THAILAND: AMBASSADOR MEETS FORMER PRIME MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000319 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR MEETS FORMER PRIME MINISTER BANHARN SILPA-ARCHA, DISCUSSES 2010 POLITICAL WAY AHEAD REF: A. BANGKOK 287 (KING RESUMES VISIBLE ROLE) ¶B. BANGKOK 281 (COALITION PARTNERS SUBMIT PROPOSAL) BANGKOK 00000319 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with former Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa on February 4 at Chart Thai Pattana party headquarters to review the latest political developments. Countering much press speculation, Banharn told the Ambassador he never expected the Democrat party to endorse the constitutional amendment initiative (REF B) and said the disagreement over the proposal would not affect the stability of the coalition. Banharn expressed worry that the government may have "backed Thaksin into a corner" and "gone too far." Banharn suggested King Bhumibol -- who seemed to be in much better health -- may have reached the same conclusion, as many believed His Majesty's recent exhortations to two separate groups of judges (REF A) included a plea for the legal system to show Thaksin leniency in the former PM's pending frozen assets case. Ideally, Banharn said the RTG would begin to soften its position on Thaksin in an effort to move towards reconciliation, though he characterized that possibility as unlikely. ¶2. (C) Comment: Banharn came across as being as relaxed and sure of himself as ever, despite his December 2008 five-year ban from politics due to election violations (Note: his brother now formally heads the CTP party, though Banharn still calls the shots. End Note.) If Thaksin and Puea Thai hope to have any chance of dissolving the government through parliamentary maneuverings, flipping Banharn and his CTP party would form the heart of any successful strategy. If Banharn is to be taken at his word, however, it would appear Puea Thai's no confidence motion has only limited prospects for success. Banharn's interpretation of the King's recent comments to judges is not authoritative; Bhumibol's Delphic-like pronouncements can nearly always be read in different, even opposing ways by those seeking political import or advantage. End Summary and Comment. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PUSH -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador began the February 4 meeting by asking Banharn about the Democrat party's refusal to support a constitutional amendment push. Banharn told the Ambassador that although he knew the initiative was doomed from the start, he decided to move forward anyway in an effort to see whether the Democrat party would be willing to make some concessions towards the smaller parties in the coalition. Banharn claimed to the Ambassador that the current Constitution was crafted for the sole purpose of making life difficult for former PM Thaksin, who nevertheless still did as he pleased, and that it needed to be replaced or revised. Banharn asserted that the 1997 Constitution would be far superior to the current version. ¶4. (C) When the Ambassador asked Banharn to explain the fundamental differences between his and Democrat views on changing the constitution, Banharn said that it boiled down to a difference of opinion on single seat parliamentary constituencies. Banharn claimed that while moving from multi-seat to single seat districts would have little to no practical effect on his party's prospects moving forward, the real issue was making MPs more accountable to their constituencies. Banharn argued that the current system, in which multiple MPs represented the same electoral district, made it difficult for even the most discerning voter to understand who truly represented them. (Note: such a principled explanation rarely animates the political decisions of small parties in Thailand. It is more likely Banharn and CTP have concluded they could be more successful, and spend less in an electoral campaign, with single-member districts. End Note.) BANGKOK 00000319 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Banharn said that the Democrats, on the other hand, believed that elections for single seat districts, in which two candidates competed for one seat, were far too easily corrupted by money politics. The Democrats also believed that elections for multi-seat districts were superior than the ones for single seat districts because they were cheaper and easier to manage for both the RTG and the parties involved. Banharn also believed the Democrats stood to win more seats with the current multi-seat format, and therefore were disinclined ever to support the return to single district seats. Banharn said the coalition had decided to table the proposal anyway, and would see what happened. ¶6. (C) On the question of whether PM Abhisit and the Democrat party would ever be willing to consider changes to Article 237 in the Constitution, which was used to ban political parties such as pro-Thaksin PPP and his own former Chat Thai party, Banharn suggested that it