DETAINEE RELEASES AND TARGETING APPROVAL CHANGES

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000500 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS PTER IZ SUBJECT: DETAINEE RELEASES AND TARGETING APPROVAL CHANGES ROUND OUT MAYSAN OPERATION FALLOUT REF: A. BAGHDAD 405 ¶B. BAGHDAD 426 ¶C. BAGHDAD 378 ¶D. TD-314/013127-10 Classified By: DCM, Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: U.S. forces transferred thirteen detainees captured in Maysan in a joint U.S.-Iraqi operation in accordance with demands by the PM and terms of the Security Agreement. After an initial transfer of nine of the detainees, the Prime Minister ordered high value target special operations to cease until the remaining four had been transferred. The GOI released the initial group of nine detainees upon transfer from U.S. custody, to the surprise of the Maysan Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) sMG Sa'ad, who is currently acting commander of the Maysan Operation Center (MOC). The Iraqi Operational Coordination Group (IOCG), which coordinates high value targets, received orders on February 21 to "get back to work." The group works directly with U.S. SOF elements in coordinating joint U.S.-Iraqi operations against specific targets. General Abud, former commander of the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) and current Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, has taken the place of Military Intelligence (M2) head sMG Ala'a in targeting approval. USF-I also received word that despite past U.S. efforts to retain sMG Ala'a, he had been ordered to vacate his post within 48 hours by Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) General Farouq (on behalf of the Prime Minister). sMG Ala'a raised concerns about the PM's manipulation of the M2 along sectarian lines, but requested the U.S. not seek his retention so that he could retain his current housing privileges in his reassignment. A recent transfer order of 17 Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) officers has also raised concerns about the PM's involvement in the intelligence services. The transfer and release of the detainees, while disappointing, must be balanced against the need to protect a valuable joint SOF capability to target AQI on the eve of elections. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶2. (S/NF) In accordance with the PM's express conditions for considering a return to normal SOF high value target clearance procedures, USF-I transferred to the GOI the last four of the Katib Hezbollah (KH) Maysan detainees on February 19 after transferring nine the previous night. The detainees were arrested in accordance with Operation Steel Curtain (ref A). USF-I received word that the GOI released the initial nine prisoners on February 20 to the surprise of USF-I and the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) sMG Sa'ad. sMG Sa'ad is also serving as the acting Maysan Operations Center (MOC) commander during the absence of the commander, sMG Habib of the 10th IA, who is out due to medical problems. (NOTE AND COMMENT: In a late breaking development, sMG Sa'ad was informed on February 23 that he was being removed from office as a result of pressure from the Maysan PC Chairman, who has links to KH, according to USF-I. The Maysan PC Chairman (ISCI) has apparently secured approval from the PM for sMG Sa'ad's removal. The PC Chairman has tried to get sMG Sa'ad removed before, but the decision was overruled by the PM on previous efforts. Sensing an opportunity in the aftermath of Operation Steel Curtain, the PC Chairman gave the PM a choice QOperation Steel Curtain, the PC Chairman gave the PM a choice to retain either the Governor (a Da'wa party member) or sMG Sa'ad, and the PM chose the Governor. Having both MOC commanders out in the weeks before the elections likely will pose security/political coordination challenges. END NOTE AND COMMENT.) ¶3. (S/NF) After the detainee release, the IOCG received orders to "go back to work" on February 21. General Abud, former BOC commander and current Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS OPS),has replaced Military Intelligence (M2) director sMG Ala'a as approver for targeting operations. USF-I will familiarize General Abud in order to familiarize General Abud with the IOCG process and its relations with U.S. SOF elements. USF-I will also increase coordination with the MOD's Joint Operations Center to support 24/7 operations. During discussions to get operations back on track with the IOCG after the recent PM orders (ref B),the GOI reiterated to USF-I that operations against sensitive targets must be Iraqi led - meaning that the missions would be U.S. command and controlled, logistically supported, etc., but that "Iraqi led" meant that the Iraqis would make first contact. General Farouq of OCINC and General Abud also said that the balance of forces needed to be better weighted toward the Iraqi side and that the more important the target, the more balanced the force should be. They acknowledged that the U.S. had to have heavy involvement in a support and enabler capacity. ¶4. (S/NF) sMG Ala,a,s reprieve to remain the M2 was short lived (ref C). He informed USF-I contacts on February 20 that General Farouq passed orders from the PM that he was to transfer to another position within 2 days. Though direct USF-I involvement granted sMG Ala,a a reprieve last week, he has asked that the U.S. not get involved again due to the effect it may have on any future assignment. It is unclear if MG Hatim Jabar Al-Maksusi of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI),who was previously named as his replacement last week, will in fact assume the position. sMG Ala,a opined that the PM,s goal is to increase the Shi'a dominance of the M2, which of its 132 officers, 78% are Shi'a (including new officers). Recent reporting has also highlighted the PM's attempts to transfer 17 senior Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) to other non-intelligence Ministries (such as Oil or Youth and Sports). All 17 of the officers were Sunni and had worked for Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) under the former regime. Other INIS officers with IIS experience who are Shi'a were noticeably missing from the PM's list. Senior INIS officials have expressed concern that INIS would lose some of its strongest and most experienced officers (ref D). ¶5. (S/NF) COMMENT: After the events of Operation Steel Curtain were publicized in the press, the PM asked for the Maysan detainees in our continuing custody be transferred to the GOI. The transfer of the detainees, at least nine of which have been confirmed released since transfer, must be balanced with the need to preserve, through SOF cooperation, the ability to maintain pressure on AQI and Shi'a extremists - especially to deny them the initiative in counter-election operations. Once the PM demanded the transfer of the detainees in accordance with the Security Agreement and threatened to cancel all high value SOF cooperation activities, USF-I weighed the loss of the detainees versus the loss of SOF cooperation and handed over the KH prisoners. This is disappointing, and it appears that more dialogue will be required to get the IOCG and ISF to resume full joint operations against CT targets. END COMMENT. HILL