COALITION PROFILE: COALITION FOR IRAQ'S UNITY

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000501 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020 TAGS: IZ KDEM PGOV SUBJECT: COALITION PROFILE: COALITION FOR IRAQ'S UNITY Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1.(C)SUMMARY: Led by Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani, members of the Coalition of Iraq's Unity (CIU) purportedly share a secular-nationalist vision for Iraq and favor a U.S.-style government. (Note: The coalition is also known as the Iraq Unity Alliance (IUA). End Note.) Although Bolani is Shi,a, most of the coalition's leadership and candidates are Sunni. Along with Iyad Allawi's Iraqiyya coalition, Bolani's group was hardest hit by the recent de-Ba'athification purge, losing 67 of its candidates. Electoral strengths include Bolani's name recognition and support among Iraqi security forces. Coalition members may also appeal to voters as "outsiders" who present a fresh political alternative and do not share blame for past governmental failures. However, the CIU lacks internal cohesion and is lagging sharply behind other coalitions in the polls; its foremost Sunni name, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, may not enjoy much support outside Anbar province. These weaknesses taken together indicate the CIU is unlikely to capture a significant number of seats in the next parliament. END SUMMARY. MAJOR PLAYERS -------------- 2.(C) The major personalities and parties in the CIU all claim to subscribe, to varying degrees, to a secular-nationalist vision for Iraq. Alongside a smattering of nearly 30 smaller entities, the major players in the coalition are: -- Jawad al-Bolani, Constitutional Party: Since assuming leadership of the Interior Ministry in 2006, Bolani has gained national recognition for his leadership of successful counterinsurgency efforts (particularly in Basra and Mosul). He is widely perceived as a moderate, secular Shi,a who has reached out to Sunnis and integrated them into sensitive security jobs. The charismatic Bolani has attempted to promote a non-sectarian Iraqi national identity, and has made efforts to tackle corruption and increase respect for human rights as Interior Minister. While at one time an ally of PM Maliki, Bolani drew the PM's ire when he formed his Constitutional Party (CP) and set his sights on Maliki's job. Maliki reportedly wanted to sack Bolani after the August 2009 terrorist bombings in Baghdad, but lacked sufficient political support to accomplish this; Maliki may yet seek to remove Bolani. -- Ahmed al-Rishawi (Abu Risha),Anbar Awakening Council: 
Abu Risha is the leader of the tribal Awakening Movement (Sahwa) in Anbar province. His relationship with the U.S. military and influence as the Sahwa head saw him emerge as a "kingmaker" in local Anbari politics, but Abu Risha has been frustrated in his attempt to make the jump from the local to national political stage. Moreover, although he retains significant influence in Anbar, that could wane with the continuing withdrawal of U.S. troops from the province. Other Anbar sheikhs have doubted his claim to be a paramount tribal leader. Despite his frequent appearances in Western media, Abu Risha appears to enjoy only limited appeal outside his home province. -- Abdel Ghafour al-Samarrai'e, Iraq Charter Assembly: Samarrai'e heads the Sunni Endowment or "Waqf" responsible for the property and funds of Iraq's Sunni religious community. He gained national prominence under the previous regime when his Friday sermons calling for tolerance and non-sectarianism often appeared live on national television. Post-2003, Samarrai'e was a strong supporter of the Sahwa forces in Baghdad's Adhamiya neighborhood. Samarrai'e is Qforces in Baghdad's Adhamiya neighborhood. Samarrai'e is running as the independent head of his own political party and does not claim to represent the Sunni Endowment on a political level, but many of its employees may support his political agenda. -- (S/NF) Tariq al-Halbusi, My Homeland Iraq: Halbusi's status as a paramount Anbari sheikh, his personal wealth, and his wide-ranging business and political connections make him a potentially valuable addition to the Bolani coalition. Yet it is doubtful whether his wealth and ties translate into appeal at the popular level. U.S. military sources indicate that Halbusi amassed his considerable fortune through close relations with Saddam's regime, including a friendship and business partnership with Udai Hussein. He reportedly enjoys a good working relationship with Prime Minister Maliki and Kurdish leaders. (Note: Halbusi's close ties to Maliki may have helped prevent his inclusion in de-Ba'athification lists. End Note.) -- Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, Iraqi National Trend: Mashhadani was the controversial Speaker of parliament from 2006 until political opponents engineered his dismissal in late 2008. Although a Salafi Sunni, he is politically pragmatic enough to preside over a mixed Sunni-Shi,a party and participate in Bolani's coalition. The erratic Mashhadani tries to portray himself as a national-level leader who can muster Sunni consensus. His limited popularity and weak support base will prevent his party within the CIU from capturing more than a parliamentary seat or two. (Note: Mashhadani's campaign posters use the slogan, "Moderation, Transparency, Truth and Courage." End Note.) POLITICAL PLATFORM -------------- 3.