Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAMAKO66
2010-02-03 08:18:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

MALI RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST: 2009 REPORT

Tags:  ELAB EIND KTIP PHUM SOCI SIPDIS USAID ML 
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VZCZCXRO4950
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0066/01 0340818
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030818Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1099
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BAMAKO 000066 

SIPDIS

DOL/ILAB FOR LEYLA STROTKAMP, RACHEL RIGBY, AND TINA
MCCARTER
DRL/ILCSR FOR SARAH MORGAN
G/TIP FOR LUIS CDEBACA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ELAB EIND KTIP PHUM SOCI SIPDIS USAID ML
SUBJECT: MALI RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST: 2009 REPORT
ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR

REF: A. 09 SECSTATE 131995

B. 08 BAMAKO 488

C. 09 BAMAKO 009

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BAMAKO 000066 SIPDIS DOL/ILAB FOR LEYLA STROTKAMP, RACHEL RIGBY, AND TINA MCCARTER DRL/ILCSR FOR SARAH MORGAN G/TIP FOR LUIS CDEBACA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB EIND KTIP PHUM SOCI SIPDIS USAID ML SUBJECT: MALI RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST: 2009 REPORT ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR REF: A. 09 SECSTATE 131995 ¶B. 08 BAMAKO 488 ¶C. 09 BAMAKO 009 ¶1. This cable responds to Reftel A requests for information on child labor and forced labor for DOL congressional reporting requirements. Tasking 1 / TVPRA ¶2. The following answers, keyed toquestions in paragraph 15 of 2009 State 131995, are provided below: 1A) GOOD: As per paragraph 14 of Reftel A, post has no information pertaining to goods not already named on the current TVPRA list or discussed in Reftel B. 1B) TYPE OF EXPLOITATION: As per paragraph 13 in Reftel A, post has no new information pertaining to the type of exploitation described in Reftel B. The labor practices described in Reftel B are exploitive child labor due to the hazardous nature of the labor. 1C) SOURCES OF INFORMATION: In addition to the sources listed in Reftel B, post has obtained information concerning exploitive child labor from the director of TBP-Mali, a DOL/ILO project to address child labor in Mali, the director of the Malian National Office Against Child Labor, a project officer at the United Nation's Children Fund, and a provisional report entitled "Understanding Children's Work in Mali," a joint publication by the ILO, UNICEF, and the World Bank Group issued in October 2008. 1D) NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION: As per paragraph 13 in Reftel A, post has no new information concerning conditions of labor. 1E) PREVALENCE: Post has no information beyond that reported in Reftel C, section E. 1F) HOST GOVERNMENT/AUTHORITIES, INDUSTRY OR NGO EFFORTS: On February 4, 2009, Mali's Ministry of Labor published a list of the "worst forms of child labor" prohibited for those under the age of 18. The list expanded upon certain activities that had already been banned for those under the age of 18 pursuant to a government decree dating from 1996. The new list of hazardous work includes a variety of jobs in the agricultural domain, as well as eight enumerated tasks common in the mining industry. In 2009, TBP-Mali, a 3.5 million USD DOL/ILO project described in Reftel C, ended a few months sooner than anticipated due to funding shortfalls. TBP-Mali had worked with the Malian Ministry of Labor on enumerating the lis
t of "worst forms of child labor" mentioned above, and had promoted community-based awareness campaigns to decrease child exploitation. TBP-Mali was able to amass statistical data concerning individual children rescued from exploitive labor through its efforts. Tasking 2 / TDA ¶3. The following answers, keyed toquestions in paragraph 21 of 2009 State 131995, are provided below: 2A) PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITIVE CHILD LABOR: Of 1.8 million economically active children in Mali between ages 5 and 17, approximately 10 percent, or 180,000, are employed as domestic servants. Domestic service is by far the most prevalent sector of child labor not related to the production of goods. In certain parts of Mali, relationships of hereditary slavery/servitude exist, resulting in forced child labor. In addition, children are frequently forced to beg on the streets by Koranic masters to whom their parents have entrusted them. Child prostitution exists, although there are not reliable figures upon which to estimate its prevalence. During the reporting period, the Malian government collected data on child labor, and publication of that data is anticipated as part of the process of developing a new National Action Plan to Eliminate Child Labor. The data collection has been performed by the Ministry for the Advancement of Women and Children in conjunction with the National Statistics Directorate. Post anticipates that the Ministry will be willing to share data with DOL once the data is published. 