was unlikely. According to Banharn, the Democrat party, not to mention CTP and other coalition members, had concerns any such effort would be viewed negatively by those close to the monarchy. GOVERNMENT STABILITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to the subject of government stability, the Ambassador asked Banharn whether this disagreement on the Constitution would lead to fissures in the coalition. Banharn stated unequivocally that it would not, and said that the small coalition parties were in for the long haul. In Banharn's mind, the greatest impediment to the longevity of the government was the Democrat party itself, which Banharn suggested ran the risk of "tripping over itself." The coalition partners, which he suggested he could speak for as their de facto leader, would not end the government themselves. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted that PM Abhisit, by parceling out cabinet positions on the one hand, but toeing the line on the constitutional amendment push on the other, had done a reasonably good job of balancing national and party interests with those of his coalition partners. Banharn replied that if Abhisit had not handed out the cabinet positions: "he would still be in the opposition." Asked if Banharn and the CTP could therefore just pick up and switch their allegiance to Puea Thai, provided they could retain their cabinet portfolios, Banharn told the Ambassador that it would be "very difficult." without elaborating why. THAKSIN -------------- ¶9. (C) Banharn told the Ambassador that while he considered former PM Thaksin a friend, he viewed him as utterly unpredictable. He speculated that Thaksin -- with whom he had not spoken in a long time -- was probably even more unpredictable than ever, now that the RTG had "backed him into a corner." As with anyone in this situation, this made Thaksin potentially dangerous, and Banharn said he wished the RTG would adopt a more flexible and compromising approach vis a vis Thaksin. By sticking to the letter of the law and remaining so strident in its dealing with Thaksin, the RTG had eliminated any possibility for reconciliation. Now both parties had gone "beyond the point of no return." ¶10. (C) When the Ambassador asked Banharn for his prescription for dealing with this problem, Banharn conceded that there was no one with the requisite stature and reputation for impartiality to successfully negotiate between both sides. Thaksin and the RTG had both drawn a line in the sand on the question of Thaksin serving time in jail. In Banharn's mind, any successful compromise would have to be predicated on the idea of putting this issue aside to start. In any case, Banharn emphasized that Thaksin's periodic comments to the press stating that he was out of politics for good were laughable. Thaksin was a political animal and BANGKOK 00000319 003.2 OF 003 would always seek to find a way back into the game, a fact that helped explain why the RTG was so nervous. THAKSIN'S ASSETS -------------- ¶11. (C) Banharn told the Ambassador that February 26, the day of the Thaksin assets case verdict, could represent the next flash point in the red-yellow saga. Banharn and the Ambassador both noted that Thaksin already had 35-40 percent of the 76 billion baht in assets currently frozen by the RTG in the bank when he became PM. Given that fact, Banharn believed that if the court decision stripped him of everything, this could provoke a strong reaction from Thaksin. Banharn suggested that even the King had reached the same conclusion about the perils of taking all of Thaksin's frozen assets, pointing to recent public comments to two separate groups of judges that "even criminals deserve justice," a line that many had interpreted as a signal to allow Thaksin to keep a portion of his money. ¶12. (C) On balance, especially given the King's recent remarks, Banharn believed Thaksin could stand a chance of recovering a portion, though not all, of his assets on February 26. Regardless of the outcome, Banharn believed Thaksin had other resources at his disposal, meaning the verdict did not represent a make or break proposition for him. THE KING'S HEALTH -------------- ¶13. (C) When the Ambassador asked Banharn for his thoughts on the King's health, Banharn said that the King appeared to be doing much better, noting that he delivered his two most recent public speeches off the cuff and without the halting, subdued speech that marked his birthday address last December (Ref A). By all accounts, he appeared on the road to recovery. ¶14. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about the King's continued hospitalization, Banharn suggested that -- despite the King's remarkable improvement -- His Majesty's medical team had urged him to remain at Siriraj hospital until he was fully recovered. Returning to the Palace would introduce major logistical issues for his medical team, beginning with the fact that the doctors would be separated from the King by one floor, which would unnecessarily complicate his full and speedy recovery. JOHN