(U) The CIU's website (Arabic only -- http://iraqunity.com/ent/political/php) presents the party's secular-nationalist bent and a vision for a constitutionally based political system that transcends sectarian or ethnic affiliations and is capable of delivering services to the average Iraqi. The CIU proclaims that it values a government that sounds very similar to that of the United States: three equal branches of government; a free press as a "fourth" power; equal rights for women and an emphasis on stopping domestic violence against them; care for the handicapped; partnership with international institutions; and a move towards a free market economy. On the campaign trail, coalition candidates claim they will help ensure the following "rights" for Iraqis: security, jobs, a place to live, health care, and education. 4.(U) According to its website and a recent media appearance by Bolani on "Iraqiyya" television, the coalition is satisfied with the implementation of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. In conjunction with the U.S. troop withdrawal, the CIU calls for the development of a strong Iraqi army that is capable of defending itself and guaranteeing its independence. ELECTORAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES -------------- 5.(C) Bolani's name recognition and relative popularity is one of the CIU's most important assets. His reputation has held up reasonably well despite the high-profile terrorist attacks in Baghdad in late 2009. As a relatively new entity, the CIU also holds some appeal as an alternative to Islamist parties that have failed to deliver services to the Iraqi public. Its emphasis on non-sectarianism likely plays well with nationalist and secular voters. Moreover, as Interior Minister, Bolani could potentially bring along the votes of Iraq's numerous security force members. 6.(S/NF) The CIU's major liability is its lack of cohesion and its internal squabbling. Mashhadani, for example, has told us that he considers Bolani to be a weak candidate. U.S. military sources indicate that Halbusi and Abu Risha had a personal falling out in September 2008 and have not gotten along since. Contacts have also told us that Abu Risha may have all but withdrawn from the coalition, although his party remains on the slate. Furthermore, the CIU is having a hard time articulating a message that is distinctive from its more well-known and prominent secular nationalist rival, the Iraqiyya coalition. Held together less by a common political vision than by a shared sense of political pragmatism, the coalition is unlikely to stay intact during post-election government formation negotiations. (Note: Along with Iraqiyya, the CIU was hard hit by the purge of allegedly Ba'athist candidates from election ballots. Sixty-seven of its candidates appeared on the disqualification lists. End Note.) ELECTIONS FORECAST QELECTIONS FORECAST -------------- 7.(C) Bolani's coalition is doing poorly in polls. The latest polling by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) shows the CIU would likely garner only two percent of national votes in the upcoming elections. None of the CIU's candidates rank among the top three most popular Iraqi politicians, and the coalition as a group does not register among the most popular blocs. Some observers claim that the polls understate Bolani,s support, as potentially many thousands of Interior Ministry employees, most notably the police who are not canvassed in such polls, could vote for the CIU. However, Bolani's Constitutional Party, even with the votes of MOI supporters, did not fare well in the January 2009 provincial elections, winning only three provincial council seats in Wasit province. Based on the considerations outlined above, we expect the CIU to gain 6-12 parliamentary seats in the next government. 8.(C) Bolani's personal rivalry with PM Maliki, and to a lesser extent with Iyad Allawi, along with the CIU's weak internal cohesion and limited electoral prospects will severely handicap the coalition's influence in the government formation process. A CIU-Iraqiyya alliance would make sense given their shared secular-nationalist agenda, but past merger discussions between the two groups did not bear fruit. The INA and its Islamist cohorts, meanwhile, are opposed to Bolani's political agenda; the Sadrists especially distrust him for allegedly re-integrating former regime elements into the security services. If the CIU splinters in the post-elections period, which is very possible, Bolani and the CP may ally with parties at odds with his former partners. Some CIU leaders like Mashhadani appear to have no overriding objections to Maliki and may see it in their political interest to join with him. HILL