2B) LAWS AND REGULATIONS: There were no new laws adopted in 2009 pertaining to curtailing exploitive child labor. The Ministry of Labor finalized a list of the "worst forms of child labor" as required by Mali's obligations under international labor treaties. As a general matter, Mali's legal framework is adequate, but enforcement of legal standards is lacking. In certain areas, however, Mali's legal framework leaves a gap. For example, the Criminal Code does not have a provision directly pertaining to child prostitution. Child prostitutes are frequently taken into custody by the Malian Morals Brigade of the National Police, BAMAKO 00000066 002 OF 006 but are released without the necessary support and follow-up to provide a means to escape permanently from their exploitation. Similarly, although slavery is not legally recognized, there is no provision in the law that explicitly criminalizes it. This limits the legal options of children caught in relationships of hereditary servitude. Most importantly, there are no laws specifically pertaining to child labor in the informal sector, including agriculture, domestic service, and petty commerce. ILO has also noted that most Malian laws on the subject of child labor are prescriptive in nature, prohibiting undesirable behavior but without providing alternatives for families driven by poverty to use child labor. 2C1) INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT -- HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR 2C) - 1: HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: Responsibility for enforcement of child labor laws rests with the Ministry of the Promotion of Women, Children, and the Family; the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Internal Security through its Morals Brigade of the National Police; the National Social Security Institute (INPS) through its health service; and the Ministry of Labor. 2C) - 2: HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: Mechanisms exist through a panoply of interagency commissions and committees set up, including the National Program Against Child Labor (PNLTE), the Project Against Child Trafficking (LUTRENA),the Support Project for TBP-Mali, and the Project Against Child Labor through Education (TACKLE). In addition, there is a National Committee Director charged with coordinating the actions of the various ministries and committees in relation to the National Action Plan. The mechanisms for exchanging information have proven counterproductive, as the multiplication of commissions, committees, programs, and projects have made the entire system inefficient and cumbersome. 2C) - 3. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: The Ministry of Labor accepts complaints for all forms of labor violations, including child labor. The number of complaints received during the reporting period pertaining to child labor was not made available to post. 2C) - 4. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: The funding for Ministry of Labor inspections is inadequate, and there are no funds specifically earmarked to target child labor. Instead, the Ministry of Labor has one budget for inspections of all labor code violations, and this has proven to allow only cursory oversight. Inspectors are underpaid, and the most experienced inspectors often leave the Ministry of Labor to pursue work elsewhere. The legislation authorizing inspections by the Ministry of Labor is only applicable to the formal sector, thus, inspectors have no jurisdiction over the vast majority of child labor in Mali. 2C) - 5. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: In 2009, the Ministry of Labor employed 52 inspectors. This number is inadequate, although an improvement from recent years (in 2007, post reported there were only eight inspectors). 2C) - 6. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: At least one inspection was carried out during the reporting period. An inspection of a restaurant/bar in Bamako's Commune III revealed eight under-aged girls working as prostitutes. 2C) - 7. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: The eight under-aged girls working as prostitutes in a Bamako bar were placed in the care of the NGOs APAF/Moussa Dambe and Kanaso, which specializes in assisting prostitutes. 2C) - 8. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: Unknown. The bar identified above was charged a fine. 2C) - 9. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: Unknown. 2C) - 10. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: Unknown. 2C) - 11. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: N/A. 2C) - 12. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: The bar at which the eight under-aged girls were discovered working as prostitutes was assessed a fine, and the owners of the bar paid. The criminal code does not specifically address child prostitution, although "pimping" is severely punishable. The proportionality of the fine assessed to the penalties prescribed by law depends on what information the inspectors had in their possession. Post does not know if the bar owners were "pimping" the prostitutes or merely allowing them to work there. 