PM ADVISOR CITES IMPACT OF BLACKWATER DECISION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000071 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC KJUS PREF IZ SUBJECT: PM ADVISOR CITES IMPACT OF BLACKWATER DECISION ON AMCIT CIVIL CLAIMS; CONSIDERS AL-MUTLAQ CONTROVERSY REF: A. 09 BAGHDAD 3367 ¶B. BAGHDAD 0053 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: PM Advisor Sadiq Rikabi told Pol M/C January 10 that the Blackwater decision would greatly complicate efforts to settle the Saddam-era civil claims of American citizens, and telegraphed that the GOI intended to use the decision as a lever in its bargaining on the level of compensation. Regarding Chapter VII, Rikabi said he would follow up with the MFA on USG-proposed options for getting the WMD-related resolutions lifted and committed to making another push to get the Council of Representatives to ratify the Additional Protocol. He expressed optimism that the oil-for-food contracts would be closed out within a few months. Regarding the reports that leading Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq could be barred from running for re-election to the Council of Representatives (COR) because of pro-Baathist sympathies, Rikabi insisted that "no one in the PM's office" or Da'wa was involved and suggested that the effort had been mounted by "cronies of Ahmed Chalabi" in an attempt to damage Mutlaq's political prospects. Rikabi spoke briefly about out-of-country voting and the possibility of getting GOI assistance for heating oil to poor refugees in Syria, before concluding the meeting with a complaint that al-Hurra in Iraq was communicating anti-Maliki messages. End Summary. BLACKWATER DECISION COMPLICATES AMCIT CLAIMS SETTLEMENT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Pol M/C briefed PM advisor Sadiq Rakabi January 10 on the Blackwater decision, highlighting the statement the Department issued January 6 and noting that the Department of Justice was carefully reviewing its options. Rikabi expressed appreciation for the briefing and added that "this has complicated settlement of the American citizens' claims. No one can go to Washington now and negotiate an agreement on these claims." He also said that "we will use this in our negotiations on compensations." Pol M/C underscored that such an approach would be ill-advised given that the cases were not alike, and further warned of the risks of heading down this road. "We understand no two cases are identical," responded Rikabi. WMD: ONE MORE PUSH FOR COR RATIFICATION? -------------- ¶3. (C) Moving on to Chapter VII issues, Rikabi told Pol M/C January 10 that he was unaware of the three USG-proposed options that the Iraqi MFA was considering, as possible avenues to help persuade the UNSC to lift the WMD-related resolutions (ref A). Rikabi committed to following up with MFA senior advisor Mohammed al-Haj Hamoud and to having the PM's office make another push to get the Council of Representatives (COR) to ratify the Additional Protocol. He agreed with Pol M/C that ratification would greatly facilitate lifting WMD-related UNSCRs. CLOSING OUT "OFF" CONTRACTS IN A FEW MONTHS -------------- ¶4. (C) Regarding the Oil-for-Food contracts, Rikabi said he had spoken to Dr. Abdul Basit Turki, head of the Iraqi Financial Control Office and suggested that office take over wrapping up these contracts for the GOI, instead of leaving individual ministries to address the relevant contracts. According to Rikabi, there was supposed to have been an inter-ministerial meeting the previous week to bless this course of action, but it had not been held. He expressed optimism that the oil-for-food contracts would be closed out Qoptimism that the oil-for-food contracts would be closed out within a few months. AL-MUTLAQ: A WELL-DESERVED BUT ILL-ADVISED HATCHET JOB? -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding the reports that leading Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq could be barred from running for re-election to the Council of Representatives (COR) because of pro-Baathist sympathies (ref B),Rikabi insisted that "no one in the PM's office and no one in Da'wa" was involved or had any right to be involved. Echoing other contacts, Rikabi questioned the legality of the procedures that had been used so far in generating the complaint against Mutlaq. Rikabi raised the possibility that the author of the complaint letter against Mutlaq, Faisal Ali al-Lami, whom he termed "a Sadrist" who was cooperating with Ahmed Chalabi, was really engaged in a political hatchet job and that the entire legal procedure they had cynically kick-started might choke off in a week or so, once the media coverage died down. On the legalities themselves, Rikabi questioned whether al-Lami and Chalabi had the authority to lodge a complaint with the electoral commission (IHEC) given that the COR had constituted a new de-Baathification commission to deal with these issues. The problem, noted Rikabi, was that the COR did not follow through and appoint members. This left a vacuum, which Chalabi and al-Lami were exploiting, for political ends, according to Rikabi. ¶6. (C) Rikabi made clear he was not defending Mutlaq, whom he characterized as a Baathist and said he had heard rumors of evidence that demonstrated Mutlaq's Baathist sympathies, including a pro-Baathist speech that he had delivered. The PM's advisor also made the broader point that Baathists were banned by the Constitution from participating in the political process and "we should not allow them to cover themselves with a sectarian banner," saying "we are Sunnis" or to pose as a tribal group, to skirt the Baathist prohibition in the Constitution. At one point, Rikabi insisted that the GOI knew that supporters in Iraq of Izzat a-Duri and Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmed, Iraqi Baathists in Damascus, had been told to vote for Mutlaq. (COMMENT: IHEC Chairman Faraj al-Haydari insisted to Pol M/C in a separate conversation afterwards that both major Shia coalitions strongly supported the effort to remove al-Mutlaq but party leaders were not being candid about their views on the issue in public or outside party circles. That support from the coalitions was making it extremely difficult for IHEC to question the legitimacy of the al-Lami letter or to refuse to remove al-Mutlaq. Details reported septel. END COMMENT.) OCV AND HEATING OIL -------------- ¶7. (C) Switching gears, Pol M/C highlighted the importance of out-of-country voting (OCV) in the upcoming March 7 elections and urged the PM to issue a statement underlining the importance that Iraqis resident outside Iraq participate fully. He mentioned White House advisor on Iraqi refugees Samantha Power and began to address the issue of heating oil for refugees in Syria. Rikabi interrupted Pol M/C and noted that he was briefed on the issue. Rikabi promised to follow up with the Minister of Oil and noted that the Minister offers similar assistance to some categories of Iraqis in Iraq. WHINING ABOUT AL-HURRA'S ANTI-MALIKI TONE -------------- ¶8. (C) Rikabi concluded the meeting by complaining to Pol M/C about what he identified as an anti-Maliki bias in the coverage and programming of al-Hurra in Iraq. This came out in a steady stream of programs that took an anti-government tone, a message that was intended and clearly understood by Iraqis, in an election season, as anti-Maliki in content. To illustrate, Rikabi mentioned a recent program highlighting an Iraqi school with disastrously bad services and facilities. He claimed the al-Hurra journalist interviewed a group of elementary school children who had allegedly been "coached" to make similarly critical remarks about the government. He said it was "not the kind of message" a small child would normally utter. According to Rikabi, one of the chief editors at al-Hurra was Ali Abdul Almeer, who was well-known in Baghdad as the former editor of a pro-Iyad Allawi newspaper and as an outspoken critic of the Maliki government. Rikabi acknowledged that there was significant press freedom in Iraq and lots of external influence being exerted, especially by the Saudis and the Iranians, on the media. The problem with letting such bias go unchallenged on Qmedia. The problem with letting such bias go unchallenged on al-Hurra, which is known to be operated "by the Americans," is that it conveys the perception that the USG "is against Maliki and in favor of this other group." Pol M/C took on board his criticisms and said he would advise Washington of his concerns. HILL