KRG OFFICIALS ON ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000064 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2030 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM USNC IZ SUBJECT: KRG OFFICIALS ON ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK REF: BAGHDAD 3229 Classified By: DCM Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with senior leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),the Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraqi (SANI) emphasized U.S. support for a negotiated, consensus-based solution to Kirkuk. SANI stressed to Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Speaker Kamal Kirkuki and Kurdistan Regional Government Deputy Prime Minister Azad Barwari that deliberate, careful consultations between all parties were needed to avoid exacerbating tensions in the disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) areas, including Kirkuk. Kirkuki, a hardliner, claimed the Kurds had compromised on the election law based on perceived promises in the POTUS/VPOTUS calls to KRG President Barzani and the White House statement of December 7. He insisted on implementing Article 140 in accordance with the Kurds' interpretation (a census followed by "up or down" referendum on Kirkuk), claimed any other approach would engender civil war and "another genocide" for Iraq's Kurds, and threatened to boycott the national elections. Barwari was more measured, saying he saw "nothing new" in the White House statement and that while the election law compromise was not ideal, it had allowed Iraq to move forward. Barwari expressed concern that mounting tension between the Kurdish PUK and Goran Movement parties could lead to political violence in the run-up to national elections. He also said the merger of KDP and PUK peshmerga elements was moving forward, and he offered that "unhealthy" U.S. policies in the region were such that Iran would continue to benefit as long as discussions over its nuclear program continued. Barwari denied that Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran aspire to a unified, independent Kurdish state, and cautioned that Iraq and other states with significant Kurdish populations needed to protect Kurds' rights. Kirkuki's hardline, emotional reaction to our view on Kirkuk -- especially the need for negotiated consensus as a precursor to any referendum under Article 140 -- highlights the difficulties in resolving Kirkuk's status through a negotiated process, instead of the less consensual approach favored by the KRG. END SUMMARY. SANI CLARIFIES U.S. POSITION ON ARTICLE 140 & KIRKUK -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq (SANI) met with the Speaker of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP),Kamal Kirkuki, on December 20 in Erbil. (Note: Kirkuki, a member of the KDP's politburo and a former peshmerga general, is a hardliner on Kurdish national interests, particularly Kirkuk. End note.) SANI conveyed reftel points, clarifying that U.S. support for implementation of Article 140 of Iraq's constitution envisions a referendum to confirm a negotiated, consensus-based resolution of Kirkuk's status (a "confirmatory referendum"),not/not an "up or down" referendum to decide among possible solutions for Kirkuk's status. He noted Ambassador Hill's experience in the Balkans, where several types of referenda -- including those to affirm consensus agreements -- contributed positively to the resolution of complex and difficult political situations. As the WH statement of December 7 made clear, the U.S. is ready to support the GOI's effort to conduct an accurate census as one element in support of future provincial and national elections. From the U.S. perspective, there was flexibility with respect to the timing and sequence of the Qflexibility with respect to the timing and sequence of the census, all-party negotiations, and a subsequent referendum to affirm a negotiated solution on Kirkuk. KIRKUKI REJECTS ALTERNATE APPROACHES -------------- ¶3. (C) Kirkuki pushed back strongly, claiming the U.S. committed in the POTUS/VPOTUS telcons with KRG President Barzani on December 6, and in the WH statement on December 7, to implement Article 140 according to the "normal" Kurdish intepretation, e.g., census followed by a straightforward referendum offering two options: Kirkuk Province either: A) becomes part of the KRG, or; B) becomes a regular province with no affiliation to the KRG. If the U.S. was not faithful to its original promise, he said, there would be "a crisis for the Kurds". He rejected "completely" that there could be any flexibility in applying Article 140, arguing that it clearly called for a census followed by a referendum on whether Kirkuk would become part of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). In a long, emotional presentation, Kirkuki conveyed the following points: - The KRG would reject any attempt to use Article 142 to amend Article 140. - KRG leaders were under heavy pressure to avoid concessions on Kirkuk. The Kurdish opposition (i.e., the Goran Movement) claimed the U.S. "deceived" KRG leaders into accepting an election law compromise unfavorable to Kurdish interests and that KRG leaders had "betrayed" the Kurdish people, limiting KRG leaders' room for maneuver. - It was unfair to expect the IKR's inhabitants to remain part of Iraq without having their constitutional rights (i.e., implementation of Article 140 according to the Kurdish formulation) protected. Kurds "would not understand this". - Claiming Kurds "had not had justice" in Iraq, Kirkuki alleged that former PM Allawi, former PM Jaafari and current PM Maliki had all promised to implement Article 140 (again, according to the "normal" Kurdish formulation),but none had done so. - Arabs were "extremists" who would exploit power to "slaughter" other groups. The U.S. was mistaken