2C) - 13. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: The Malian government is sincere in its desire to combat child labor, although the inspections discussed in questions 7-10 above are not necessarily proof of that commitment as they were random in nature and too infrequent to be effective. 2C) - 14. HAZARDOUS CHILD LABOR: The Malian government, through ILO, offers its inspectors the opportunity to attend numerous trainings. In 2009, there were four in-country BAMAKO 00000066 003 OF 006 trainings. In addition, inspectors are sent to CRADET, a training center in Cameroon for Francophone labor inspectors, and the International Training Center in Turin, Italy. These trainings have had a negative impact overall, because once trained, inspectors use their new qualifications to seek higher-paid work outside of the Ministry of Labor. One Embassy source indicated it was unusual for anyone returned from training at CRADET to still be at the Ministry of Labor one year later. 2C) INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT -- FORCED CHILD LABOR 2C) - 1. FORCED CHILD LABOR: Responsibility for enforcement of child labor laws rests with the Ministry of the Promotion of Women, Children, and the Family, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Internal Security through its Morals Brigade of the National Police, the National Social Security Institute (INPS) through its health service, and the Ministry of Labor. 2C) - 2. FORCED CHILD LABOR: Mechanisms for exchanging information exist through a panoply of interagency commissions and committees set up, including the National Program Against Child Labor (PNLTE),the Project Against Child Trafficking (LUTRENA),the Support Project for TBP-Mali, and the Project Against Child Labor through Education (TACKLE). In addition, there is a National Committee Director charged with coordinating the actions of the various ministries and committees in relation to the National Action Plan. The mechanisms for exchanging information have proven counterproductive, as the multiplication of commissions, committees, programs, and projects have made the entire system inefficient and cumbersome. 2C) - 3. FORCED CHILD LABOR: The Ministry of Labor accepts complaints for all forms of labor violations, including child labor. The number of complaints received during the reporting period pertaining to child labor was not made available to post. 2C) - 4. FORCED CHILD LABOR: The funding for Ministry of Labor inspections is not adequate, and there are no funds specifically earmarked to target child labor. Instead, the Ministry of Labor has one budget for inspections of all labor code violations, and this has proven to allow only the most cursory oversight. Moreover, inspectors are woefully underpaid, and the most experienced inspectors leave the Ministry of Labor to pursue work elsewhere. 2C) - 5. FORCED CHILD LABOR: In 2009, the Ministry of Labor employed 52 inspectors. This number is inadequate, although a dramatic improvement from recent years (in 2007, post reported there were only eight inspectors). 2C) - 6. FORCED CHILD LABOR: None dealing with forced child labor. 2C) - 7. FORCED CHILD LABOR: Zero. 2C) - 8. FORCED CHILD LABOR: Zero. 2C) - 9. FORCED CHILD LABOR: Zero. 2C) - 10. FORCED CHILD LABOR: N/A. 2C) - 11. FORCED CHILD LABOR: N/A. 2C) - 12. FORCED CHILD LABOR: N/A. 2C) - 13. FORCED CHILD LABOR: The Malian government has failed to adequately address forced child labor, in part because of its reluctance to admit the existence of hereditary slavery, and in part because it has focused on child labor in other areas. 2C) - 14. FORCED CHILD LABOR: The Malian government, through ILO, offers its inspectors the opportunity to attend numerous trainings. In 2009, there were 4 in-country trainings. In addition, inspectors are sent to CRADET, a training center in Cameroon for francophone labor inspectors, and the International Training Center in Turin, Italy. Ironically, these trainings have had a negative impact overall, because once trained, inspectors use their new qualifications to seek higher-paid work outside of the Ministry of Labor. One Embassy source indicated it was highly unusual for anyone returned from training at CRADET or in Italy to still be at the Ministry of Labor one year later. 2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT -- CHILD TRAFFICKING 2D) - 1. CHILD TRAFFICKING: The Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children, and the Family is charged with combating child trafficking, but shares enforcement responsibilities with the Ministry of Internal Security and the Ministry of Justice. There were no personnel dedicated exclusively to investigating child trafficking. 