THE WAY FORWARD ON THE AL-MUTLAQ CONTROVERSY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000097

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: THE WAY FORWARD ON THE AL-MUTLAQ CONTROVERSY

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.



1. (C) Summary: The controversy that has erupted over the
possible barring of Sunni political leader Saleh al-Mutlaq
has highlighted some of the swirling political cross-currents
evident in the run-up to Iraqi elections in March. Few if
any contacts have anything good to say about Mutlaq but many
recognize the risks involved in disqualifying him and betting
that his political influence is relatively limited. The
pressure from the Mutlaq controversy has divided the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC),a generally
weak institution, whose commissioners are hand-picked by the
major party factions. While none of the contacts we have
spoken with believe that the controversy will end in a
political crisis and a Sunni boycott, we believe we must
remain vigilant to guard against this possibility. The key
element in the Embassy's strategy is to stay lashed tightly
with UNAMI on this issue, allowing SRSG Melkert and his staff
to take the lead in public. We do not believe that a public
statement would serve a useful purpose in this context.
Accusations of Baathist affiliation evoke intense emotions
and visceral political reaction in Iraq. A statement will
not calm those feelings and it will not provide support to
well-intentioned Iraqi politicians trying to navigate these
treacherous political currents and find a quiet way out. End
Summary.

GETTING A GOOD READ ON THE CONTROVERSY
--------------


2. (C) The controversy that has erupted over the possible
disqualification of Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq has
highlighted some of the treacherous political cross-currents
evident in the run-up to Iraqi elections in March. No one of
significance has come out strongly in defense of Mutlaq and
his crypto-Ba'athist politics. Even members of his Iraqiyya
coalition are reportedly nervously eyeing the political
exits, squirming as he calls on them to withdraw from the
campaign in solidarity if he is barred. Interestingly, they
have also been the most anxious for USG intervention.
Strongly anti-Ba'athist politicians like the PM seem to
welcome the decision by the Commission on Accountability and
Justice (AJC) (see septel for Ambassador's conversation with
al-Maliki). Even President Talabani, not known for extreme
views, is hard over on the Mutlaq case, insisting to the
Ambassador January 13 that "Mutlaq is 100 percent tied to the
Syrian Ba'ath Party and I have no sympathy for him. He has
no one to blame but himself," Talabani added, while insisting
that Mutlaq has legal recourse to an appeals procedure.
Deputy Speaker Attiyah also underscored that it is necessary
to let process play itself out in the proper administrative
and legal channels. Some contacts believe the effort to
disqualify Mutlaq originated with the Iranians.


3. (C) The pressure from the Mutlaq controversy has divided
the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC),a generally
weak institution, whose commissioners are hand-picked by the
major party factions. Contacts tell us that the
Shia-affiliated commissioners and at least one Sunni from the
Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) are strongly in favor of accepting
without question the AJC's findings of ineligibility
regarding Mutlaq and 15 political parties. No decision has
been taken at IHEC but its chairman Faraj al-Hadairy has told
poloffs that sentiment would likely prevail if he brings the
matter to a vote. Hadairy recognizes the dangers such a
decision could pose to the fragile preparations for the March
elections, and he is also aware, as are many of our contacts,
Qelections, and he is also aware, as are many of our contacts,
of the shoddy evidentiary and legal basis of the AJC's
decision. However, he insists he does not have the votes at
present to prevent the decision from being implemented.

THE WAY FORWARD
--------------


4. (C) The worst case scenario is that this political
controversy deteriorates into a larger political crisis and
eventually provokes a Sunni boycott of the elections. None
of the contacts that we have spoken to, including Talabani,
believe that such a scenario is likely. Nonetheless, we
believe we need to remain vigilant to guard against this
possibility. The Embassy will continue to weigh in with
Party leaders, as we have done since the controversy broke,
particularly with the Shia and the Kurds, urging them to
avoid taking or supporting precipitous action based on
short-term political calculations. We will also underscore
that there are distinct risks involved in putting to the test
the theory, advocated by Maliki and others, that Mutlaq lacks
the political influence to galvanize a national political
reaction or precipitate a political crisis.