if it believed the Arabs would be "wiser now" with respect to the Kurds than in the past, when they had deployed chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians. - If Kirkuk's status was not resolved "according to Article 140 and the constitution" (i.e., the Kurdish formulation of normalization, census and up/down referendum, in that order), there would, "for sure", with 100 percent certainty be a civil war. - If Article 140 and the constitution are not implemented, there will be "another Kurdish genocide" after the drawdown of U.S. forces, which KRG leaders cannot permit. - In a Kurdish language aside to his assistant, Kirkuki said that if the SANI's message accurately reflected U.S. policy, KRG leaders should instruct Kurds to boycott the March 2010 national elections. ¶4. (C) Pushing back, SANI stressed that the POTUS/VPOTUS calls to Barzani reflected the U.S. commitment to its friendship with the KRG and the Kurdish people. Even after the withdrawal of its forces, the diplomatic and political efforts of the U.S. would continue. It was important to make progress in the coming period on Kirkuk and other problems in the disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas. U.S. leaders understand Kirkuk is a complicated issue, but a civil war would hurt Kurdish interests, undo the IKR's achievements and jeopardize Iraq's unity. SANI asked for commitment to a step-by-step process that would allow all parties to proceed in a deliberate, careful manner. The U.S. view was that such a process should comprise the following elements: 1) holding on-time national elections; 2) conducting, with U.S. support, a census in 2010, and; 3) negotiating a consensus-based agreement on Kirkuk's status. He urged continued close consultation between KRG and U.S. leaders, aimed at preserving Kurdish rights and Kurdish achievements within a unified Iraq. ¶5. (C) Saying the U.S. views resembled those of UNAMI, which employed many Arabs and was "biased against the Kurds", Kirkuki asked whether SANI's message represented the view of the Embassy and UN, or also that of the White House. Noting he had been at the White House on the day Iraq's election law was adopted and the December 7 WH statement had been drafted, SANI assured Kirkuki that he conveyed a unified U.S. position. The U.S. closely consulted with UNAMI and viewed it as neutral. Iraqi unity was an overarching priority; there should be a constructive solution for Kirkuk that strengthened the Iraqi nation. Building a stronger, more autonomous KRG with an eye toward independence was dangerous. Claiming that Arabs interpreted "a strong Iraq" to mean a Q Claiming that Arabs interpreted "a strong Iraq" to mean a well-armed, centralized government, Kirkuki stressed that unless the DIBs were resolved before the U.S. drawdown, there would be "a valley of problems". He urged SANI to focus on implementing Article 140 (in accordance with the KRG's formulation) and to refrain from any further discussion of a negotiated, consensus-based agreement on Kirkuk's status. PESHMERGA MERGER -------------- ¶6. (C) Kirkuki confirmed media reports that there had been progress in merging the KDP and PUK-affiliated wings of the peshmerga. Barzani had issued instructions that the peshmerga, which previously had separate KDP and PUK-affiliated headquarters in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah, respectively, should be integrated into a single entity with a shared command structure and operating protocols. The budget for the peshmerga would eventually come from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. (Note: Media reports claimed that during his recent visit to Baghdad, KRG DPM Barham Salih discussed with PM Maliki the status of the peshmerga merger. There are unconfirmed reports that Maliki will soon travel to Erbil to meet with Barzani and sign an agreement for the eventual integration of the merged peshmerga into the Iraqi Army (IA). End note.) KRG DPM BARWARI LESS STRIDENT ON KIRKUK -------------- ¶7. (C) In a subsequent meeting on December 26, KRG Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Azad Barwari was more measured in his analysis of the POTUS/VPOTUS calls with Barzani and the December 7 WH statement. (Note: Barwari is a senior member of the KDP's politburo; it is widely reported that Barzani installed him as DPM to closely watch KRG Prime Minister (PM) Barham Salih, a PUK member. End note.) On the statement, Barwari said he "saw no problems with it" and nothing in it that represented new U.S. policy. The election law compromise was not ideal, but it was a solution that allowed the country needed to move forward. He anticipated problems registering out-of-country voters (OCVs),and urged that an accurate national census be conducted in accordance with the December 7 WH statement to mitigate demographic questions and facilitate future elections. IRAN WINS AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE -------------- ¶8. (C) Responding to SANI's observation that KRG PM Salih was visiting the "Iranian brothers" in Tehran, Barwari carefully noted they were "not brothers, but cousins". (Note: A reference to President Talabani's familiar dictum that the Kurds can choose their friends (e.g., the U.S.),but cannot choose their neighbors any more than a person can choose the members of his/her family. End note.) Referring to the recent takeover by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) troops of an oil well in the al-Fakkah field on the Iraq-Iran border, Barwari said if he had been in Salih's place, he would have postponed visiting Tehran. He lamented the "bad timing" of dissident Iranian cleric Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri's death, saying it could hurt efforts to moderate Iran's behavior. Noting Montazeri's criticism of Iran's nuclear ambitions and its