2D) - 2. CHILD TRAFFICKING: The amount of funding specifically earmarked for combating child trafficking was not made available to post, although the total budget for the BAMAKO 00000066 004 OF 006 Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children, and the Family was USD 7.6 million. The Ministry lacked resources to effectively investigate or respond to reports of child trafficking. In one case in December 2009, a trafficker was arrested in Nioro du Sahel, but the Ministry lacked cash on hand to provide transportation for the trafficked children back to their families in Kidal, and turned to NGOs and diplomatic missions to provide the transportation costs. 2D) - 3. CHILD TRAFFICKING: Mali does not have a mechanism for reporting child trafficking. However, the NGO Enda Tiers Monde has a network throughout the country and often substitutes for the Malian government in this regard. 2D) - 4. CHILD TRAFFICKING: On two occasions in 2009, the trafficker Sidamar Ag Cherif was taken into custody by Malian authorities in Nioro du Sahel with trafficked children in his possession. On each occasion, Ag Cherif was released with no reasonable explanation, aborting any "investigation" that might have begun. In addition, Malian authorities claimed to have arrested three traffickers in Sikasso, although there was no follow-up investigation. 2D) - 5. CHILD TRAFFICKING: A total of 24 children were rescued from Sidamar Ag Cherif on the two occasions that he was taken into custody in Nioro du Sahel. Those children were repatriated by the NGO Enda Tiers Monde. An unknown number of children were rescued from traffickers in the Sikasso incident, and were placed under the care of Save the Children. 2D) - 6. CHILD TRAFFICKING: Sidamar Ag Cherif was arrested and released on two occasions in 2009. Government authorities made no other arrests, and there were no prosecutions. 2D) - 7. CHILD TRAFFICKING: No cases were resolved. 2D) - 8. CHILD TRAFFICKING: No convictions were pronounced. 2D) - 9. CHILD TRAFFICKING: No sentences were handed out. 2D) - 10. CHILD TRAFFICKING: No sentences were imposed. 2D) - 11. CHILD TRAFFICKING: Child trafficking cases are not resolved. Historically, the trafficker is released and the affair is forgotten. 2D) --12. CHILD TRAFFICKING: The Malian government offered no such training, although NGOs have hosted awareness-raising workshops that government officials attended. 2D) - 13. CHILD TRAFFICKING: N/A. 2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT -- CSEC 2D) - 1. CSEC: The Morals Brigade of the National Police, housed within the Ministry of the Internal Security, has primary responsibility for protecting youth at risk of commercial sexual exploitation. 2D) - 2. CSEC: No budget figures for the Morals Brigade are available; however, the funding is not considered adequate, and the brigade is short of equipment and material to adequately perform the tasks assigned it. 2D) - 3. CSEC: Mali does not have a hotline or other mechanism specifically set up for reporting child trafficking or sexual exploitation. Complaints can be made in person or by telephone to local police. 2D) - 4. CSEC: One, conducted by the Ministry of Labor. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor discovered eight under-aged girls working as prostitutes in a Bamako restaurant/bar. The Morals Brigade of the National Police took into custody an unspecified number of child prostitutes at various times throughout 2009, but in all cases the children were released within a few hours with no further action taken by the Morals Brigade. 2D) - 5. CSEC: Eight. 2D) - 6. CSEC: The bar in Bamako was assessed a fine. 2D) - 7. CSEC: One. 2D) - 8. CSEC: The bar in Bamako was assessed a fine. Otherwise, zero. 2D) - 9. CSEC: N/A. 2D) - 10. CSEC: N/A. 2D) - 11. CSEC: There are no cases. 2D) - 12. CSEC: Unknown. 13. N/A. 2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT - USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES Note: Although it is possible that there are some children in Mali being used as couriers or runners for drug and arms traffickers, Post has never heard of any specific instance, and no NGO has raised the issue as one of exceptional concern. End note. 2D) - 1. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: Responsibility for combating the use of children in illicit activities would reside with the Judicial Investigation Police under the Ministry of Internal Security as part of their regular law enforcement functions. In the case of BAMAKO 00000066 005 OF 006 children working for drug traffickers, responsibility would reside within the Drug Brigade of the Judicial Investigation Police. 2D) - 2. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: The budget for the National Police and the Drug Brigade was not provided to post. However, it is known that the Malian police are underfunded. As of early 2009, the entire Drug Brigade employed only 24 officers to combat drug trafficking in a nation the size of Texas and California combined. 2D) - 3. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: Mali has no mechanism specifically set up for that purpose. Complaints can be made in person or by telephone to local police. 2D) - 4. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: No investigations were opened during the reporting period. 