QUIET INITIAL EFFORT AT THE COR TO REVERSE COURSE
-------------- --------------


5. (C) We have some preliminary indications that these
interventions are beginning to bear fruit. While all the
contacts we have spoken to have reiterated their abhorrence
of Baathism and their low regard for Mutlaq, some are
beginning to acknowledge the risks involved. Shia
independent Qasem Daoud, told Pol M/C January 13 that
although he finds Mutlaq's political views abhorrent, he sees
the need to reverse the disqualification, and noted that
there is a quiet but vigorous effort at the COR to defuse the
crisis. It is unclear if this effort, if it gathers
momentum, would take the form of attempting to reverse the
AJC disqualification determination or getting the word to
IHEC through party leaders that they should ignore the AJC
letters. This effort in the COR is being spearheaded by a
COR special committee recently formed to reviewed the AJC
decision. Most members have been drawn from COR committee
with oversight responsibilities for de-Ba'athification
matters. There is evidence that COR members behind the
scenes are troubled by the legal irregularities of the AJC
decision. Two COR committees have written separate letters
urging IHEC not to act on the AJC recommendation against
Mutlaq and 15 political parties.

STAYING LASHED TIGHTLY WITH UNAMI
--------------


6. (C) The key element in the Embassy's strategy is to stay
lashed tightly with UNAMI on this issue, allowing SRSG
Melkert and his staff to take the lead in public. The
Ambassador has discussed the issue at length with Melkert and
the Embassy's Political Section has been in close contact
with UNAMI counterparts since the controversy arose,
exchanging views on the dynamics at IHEC and on the most
effective strategies to address the issue in the COR.

PUSHING FOR A "VET THE WINNERS" POSTURE
--------------


7. (C) The Embassy, with UNAMI, will attempt to postpone any
IHEC decision, given the risks of a decision favoring
Mutlaq's expulsion. We will also support ideas endorsed by
UNAMI, including the possibility of provisional certification
of candidates at this time -- to facilitate ballot printing
and orderly electoral preparations -- while helping IHEC (and
the COR, if necessary) establish procedures to "vet the
winners" for Ba'athist affiliations (any winners found
subject to the strictures would not be seated; the next
highest vote-getter from the same coalition would be given
the seat). We (with UNAMI) believe the language of the Iraqi
Constitution and relevant Iraqi law (the 2008 law that
created the AJC) is flexible enough to permit such
procedures. (NOTE: We also need to ensure that IHEC does
not take action prematurely to remove the name of Mutlaq's
party from the ballot or his name from the official candidate
list, both of which will be printed in mass quantity within a
few weeks. END NOTE.)

AVOIDING PUBLIC STATEMENTS
--------------


8. (C) We do not believe that a public statement would serve
a useful purpose in this context. Accusations of Baathist
affiliation evoke intense emotions and visceral political
reaction in Iraq. A statement will not calm those feelings
and it will not provide support to well-intentioned Iraqi
politicians trying to navigate these treacherous political
currents and find a quiet way out that avoids a political
crisis but does not leave too much evidence of intervention.
This calls for behind-the-scenes but persistent political
efforts -- led by UNAMI and backed by the Embassy to the
hilt. A public statement could also provide fodder for the
Iranians and others to paint the U.S. as supporting a return
QIranians and others to paint the U.S. as supporting a return
to power by the Ba'athists, a powerful attack line that that
has been used effectively at certain junctures in the past.
In the end, Mutlaq may have to rely on the legal process of
appeals if this behind-the-scenes intervention by Iraqi
politicians -- with our and UNAMI's support -- does not
succeed. We need to intervene firmly but quietly to stop
this effort to bar Mutlaq, but recognize that we may need to
do some damage control it doesn't succeed.


HILL