stem from personal resentment toward PM
Abhisit, the influence of fugitive former PM Thaksin, or
perhaps fatigue over dealing with a multitude of new Thai
administrations over the years. Panitan stated candidly that
he understood Hun Sen's frustration with Thailand's
frequently changing governments and bureaucratic procedures,
making resolution of bilateral issues much more difficult.
When there were discussions of prisoner exchanges in early
2009, Hun Sen delivered on the return of several Thai "within
48 hours"; the counterpart Thai judicial review of 3
Cambodian incarcerations is still ongoing months later.
Panitan expressed the RTG's intention to continue to work
with Hun Sen towards a resolution of border
disputes/demarcation and to be patient; PM Abhisit had
intentionally not responded publicly to Hun Sen's outburst.
The Thai and Cambodian regional commanders maintained good
relations, which is important for managing incidents calmly.


14. (C) Kraisak, who helped dramatically reorient Thai policy
towards Cambodia during his father Chatchai's 1988-91 stint
as PM, stated that both Thailand and Cambodia were guilty of
manipulating the conflict for nationalistic purposes, and
that the contentious history of recent decades continued to
affect bilateral relations. To be fair to Hun Sen, Thailand
had spent the 1980s funding the joint Cambodian resistance
seeking to oust his Vietnamese-backed regime from power, and
Thailand's cultural soft power, through TV soaps and radio
programming, was significant in Cambodia. Even Thaksin and
Hun Sen had a complicated history; Thaksin had been PM in
2003 when Hun Sen instigated the xenophobic burning of the
Thai embassy and 38 Thai-owned businesses in Cambodia.
Kraisak alleged that Thaksin bought Hun Sen's cooperation at
a 2004 summit in which he made a $125 million donation to Hun
Sen, but the subsequent Hun Sen pledge to compensate the Thai
companies for their losses had never been fulfilled.


15. (C) Kraisak felt the ultimate shared benefits that could
overcome the mutual animosity lay in a Joint Development
Arrangement (JDA) for disputed maritime areas in the Gulf of
Thailand, akin to the very successful Thai-Malaysian JDA from
the late 1990s. Kraisak faulted successive Thai governments
for not being more flexible in negotiating with Hun Sen,
suggesting that, like Australia's JDA with East Timor,
Thailand would ultimately benefit from the lion's share of
on-shore value-added refinery business.


15. (C) DAS Marciel hoped that the RTG would work with
Cambodia to resolve the issue rather than allow it to reach a
point where the international community felt compelled to
intervene. He also suggested Thailand explore ways to
publicize collaboration - whether government-led or not -
between the two nations on other issues in order to build
trust. Kraisak mentioned the educational initiatives
launched by Princess Sirindhorn in Cambodia; Panitan
confirmed that the most recent Thai Cabinet meeting had
agreed to expand funding for her Cambodian initiative, and
also noted the ongoing Thai program to legalize 150,000
Cambodian (and other) illegal migrants working in Thailand.
All Thai interlocutors agreed that the conflict building
between the two nations could have negative implications for

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both countries and the region.


16. (U) DAS Marciel did not clear this message.
JOHN