2D) - 5. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: Zero. 2D) - 6. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: Zero. 2D) - 7. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: Zero. 2D) - 8. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: Zero. 2D) - 9. N/A. 2D) - 10. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: N/A. 2D) - 11. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: There were no cases. 2D) - 12. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: The government offered no training specifically pertaining to the use of children in illicit activities. The government did offer general law enforcement training, and Malian police did participate in general law enforcement trainings offered by NGOs and international partners. 2D) - 13. USE OF CHILDREN IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES: N/A. 2E) GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR 2E) - 1. Yes. The Malian government is currently working on the fifth draft of a National Action Plan for the Elimination of Child Labor. It is expected to be finalized and validated in July, 2010. The National Action Plan will be built around the requirements of ILO Convetions 138 and 182. In sum, it divides proposed actions into three categories: a) prevention; b) rehabilitation; and c) law enforcement. Under prevention, the action plans anticipate efforts to raise awareness, particularly in rural locales, as to the hazards of child labor. Under rehabilitation, the plans call for providing support to those rescued from child labor, including immediate needs such as medical care but also long-term needs such as education. The Plans also have a law enforcement component, calling for application of laws already in place but currently unenforced. 2E) - 2. No. The projects dealing with child labor have been free-standing. 2E) - 3. Due to the overlap of responsibilities between ministries and the difficulty in obtaining accurate break-downs of individual ministry budgets, no specific figure can be given for the amount of money budgeted for combating child labor. Moreover, the National Action Plan does not call for specific funding authorizations. Rather, it defines the roles of the various ministries and expects funding for specific projects to come from ministry resources or international partners, such as the ILO. 2E) - 4. The Malian government has established a number of steering committees, commissions, and task forces to put the Action Plan into effect. As noted in Tasking 1F, this has resulted in the enumeration and publication in 2009 of a List of Worst Forms of Child Labor by the Ministry of Labor. 2E) - 5. N/A. 2E) - 6. Yes. The Malian government has established a number of commissions responsible for combating child labor, including commissions for the National Program Against Child Labor (PNLTE),the Project Against Child Trafficking (LUTRENA),the Support Project for TBP-Mali, and the Project Against Child Labor through Eduction (TACKLE). The Commissions have generally been ineffective, resulting in more reports and speeches than action on the ground. 2E) - 7. The government did not sign a bilateral, regional, or international agreements to combat trafficking during the reporting period. 2F) SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE CHILD LABOR: 2F) 1. In 2009, the Ministry of Labor enumerated a list of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. Also in 2009, the government collaborated with TBP-Mali, a DOL/ILO joint project that engaged in substantial efforts to raise awareness of child labor concerns in rural areas and provide a way out for children rescued from such labor. 2F) 2. No. 2F) 3. Funding for TBP-Mali came from DOL and ILO. 2F) 4. The Malian government has established a number of steering committees, commissions, and task forces to put the Action Plan into effect. 2F) 5. In general, the government relied upon NGOs and BAMAKO 00000066 006 OF 006 international partners to provide support to children once they had been rescued from exploitative situations. 2F) 6. The government did not sign any international agreements during the reporting period. 2G) CONTINUAL PROGRESS: 2G) -1. The Malian government is sincere in its desire to combat child labor, but lacks the resources to implement many of the "programs" and "plans" that its committees and commissions recommend. During the reporting period, Mali made a significant step by completing the enumeration of the List of the Worst Forms of Child Labor. While the government has not provided material support to NGOs and international partners, it has welcomed their efforts and cooperated to the extent its meager resources will allow. There is a noticeable hesitancy, however, to enforce the laws that already exist. There needs to be significantly greater effort to investigate and prosecute child trafficking and the exploitation of child labor. To date, these crimes continue to be committed with impunity. MILOVANOVIC

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