defiance of the international community, Barwari claimed that "Iran never won in a war, but it wins by politics". The Iranian account was "complicated", but U.S. policy in the region - characterized by contentious issues like Pakistan, Yemen's Houthi rebellion and Iraq - was "unhealthy" and ultimately benefited Iran. For its part, Iran was unclear about its policy goals and pursued maximalist negotiating positions, which was unhelpful. On balance, as long as discussions with the international community continued, Iran won. KDP FEARS VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN GORAN AND PUK -------------- -- ¶9. (C) On upcoming national elections, Barwari said delaying polling until March, when better weather was expected, would facilitate greater turnout in the IKR. Conceding that the open list system would change electoral dynamics, he said Kurdish parties, accustomed to party lists and strict voter discipline, were working to adjust. KDP leaders "feared" competition between the PUK and Goran ("Change") Movement in Sulaimaniyah. It was not important which of the parties prevailed, but that they did not destroy the political system in the process by fomenting political violence. There was "no evidence" that either party had planned such provocations; however, based on past experience, Barwari Qprovocations; however, based on past experience, Barwari predicted violent clashes between the PUK and Goran in the run-up to the March elections. He characterized Goran's candidates as being "slightly more confident" than the PUK's, but said the PUK also believed it would do well. (Comment: It is clear the KDP is not entirely comfortable with Goran's threat to the traditional bipolar KDP/PUK order; Barwari's remark about PUK candidates' confidence may have represented a triumph of hope over analysis. End comment.) PESHMERGA MERGER A "VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT" -------------- - ¶10. (C) Barwari characterized progress on merging KDP and PUK peshmerga elements as a "very positive development". According to Barwari, USF-I CG Odierno had visited the IKR several times to discuss the effort and there was a good plan, captured in a draft law, to implement the merger. The IKP's Council of Ministers needed to approve the draft law, which also addressed the proposed merger of KDP and PUK Assayesh elements. It would then go to the full IKP for approval. It would be problematic if the peshmerga remained divided into politically-affiliated camps; the merger would mitigate the potential for political violence in the IKR. The SANI asked about reports that PM Maliki would soon visit Erbil to follow up on recent meetings in Baghdad with KRG PM Salih and, according to press reports, sign agreements related to the eventual integration of the peshmerga into the IA. Barwari claimed to have no knowledge of dates, but noted that it would be "natural" for Maliki to visit since the IKR was part of Iraq and therefore fell within his bailiwick. NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE AND KURDISH ASPIRATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Barwari questioned whether the IA's capacity and authority were equal to the challenge of implementing the joint security architecture in the DIBs areas. Kurdish forces would help lend capability to those forces within the context of the joint checkpoints and joint patrols. The IKR was part of Iraq, but Arab Iraqis claimed the Kurds were working to achieve independence. The IKR needed to be a "real partner" in Iraq; it would be helpful for the Iraqi national parliament to clarify the interpretation of key dispute articles of the constitution to reduce friction between the IKR and the rest of the country. Agreement on those interpretations should be achieved through democratic consensus, not by the dictates of the majority. ¶12. (C) Acknowledging sectarian and ethnic tensions, Barwari stressed that Iraq needed to move beyond those. Noting that there would always be problems if Kurds' constitutional rights were denied, Barwari stressed that Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran did not/not aspire to a unified, independent Kurdish state. The prevailing political culture in the states with significant Kurdish populations was such that they wanted to contain what they perceived as a Kurdish threat to their territorial integrity. It was therefore incumbent on the Kurds to be mindful of the perceived threat they posed and be "a bit patient" in their demands. Noting that one of the only points of agreement between those states was a desire to oppress the Kurds, Barwari expressed hope that the issue of Kurdish rights could be successfully resolved as it had been in Iraq. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: The difference in Kirkuki and Barwari's tone in discussing implementation of Article 140 underscores that views within the KRG are not homogeneous. That said, Kirkuk remains a highly emotive issue and the KRG's moderates feel constrained in their ability to advocate for less contentious approaches. Kirkuki's emotional reaction to the U.S. position on Kirkuk highlights the difficulties we will surely face when the time comes to press in earnest for resolving Kirkuk's status through a negotiated, consensual process, instead of the up-or-down, instant decision by referendum approach that has become the default position of the KRG. More sophisticated Kurdish interlocutors, such as Barzani chief of staff Fuad Hussein, readily acknowledge the need for a negotiating process with Arab, Turkoman and other minority communities as part of the any "settlement" of Kirkuk (details septel). We will need to promote a negotiated, consensus-based approach in our discussions with KRG leaders in the months ahead to prepare the ground for an eventual diplomatic push to resolve Kirkuk's status. HILL